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THE VIENNESE LIBERALS OF 1848 AND THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM[1]

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THE Austrian revolution of 1848 was a middle class liberal and nationalist revolution. When the revolution began in March, the hopes and aspirations of the bourgeoisie and their well-wishers among the nobility, workers, and peasants were centered around liberalism and nationalism. Except in Hungary and perhaps in Italy, by November only a small number of extremists were still convinced liberals.

The trouble was that liberalism and nationalism denoted too many things to too many people. In March liberalism meant freedom of the press, speech, education, and trade, equality before the law, the establishment of a citizens' militia, limited rights of provincial self-administration through the traditional Estates, and a united diet, comprised of representatives from the provincial Estates, to advise the Emperor on legislative matters, approve taxes, and control the financial administration of the monarchy.[2] As the revolution progressed, the extremists, particularly in Vienna, spared no efforts to turn this limited liberal idea into a democratic one, in the hope that they could share the fruits of the revolution. As a result, they aroused in the more moderate of the March revolutionists a terrifying fear of the possibility of a "red" republic and inevitable anarchy. Beginning in late May, after the Emperor fled from Vienna to Innsbruck, in ever increasing numbers the more prosperous and "respectable" bourgeoisie in Vienna and in the provinces, alarmed by the excesses of the extremists during the preceding two months, deserted the popular cause for the counterrevolution. With the defection of the more moderate bourgeoisie, the "democrats" in Vienna fell ready prey to Windischgrätz's besieging army.[3]

[1]A summary of this paper was read at the annual convention of the Southern Historical Association at Columbia, S. C., on November 12, 1954.

[2]See especially the proclamation and program of "the party of progress," March 4, 1848, Reschauer, Heinrich, and Moritz Smets, *Das Jahr 1848. Geschichte der Wiener Revolution* (2 vols., Vienna: Waldheim, 1872), I, 123-27; memorandum of thirty-three liberal members of the Lower Austrian Estates, March 3, 1848, *ibid.*, 131-32; citizens' petition to the Estates of Lower Austria, Vienna, March 1, 1848, *Oesterreichisch-kaiserlich-privilegirte Wiener-Zeitung*, No. 78 (March 18, 1848), 351; and students' petition to the Emperor, signed on March 12, 1848, *ibid.*, No. 80 (March 20, 1848), 361.

Thus, Viennese democracy was destroyed, in part, because by October many of the revolutionary leaders of March had come to believe that the hated officials of the pre-1848 régime were veritable angels in comparison with the satanical republicans in control of the government in the Habsburg capital. Also, the Austrian revolution of 1848 failed because the subject nationalities in the empire were imbued with political aspirations which differed markedly from those of the Germans in Vienna and the areas surrounding it. To the non-Germans liberalism meant liberal nationalism: complete liberty for all peoples in the monarchy to decide their own political future. To the Austro-Germans national self-determination was a prerogative reserved for the superior Teutons. Whereas they loudly defended their own right to unite with a Greater Germany, most Austro-Germans shook their heads with indignation when the Slav nations of the Austrian monarchy likewise expressed a yearning to settle their own destiny. This uncompromising refusal of the Austro-Germans to surrender their age-old overlordship over the Slavs partly explains why the Habsburg court was able to make use of the South Slav army under Jelačić and Windischgrätz's troops, stationed in Bohemia, to besiege and capture rebellious Vienna in October, 1848.

Ever since the days of Maria Theresa and Joseph II German had been the official language of the monarchy and Habsburg interests had been identified with those of the Germans.[4] With the rise of a cultural nationalist movement among the non-German nationalities, which gradually transformed into a political movement among the Hungarians, Italians, Czechs, and Poles during the years preceding 1848, German supremacy was clearly challenged.

In the 1840's a few Austro-German liberals clearly saw and deplored the growing alienation of the subject nationalities from the Habsburg government,[5] but they closed their eyes to the fact that the Germans would voluntarily have to extend to all the peoples in the empire a large measure of autonomy if they wished to allay the growing national disaffection. To quiet the increasing discontent the liberal opponents of the régime advocated such wholly liberal, and not nationalist, concessions as granting limit-

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[3]I have discussed the estrangement of the moderates from the Viennese revolution in my articles on "Public Opinion during the Viennese Revolution of 1848," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* VIII, No. 2 (July, 1948), 160-80; and "The Failure of an Ideal: the Viennese Revolution of 1848," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,* September, 1953, 3-20.

[4]For a good discussion of the impact of Joseph II's reforms on the nineteenth century nationality problem in the Habsburg empire, see Kann, Robert A., *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918* (2 vols., New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), I, 52-8. For an interesting Communist evaluation, see Fischer, Ernst, *Österreich 1848: Probleme der demokratischen Revolution in Oesterreich* (Vienna: Stern-Verlag, 1946), 122-27.

[5]See especially [Andrian-Werburg, Victor von,] *Oesterreich und dessen Zukunft,* Pt. I (3rd ed., Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1843), 23-4; Schuselka, Franz, *Oesterreichische Vor- und Rückschritte* (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe, 1847), 229; [Schuselka, Franz,] *Deutsche Worte eines Oesterreichers* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1843), 203; and [Moering, Karl,] *Sibyllinischen Bücher aus Oesterreich* (2 vols., Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1847), *passim.*

ed administrative and financial responsibilities to the communes and to the provincial Estates[6] or turning the government into a democratic monarchy.[7] Of the numerous Austro-German littérateurs who in the 1840's criticized the shortcomings of the Habsburg régime Karl Moering alone foresaw that the granting of "liberal" rights of self-government would eventually result in the establishment of "the national principle."[8] And just one writer recognized that "the basis, the guarantee, for national unity in the Austrian Empire" could be found only "in the free development" of the "Austrian nationalities."[9]

Not a single German pre-March liberal was willing for the Germans to renounce their monopoly of the cultural and political life of the Habsburg empire. Although here and there a violent antagonist of the régime expressed a word or two of sympathy for the non-German nationalities[10] or openly demonstrated his delight that the nationalist agitation was causing embarrassment to the unpopular Metternich government, the Austro-Germans, on the whole, were indifferent to the nationalist movement among the subject peoples[11] or they were downright contemptuous of the presumptuous claims of the "lesser peoples" in the empire for more privileges.[12] Almost to a man they were convinced that if Austria "gives up its German soul, the body will fall to pieces."[13]

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[6]Baron Victor von Andrian-Werburg made this recommendation in his *Oesterreich und dessen Zukunft*, Pt. II (1st ed., Hamburg: Ludwig Giese, 1847), 190-95.

[7]As the radical middle class spokesman, Franz Schuselka, did in his *Deutsche Worte eines Oesterreichers*, 138-39; and Karl Moering, the captain in the Habsburg army who instructed Archduke Rainer's children in mathematics and military tactics, did in his *Sibyllinischer Bücher, passim.*

[8]See Kann, *Multinational Empire*, I, 61.

[9]The anonymous author of *Vier Fragen eines Österreichers*, published in Leipzig in 1844. The above citation is to Kann, *Multinational Empire*, I, 67.

[10]Schuselka, *Oesterreichische Vor- und Rückschritte*, 229.

[11]Bodenstedt, Friedrich Martin von, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben* (2 vols., Berlin: Allgemeiner Verein für Deutsche Literatur, 1888-90), I, 414.

[12]Although the following statement, lifted out of context from Franz Schuselka's *Deutsche Worte eines Oesterreichers*, 203-4, perhaps does not give an accurate impression of Schuselka's real opinions about the Slavs, it well expresses the views of many of the more nationalistic Austro-German liberals: "The Slavic nationality is fighting for consciousness and recognition and freedom and power. It is a real misfortune for them, however, that after hundreds of years of passiveness their first manifestations of life are for the most part negative. The Slavs are suddenly thinking of what they could already be and what they should be, but because of their shame and irritation over the fact that they are still not that, they have forgotten whose fault it is. 'You have suppressed us,' they are shouting to us Germans. But when a nation of almost 80 million lets itself be suppressed is this not proof of an evident lack of vitality, character, and the capability of being cultured? And this suppression took place only among some of the advanced Slavic tribes who ceased to be Slavs and became German. The Slavs themselves are to be blamed for the fact that, as a nation and as separate independent tribes, they have remained so far behind all other European peoples. It is because of the basic nature of their character. No middle class life has appeared among them, and when this does not exist there can be no talk of a national culture. The fact that wherever the Slavs have ruled and still rule there were only nobles and servants—and essentially this is still true today—and the fact that the nobles always had a foreign education, while the servile and enslaved masses always remained stupid and in the same old frame of mind—these alone are to be blamed for the fact that up to now no actual Slavic culture, no Slavic learning, and no halfway significant Slavic literature have been developed. The fact that the Slavs now earnestly

In the spring of 1848, when German supremacy in the Habsburg monarchy was seriously threatened, the Austro-Germans were rudely jolted out of their complacent unconcern over the claims of the subject nationalities for political rights. In Vienna the liberals revolted on March 13-15, forcing the Emperor to dismiss Metternich, establish freedom of the press and a National Guard, and promise to grant a "liberal" constitution to his subjects. In Italy the report of the Viennese insurrection produced bloody fighting on March 18 between the Milanese and Marshal Radetzky's soldiers, as a consequence of which the Austrians were compelled five days later to retreat through Lombardy to the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. On March 22 Venetian liberals forced the Habsburg troops to leave their island city. The next day the king of Sardinia declared war on the Austrians. The Hungarians induced Emperor Ferdinand on March 16 to assure them an independent ministry. In compliance with several urgent petitions from Prague, the Habsburg sovereign on April 8 approved the equality of the Czech and German languages in the schools and all branches of the government, offered to establish a common administration for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and agreed to convoke a Bohemian diet. In Galicia nationalist disturbances broke out in Lemberg and Cracow, while the Poles clamored vociferously for the appointment only of Poles to state offices, the use of Polish as the official administrative language, and the assumption of the title of king of Poland by the Habsburg emperor. At an assembly at Agram (Zagreb) on March 25 South Slav leaders demanded a vast degree of autonomy within the Hungarian kingdom, and Baron Josip Jelačić, who was appointed Ban of Croatia three days later, shouted defiance at the Magyar taskmasters. Meanwhile, in Germany on March 5 fifty German leaders had gathered at Heidelberg to draw up plans for convoking a German parliament. On March 31 a much larger group meeting at Frankfurt issued calls for the election of members for a German National Assembly and appointed a committee of fifty to supervise the diet of the Germanic Confederation until the Frankfurt Assembly would formally open its sessions in May.

These precipitate, breath-taking alterations in age-old relationships be-

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want to strive for these possessions is an honorable aspiration which the Lord shall not fail to bless. However, they should not brag about deeds which they can perhaps achieve only in a hundred years. They should let their nationality work more inwardly than outwardly. In short, they should become, and should do something, efficient, humane, and honorable, and then recognition will come to them." In passing it should be noted that Marx and Engels had a similar attitude towards the Slavs. Note, for instance, the following statement of Marx and Engels: "The chief champion of the Tschechian nationality, Professor Palacky, is himself nothing but a learned German run mad, who even now cannot speak the Tschechian language correctly and without foreign accent. But as it often happens, dying-Tschechian nationality, dying according to every fact known in history for the last four hundred years, made in 1848 a last effort to regain its former vitality—an effort whose failure, independently of all revolutionary considerations, was to prove that Bohemia could only exist henceforth, as a portion of Germany, although part of her inhabitants might yet, for some centuries, continue to speak a non-German language."—See Engels, Friedrich, [and Karl Marx,] *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1933), 57.

[13]Schuselka, *Oesterreichische Vor- und Rückschritte*, 272.

tween the nationalities in the monarchy hit German Vienna like a thunderbolt. Austria had suddenly broken with her whole past. Not only was a seemingly invincible despotism shattered, but also the traditional German hegemony in the empire was threatened with annihilation. To replace the old temple of absolutism which had been torn down the revolutionists suddenly found themselves charged with the responsibility of building a new constitutional edifice, on a foundation of personal freedom, and erecting a new supra-national community latitudinarian enough to satisfy all the excited, divergent national tenants who were to live in it.

Exhilarated by the new age of liberty, some liberals gushed eloquently over the prospective constitutional Fatherland which was to be protected by the intrepid Hungarians, the freedom-loving Slavs, the proud Italians, and the honest, energetic Germans.[14] Those Viennese who looked for future bliss just in a supra-national Habsburg empire, however, were few in number. The overwhelming majority of Austro-Germans wanted Austria to merge with the other German lands to form a single democratic state comprising all German-speaking peoples in Central Europe. From the outset, to the Viennese revolutionists the liberal reforms that were to be made in Austria were of secondary importance to those which were to be accomplished in Germany.[15] Everywhere the black and yellow Habsburg colors were replaced by the new black, red, and gold German banner, which alone was tolerated as a shining symbol of progress and an unmistakable token of freedom.[16]

At first the newly liberated Viennese poured out their love for their German Fatherland without stopping to inquire whether union with Germany might not be dangerous for the preservation of the Habsburg monarchy.[17] However, when the initial state of revolutionary intoxication was over, they became intensely interested in the question of whether Germany was to be united as a federation or a confederation. The radical democratic left, which emerged in Vienna almost immediately after the March revolution was over, contended that only a federal state would be strong enough to safeguard the liberties of the German people.[18] Their moderate opponents felt otherwise. Fearing that if a German federal state were created the

[14]See, for example, the poem, "National-Lied. Nach Schillers Punschlied zu singen," in *Die Constitution. Togblatt für constitutiönelles Volksleben und Bellhrung,* No. 7 (March 29, 1848), 68.

[15]See especially Ficquelmont, [Karl] L[udwig] Grafen, *Aufklärungen über die Zeit vom 20. Mär bis zum 4. Mai 1848* (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1850), 48-9.

[16]*Ibid.*, 65; Stiles, William H., *Austria in 1848-49: being a History of the Late Political Movements in Vienna, Milan, Venice and Prague; with Details of the Campaigns of Lombardy and Novara; a Full Account of the Revolution in Hungary; and historical Sketches of the Austrian Government and the Provinces of the Empire* (2 vols., New York: Harper, 1852), I, 119; *Constitution,* No. 15 (April 7, 1848), 200; [Hartig, Franz Graf von,] *Genesis der Revolution in Oesterreich im Jahre 1848* (2nd ed., Leipzig: Friedrich Fleischer, 1850), 226-27.

[17]Ficquelmont, *Aufklärungen,* 48. The ultra-radical *Constitution* went so far as to demand the immediate creation of a German Republic, with the Austrian Emperor as its president.—Zenker, Ernst Victor, *Geschichte der Wiener Journalistik während des Jahres 1848* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1893), 43.

non-German nations in Austria would be alienated from the monarchy[19] and only lovely little German-Austria would be "left to sit in the deliberations at Frankfurt, like a cripple among healthy men,"[20] the "middle-of-the-roaders" and their more conservative confreres argued loudly for the creation of a confederation. Only a confederation, they maintained, would enable the Austrians to draft a constitution of their own which would take full account of the divergent national interests in the monarchy.[21] In other words, the Viennese moderates advocated unification with Germany without surrendering sovereignty. As the dramatist Friedrich Hebbel described it:

> The dear Austrians! Now they are thinking about how they can unite themselves with Germany without uniting themselves with Germany! This will be difficult to carry out—just as difficult as two people who want to kiss each other but at the same time want to turn their backs to one another.[22]

Had they shown as much solicitude for the subject nationalities in the Austrian empire as they did for themselves, the Austro-Germans in Vienna should have been willing to extend to the non-German peoples in the Habsburg domains the same liberal nationalist right of self-determination which they claimed for themselves by demanding *Anschluss* with a powerful new Germany. Consistency in national attitudes, however, is all too frequently only a virtue demanded of the other fellow, rarely a restraint put on oneself or his compatriots. In 1848 consistency with the line of reasoning connoted by their stand on the German question was an attribute just of the democratic left in Vienna, and then only in their dealings with the Italians, Magyars, and Poles. The "want to have my cake and eat it too" appetite of the partisans of law and order was rarely upset by the disturbing idea that union with Germany implied a loosening of the bonds of the multinational Habsburg empire.

In accord with their stand on the German question, the Viennese demo-

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[18]See especially Cohn, Hermann, "Ein- oder Zwei- Kammer-System; Bundesstaat oder Staaten-Bund!", *Constitution*, No. 29 (April 25, 1848), 447-49; and *Der deutsche Adler an die deutschen Bewohner aller Provinzen Oesterreichs* (Vienna: Klopf und Eurich, Easter Monday, 1848) (No. II/85 in the University of Colorado 1848 Austrian Revolution Collection) (Hereafter cited as "U. C. 1848 Col.").

[19]Zenker, *Wiener Journalistik 1848*, 43.

[20]Buschmann, Dr. Gotthard Freiherr von, "Aufruf an alle wahren Oesterreicher in der Frankfurter Sache," *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 111 (April 20, 1948), 530; Zang, August, *Flugschrift 1848 für das allgemeine gleiche Wahlrecht: Lebensfrage für die österreichische Monarchie* (Graz: Druck bei der Deutschen Vereins-Druckerei, 1907), 6. The last pamphlet was originally published in Vienna on April 8, 1848.

[21]Buschmann, "Aufruf an alle wahren Oesterreicher," 530. In April the then moderate revolutionary government announced that it was joining forces with the advocates of a confederation in a proclamation in which the ministry declared that it could "never completely renounce the special interests of the different parts of its territory which belong to the German confederation" nor "approve any unqualified submission to the assembly of the confederation or give up its independence in internal administration."—As printed in the official section of the *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 112 (April 21, 1848), 535.

[22]In his diary under date of April 18, 1848, Hebbel, Friedrich, *Tagebücher*. Mit einem Vorwort, herausgegeben von Felix Bamberg (2 vols., Berlin: G. Grote'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1885-87), II, 299.

crats loudly argued that a free Hungary was necessary for the common cause of freedom[23] and insisted that the Lombards and Venetians had just as much right to rebel against the Habsburgs to gain their national independence as the Viennese did when they revolted against their autocratic old régime.[24]

The more moderate of the March revolutionists in Vienna, however, were worried about the nationalist program of the Hungarians and downright angry with the Italian rebels. Although in March they had shared in the general admiration of the efforts of the Magyars to gain autonomy, later, when the Hungarians showed that they were not satisfied with just a separate ministry but yearned to transform Hungary into an independent country in all but name, an ever increasing number of them began to reproach the Magyars for taking advantage of the weakness of the monarchy to push through a separatist program.[25]

Perhaps one can argue that the sympathies of the more moderate liberals for the Magyars changed only when the latter deserted an autonomy program similar to that favored by the Austro-German advocates of a German Confederation. Any supposition that the views of the Viennese moderates on the Austrian nationality problem were always consonant with their attitudes toward Germany breaks down completely, however, when applied to Italy, where this group threw all its support behind the efforts of Marshal Radetzky to conquer the Italian provinces. Throughout the course of the revolution moderate and conservative Germans cursed the Lombards and Venetians for their lack of gratitude in rebelling against an Austria which had made them more prosperous than any other Italian state except Tuscany.[26] They castigated the Italian nationalists for attempting to establish a dangerous "red" republic[27] and pleaded that the Italian provinces must be retained, not only to preserve the honor and integrity of the monarchy,[28] but also to enable the Austrians to fulfill their sacred mission to serve as a mighty barrier to protect the new Germany against invasion from the South.[29]

If an historian were to limit his consideration of the national attitudes of the Viennese liberals just to the differing stands which the democrats

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[23]"Ungarns Stellung im Oesterreichischen Staatsverbande," *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 100 (April 9, 1848), 476; Belzar, W., "Aufruf an Ungarn," Helfert, Joseph Alexander Freiherr von, *Der Wiener Parnass im Jahre 1848* (Vienna: Manz'sche k. k. Hof- Verlags- und Universitäts- Buchhandlung, 1882), 130; Zenker, *Wiener Journalistik 1848*, 44.

[24]See especially [Violand, Ernst,] *Enthüllungen aus Oesterreichs jüngster Vergangenheit*. Von einem Mitgliede der Linken des aufgelösten österreichischen Reichstages (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1848), 62; Lugano, Adolph, *Der Fortbestand Oesterreichs bedingt durch eines innigen Anschluss an Deutschland als Herz eines central-europäischen Völkerbund* (Vienna: Carl Gerold, 1848), 18-19; "Oesterreich und Italien," *Constitution*, No. 11 (April 3, 1848), 130; Schuselka, Franz, "Das Vaterland in Gefahr," *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 93 (April 2, 1848), 437; Elmar, Carl, "Schwärmer—oder— —?!", *Constitution*, No. 11 (April 3, 1948), 133; "Nicht auf Italien! Hier bleiben!", *ibid.*, No. 16 (April 8, 1848), 210; and Zang, *Lebensfrage für die österreichische Monarchie*, 4.

[25]See especially Zang, *Lebensfrage für die österreichische Monarchie*, 4-5; Helfert, *Wiener Parnass*, xli; and Zenker, *Wiener Journalistik 1848*, 44.

[26]Lugano, *Der Fortbestand Oesterreichs*, 18; *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 94 (April 3, 1848), 444.

[27]*Wiener Zeitung*, No. 89 (March 29, 1848), 412.

[28]A favorite argument in support of the war in Italy was that the Italian provinces

and partisans of law and order took on the independence movements in Italy and Hungary, he would be confronted with this seemingly insoluble riddle: why did the subject nationalities repudiate their devoted friends, the Viennese democrats, when they were attacked in October by Habsburg troops and calumniated by former middle-of-the-road Viennese "liberals" who opposed their own nationalist movements? Fortunately the historian can bypass this perplexing conundrum, for it was not the Italians or the Magyars but the Slavs who were the main supporters of the Habsburgs when they ordered the encirclement and bombardment of Vienna. Why? Part of the answer lies in the haughty contempt with which the Austro-Germans regarded the "inferior" Slavs. However, the main reason why the Habsburg court was able to avail itself of the help of the Slavs was that, permeated as the Austro-Germans were with a terrifying fear[30] that a Russian army was poised ready to march into Central Europe at a moment's notice to rob the people everywhere of their newly acquired freedom[31] and subject them to the tyranny of the Slavs,[32] the Viennese liberals looked upon the Slav nationalist movements with a jaundiced eye, discolored by their almost hysterical dread of the Russian Bear.

It is true that the democrats and moderates assumed the same position in regard to the Polish nationalist movement which they had taken toward the independence strivings in Italy and Hungary. Viewing Poland as a strong defense bastion against Russian expansion into Central Europe,[33] the radicals maintained that only a free Poland could be the nineteenth century David who would slay the wicked Russian Goliath.[34] The moderates and conservatives, on the contrary, insisted that the Habsburgs must never set the helpless Poles in Galicia adrift to fall ready prey to the Tsar and his minions.[35]

The contribution of the Poles to the destruction of Viennese democracy, however, was relatively insignificant in comparison with that of the South Slavs and Czechs. In passing judgment on the South Slavs and Czechs the Viennese democrats played the role of plaintiff rather than that of defendant.

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had been bought "with Austria's richest province, Belgium; paid for with our noblest blood; and belongs to us as a consequence of the most sacred treaties."—*Ibid.*, No. 87 (March 27, 1848), 399.

[29]"Zur Verständigung," *ibid.*, No. 125 (May 5, 1848), 602.

[30]For good examples, see *Der freie Wiener. Wochenschrift für Scherz und Ernst, Novelle und Erzählung, Ironie und Satyre, Kunst und Literatur, Politik und Volks-Interessen,* No. 6 (April 17, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/56), 24; and "Antwort auf das jüngste Manifest des russischen Czaars," *Constitution,* No. 17 (April 10, 1848), 238.

[31]Throughout 1848 there were repeated admonitions to the Viennese to be on their guard against suspicious-acting Russians and their Austrian sympathizers. For examples, see the *Constitution,* No. 86 (July 7, 1948), 966-67;" and "Die Russen nach Wien," *Der Volksfreund. Zeitschrift für Aufklärung und Erheiterung des Volkes,* No. 43 (June 24, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/210b), 173-74.

[32]R. E. v. E., "Das Journal des Debats über die oesterreichische Lebensfrage," *Wiener Zeitung,* No. 152 (June 1, 1848), 723. It should be noted that even such a radical German as Karl Marx felt that behind the Pan-Slav "theory stood the terrible reality of the *Russian Empire.*"—In Engels and Marx, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution,* 58.

[33]Helfert, *Wiener Parnass,* xli.

[34]Dolde, Carl, "Ein freies Polen," *Constitution,* No. 21 (April 14, 1848), 308-9.

In October they were to pay the penalty for this reversal in their otherwise tolerant nationalist attitudes.

In dealing with the South Slav agitation for liberty, the democrats were the accusers while the more conservative Viennese liberals defended the efforts of the South Slavs to gain political concessions from the dominant Magyars. Because of their sympathy for the Hungarians, the democrats could see only harm and evil in the efforts of the Croatians, Slovenes, and Serbs to win autonomy. For their efforts the radicals castigated them as tools of abominable reactionaries who had stirred them up to wreck the Hungarian constitution, place the South Slavs under Russian domination, and destroy freedom everywhere in Europe.[36] Even though they were angered by South Slav complaints that the German language was given preference over the Slav tongues in their schools,[37] the more affluent middle class liberals, nevertheless, blamed the unreasonable and tyrannical nationalization policies of the Magyars for the troubles in Croatia and looked upon Jelačić, the redoutable South Slav national hero, as a kind of savior who almost single-handedly was rescuing the South Slav areas from a state of complete anarchy[38] from which only the Russians could profit.

The South Slavs at least commanded the support of those German liberals in Vienna who during the course of the summer and fall viewed with increasing disfavor the course which the revolution was taking. The Czech liberals, however, found themselves almost wholly deserted by their cohorts in Vienna.

Violent opposition to the Bohemians was voiced in the Austrian capital just a few weeks after the March revolution when the Germans learned of Ferdinand's concessions to the Czechs on April 8. Viennese of all political colorations raised a furious hue and cry over the equality status given to the Czech and German languages in Bohemia and the Emperor's promise to establish a common administration for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.[39] Palacký's rejection of an appointment to the Committee of Fifty at Frankfurt[40] served to throw more tinder on the fire, while the refusal of the Czechs to participate in the election of representatives to the Frankfurt Assembly[41] embittered the Austro-Germans to the utmost.[42] When the governor, Count Thun, on May 29 created a separate provisional government in Prague, with a separate governmental council which included several Czechs, the

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[35] *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 102 (April 11, 1848), 483-84; No. 125 (May 5, 1848), 602.

[36] *Constitution*, No. 36 (May 3, 1848), 567-68; Adolf Eisenthal, proclamation, Vienna, April 27, 1848, *ibid.*, No. 35 (May 2, 1848), 536.

[37] "Antwort der Deutschen auf den Artikel: 'Der Slovenische Verein in Laibach, zur Verständigung an die Deutschen,'" *Beilage zur Wiener Zeitung*, No. 183 (July 4, 1848), 5-6.

[38] *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 187 (July 8, 1848), 72-3. Also see "Jelacic," Zedlitz, [Joseph Christian Freiherr von,] *Soldaten-Büchlein* (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1860), 133-37.

[39] In the eyes of the Austro-Germans the Emperor's concessions would eventually lead to the subordination of the German language to the Czech, the ousting of Germans from public office to enable the inferior Czechs to get a monopoly of the government, the utter destruction of the superior German culture in all Bohemia, and the creation of a state within a state which would enable the disloyal Czechs to undermine the very foundations

Germans, looking upon this action as an ignominious capitulation to the demands of the Czech nationalists,[43] berated them for their gross ingratitude[44] to the peace-loving, benevolent Germans who had always shown such tender lovingkindness to them. In virulent terms they maligned them as the false Girondists of the Austrian revolution, who, just like the French Girondists of a half century earlier, were intriguing with the court to destroy the people—in this case, the German people—so they could establish their tyrannical rule over the monarchy and annihilate Germanism.[45]

The initiative which the Czechs took in calling the Pan-Slav Congress and the manifesto of that Congress on June 12 demanding that the Habsburg monarchy "be converted into a federation of nations all enjoying equal rights"[46] goaded the Germans into an almost uncontrollable rage. The Viennese denounced the convocation of the Congress as high treason[47] and vowed that as long as a single German was alive the Austro-Germans would fight the Slav conspiracy to destroy the monarchy.[48]

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of the monarchy.—Especially see "Die Czechen und ihre Sprache," *Constitution,* No. 5 (March 27, 1848), 43; "Czechen und ihre Sprache," *ibid.,* No. 22 (April 15, 1848), 318-21; *Constitution,* No. 27 (April 21, 1848), 419-20; and *Wiener Zeitung,* No. 103 (April 12, 1848), 490; and No. 100 (April 9, 1848), 476.

[40]For an English translation of Palacký's letter of refusal, see "Letter sent by František Palacký to Frankfurt," *The Slavonic and East European Review,* XXVI (April, 1948), 303-8; and Kohn, Hans, *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), 65-9.

[41]Of the sixty-two electoral districts in Bohemia elections were actually held in only twenty, and in these just a small minority of the electorate appeared. In Prague, with a German population of 66,000, three ballots were cast.—Wittner, Otto, *Moritz Hartmanns Leben und Werke. Ein Beitrag zur politischen und literarischen Geschichte Deutschlands im XIX. Jahrhundert.* In *Bibliothek Deutscher Schriftsteller aus Böhmen,* herausgegeben im Auftrage der Gesellschaft zur Förderung deutscher Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur in Böhmen, Vols. XVI and XIX (2 vols., Prague: J. G. Calvésche k. u. k. Hof- und Universitäts- Buchhandlung (Josef Koch), 1906-7), I, 195-96; Reschauer and Smets, *Das Jahr 1848,* II, 163.

[42]The Germans accused the Czechs of inflicting a reign of terror against them and of opposing the efforts made at Frankfurt to unite Germany solely for the purpose of aiding the Russians in "slavicizing" the Austrian empire and destroying the German nation.—See especially Dr. Franck, "Panslavismus vor der Thür," *Constitution,* No. 41 (May 9, 1848), 616-17; and Lugano, *Der Fortbestand Oesterreichs,* 27.

[43]*Wiener Zeitung,* No. 154 (June 3, 1848), 731; Bach, Maximilian, *Geschichte der Wiener Revolution im Jahre 1848* (Vienna: Erste Wiener Volksbuchhandlung (Ignaz Brand), 1898), 526-34.

[44]Füster, Anton, *Memoiren vom März 1848 bis Juli 1849. Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wiener Revolution* (2 vols., Frankfurt am Main: Literarische Anstalt (J. Rütten), 1850), II, 4-5.

[45]Hrczka, Joseph, "Unsere Girondisten," *Constitution,* No. 61 (June 5, 1848), 766-67. Also see "An die Czechen," *Wahrheit,* No. 5 (June 8, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/217a), 17-18.

[46]Manifesto of the Pan-Slav Congress, June 12, 1848, as translated for and printed in *The Slavonic and East European Review,* XXVI, No. 67 (April, 1948), 313. Also see Kohn, *Pan-Slavism,* 72-4.

[47]*Constitution,* No. 52 (May 24, 1848), 703; Freund, "Der Slavismus," *ibid.,* No. 69 (June 15, 1848), 832; "Das neue Slavenreich," *Wiener Zeitung,* No. 155 (June 4, 1848), 735-36.

[48]For examples of how alarmed the Germans were over the Slav danger to the monarchy, see "Deutsche Brüder in Österreich!", *Wiener Zeitung,* No. 174 (June 25, 1848), 827; and "Der Slavismus im Reichstage," *Wiener Postillon. Verbunden mit dem Anzeigeblatt des Dienstfreundes,* No. 18 (July 22, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No II/222), 69.

Hostile as they were to the strong autonomy movement in Bohemia, the Viennese applauded Prince Windischgrätz as a conquering hero who had done them a favor when he bombarded Prague and forced the Czech nationalists to surrender to him on June 17. While some of them shuddered over the thought of what Windischgrätz might have done to the Viennese democrats had he been in Vienna,[49] they, nevertheless, felt that "in Prague he was in his place." He had not been sent there by a constitutional ministry, but came "to cut ripe stalks of grain and to bind the sheaves of death" —a job for which he was "well fitted!"[50] What he had destroyed was nothing but an "insane or corrupt party of Czechs" which was using "every conceivable means—even a barbaric union with Russia if necessary—to turn Austria into a Slav empire, at the expense of the Germans and Hungarians."[51]

Imbued with utter contempt and fanatical hatred of the Czech nationalists, Viennese liberals of all colors—including the democrats—thus stood mutely by as the counterrevolutionaries won their first real victory against the revolution. The defeat of the Czech *Swornost* opened the door for the conservative German groups in Bohemia to make that fateful alliance with the Habsburg court which enabled the reaction within half a year to suppress the revolution in Vienna itself. After June 17 Prague became a rallying point for the enemies of liberalism to organize the forces needed to restore the Habsburgs to absolute power.

The violent anti-Czech agitation of the Germans had encouraged Windischgrätz to destroy Czech democracy. At the same time, the repressive "magyarization" policies of the Hungarian extremists, defended by the Viennese democrats as legitimate measures against pro-Russian South Slav reactionaries,[52] were driving the South Slavs into the counterrevolutionary camp, while the increasing insistence of Viennese democrats that, to protect themselves against the Russian Bear, the Poles must link their independence movement to that of the German liberals[53] helped make the Polish nationalists increasingly resentful of the Germans. Meanwhile, as the war in Italy went on, all Viennese except a small handful of democrats[54] came to the conclusion that, no matter at what cost, the Italian insurgents must be crushed, not only for the sake of the Habsburg empire, but for the sake of Germany as well.[55] Supported as he was by an overwhelming ma-

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[49]"Windischgrätz," *Wiener Tageblatt für alle Stände,* No. 15 (June 23, 1848), 1.

[50]Schumacher, A., "Die Czechenverschwörung in Prag," *Oesterreichisches Volksblatt,* No. 9 (June 24, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/155), 33.

[51]"Noch einmal Windischgrätz und die Prager Ereignisse," *Der Volksfreund,* No. 43 (June 24, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/210b), 174-75.

[52]Tölenényi, M., "Ungarn," *Constitution,* No. 36 (May 3, 1848), 567-68; "Ungarn," *Wahrheit,* No. 5 (June 8, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/217a), 19.

[53]Niederhuber, "Polen und seine Wiederherstellung," *Constitution,* No. 64 (June 8, 1848), 792; K. Z., "Die Lösung der Polenfrage," *Die freie Presse. Ein Volksblatt,* No. 3 (May 23, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/165b), 9-10.

[54]The democrats still believed that the new German empire would be much stronger if Austria retained only the purely German parts of her former Italian possessions.—*Constitution,* No. 73 (June 20, 1848), 862.

[55]"Italien," *Wahrheit,* No. 13 (June 17, 1848) (U. C. 1848 Col., No. II/217b), 50;

jority of Austro-Germans, Radetzky inflicted a crushing defeat on the Italian Army and on August 9 forced the Italians to sign an armistice. Almost unbeknown to many Viennese, the fate of the liberal revolution was rapidly being sealed!

Without doubt, all but a handful of Viennese liberals failed to realize that their own revolution was inextricably interwoven with the cause of democracy and national self-determination everywhere in the empire. The few warnings which were uttered for the Austrians "not to be led astray by the cry for nationality"[56] were voices in the wilderness. Dominated by an arrogant feeling of superiority, the Austro-Germans in Vienna were utterly incapable of understanding that the aspirations of the subject nationalities for freedom from German control were as natural and honest as the longings of the Germans for political liberation. Worse still for the future fate of the monarchy, they did not even particularly care about what happened to the other nationalities in the Habsburg domains. Believing that their choice lay in union with Germany, extinction, or a Slav-dominated Habsburg empire which would inevitably fall under Russian hegemony,[57] the Viennese democrats of 1848 went to such ridiculous lengths in avowing that they could endure only the first of these choices that some of the radical papers even began to date "their news, not from Vienna, but from 'the United States of Germany.' "[58]

By the fall of 1848 of all the subject nationalities in the monarchy the Magyars alone had a sizable number of defenders in the Habsburg capital, but that support was limited mainly to one party. The democrats still ardently championed the idea that only a strong, democratic Hungary, united with a free and democratic German-Austria, could thwart the Slav aspirations to dominate the Habsburg monarchy.[59] Most other groups, however, were thoroughly disgusted with or greatly alarmed over the increasing Hungarian strivings for complete separation from the monarchy and their refusal to concede even a modicum of self-government to the minorities in their own part of the empire. As a consequence, when the Habsburg court gave the signal to Jelačić to invade Hungary, just one faction supported the Magyar cause: the radical Viennese democrats.[60] To prevent the minister of war from sending reinforcements stationed in Vienna to aid Jelačić, the democrats revolted on October 6. They were rewarded for their efforts by having Windischgrätz's and Jelačić's troops dispatched to Vienna to crush the revolution before subduing the rebellious Magyars.

Sch. . . . .r, Dr. E. E., "Frankreich's Einrücken in Oesterreichisch-Italien sei ein *casus belli* für Deutschland," *Beilage zur Wiener Zeitung*, No. 221 (August 12, 1848), 55-6; "Die Italienische Frage," *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 165 (June 15, 1848), 781.

[56]"Nationalität," *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 160 (June 9, 1848), 758.

[57]Kudlich, Hans, *Rückblicke und Erinnerungen* (3 vols., Vienna: A. Hartleben's Verlag, 1873), I, 200; Lugano, *Der Fortbestand Oesterreichs*, 28-9; K—l—u—t, Deutscher aus Wien, "Schwarz, Roth, Gold!", *Constitution*, No. 37 (May 4, 1848), 583.

[58]Stiles, *Austria in 1848-49*, I, 144.

[59]"Verhältniss zwischen Oesterreich und Ungarn," *Beilage zur Wiener Zeitung*, No. 193 (July 14, 1848), 19; Lugano, *Der Fortbestand Oesterreichs*, 23.

[60]Opposition to the Magyars was so great in the Viennese parliament that it refused

In October the Viennese radicals found themselves completely isolated. The loudly voiced antagonism of most Viennese liberals against the subject nationalities had helped to alienate all the non-German nations except the Magyars from them. When Windischgrätz's army besieged Vienna, the non-Magyar and non-German peoples in the empire either sat by in sullen hostility or rubbed their hands in glee over the drubbing given to the "red republicans" in the capital. The growing radicalism of the Viennese extremists had weaned even the German provinces from the revolution. The peasants in the areas surrounding Vienna, on whom the democrats counted so much, instead of delivering arms and men, took full advantage of the desperate situation of the capital to sell their produce to the Viennese at the highest possible prices.[61] The help given by the Frankfurt Assembly was limited to sending an ineffectual mediating committee to end the conflict, while Hungarian aid arrived on October 30—one day before the surrender of the capital.[62]

The conservatives had their revenge on the "democratic anarchists" and "republicans," the Slavs, on overbearing German nationalists who had derided their efforts to share in what meant most to them: the liberal nationalist fruits of the revolution. Ironically, the South Slavs and Czechs cooperated with those former German liberals who consistently opposed the nationalist aspirations of all the subject peoples to defeat the democratic faction which championed the right of self-determination at least for the Italians, Poles ,and Hungarians. Like women scorned, the indignant, frustrated Slavs drew no faint line of distinction between the wicked and the less wicked when they vented their spleen against vexatious national mates. The contumelious diatribes of the Austro-Germans in Vienna against their own demands for autonomy or independence had made the Slavs think that all Germans—including the democrats—were their enemies. Feeling that no one in the whole monarchy but the Habsburg emperor could protect them against German domination, they either sat by in mute silence or joined forces with the court to defeat the imagined oppressor, only to lose their own liberties in return.

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even to receive a deputation of the Hungarian parliament which had come to Vienna to beseech aid. The Hungarian deputation had to be satisfied with the huge torchlight parade which the Viennese democrats gave them. See protocol of the 44th sitting of parliament, September 19, 1848, *Wiener Zeitung*, No. 254 (September 20, 1848), 709; Pulszky, Franz, *Meine Zeit, Mein Leben* (4 vols., Pressburg: Carl Stampfel, 1880-83), II, 199-200; and Hübner diary, Vienna, September 19, 1848, Hübner, Alexander Graf von, *Ein Jahr meines Lebens. 1848-1849* (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1891), 207.

[61]Zenker, Ernst Victor, *Die Wiener Revolution 1848 in ihren socialen Voraussetzungen und Beziehungen* (Vienna: A. Hartlebens Verlag, 1897), 229-30.

[62]For an excellent recent study of conditions in Vienna in October, 1848, see Ehnl, Maximilian, *Wenzel Cäsar Messenchauser, Nationalgarde-Oberkommandant von Wien 1848* (Vienna: Verlag Ing. Emil Ratzenhofer, 1948).

WILHELMIAN GERMANY – A HOUSE DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF*

by Andreas Dorpalen

THE Germany of William II is now coming into its own, historically. It belongs today to a rapidly receding past, it is no longer an issue of partisan politics, and it can thus be examined with disinterested detachment. Nor does an examination of the Wilhelmian period suffer any more from the proximity of that period to the melancholy days of the Weimar Republic. Seen from the troubled perspective of the latter, the Germany of the Kaiser had seemed, at least domestically, like a golden age of security and stability. Under the circumstances this was perhaps an inevitable view, but it helped to obscure the internal strains and stresses to which the empire was exposed and which were no less real because they were hidden behind a surface appearance of calm complacency. They can now be discerned more clearly, however, and so can their impact and significance. It is with these underlying problems of the period that the present paper is concerned.

Wilhelmian Germany was of course very much the child of Bismarck's Germany, and any analysis of the Wilhelmian period leads at once back to the Bismarck era. Bismarck's Reich, it need hardly be said, represented an immense concentration of power and material prosperity. But behind its impressive exterior it was not without its weaknesses. It suffered in particular from one fundamental weakness—from the lack of any inspiring ideal which would have given it a purpose beyond its mere existence. It had no guiding idea which could have lifted the eyes of its citizens to values above national perspectives. It held out no expectant vision of a richer future, nor was it borne up by that deep faith in humanity which underlay the birth of the United States and the French nation-state of 1789. Instead, it saw its primary mission in the preservation and strengthening of its power position.

Whether Bismarck could have been expected, by background and upbringing, to endow his creation with a supranational ideal such as America's "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness," or France's "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," may well be debatable. But there can be no doubt that Bismarck did what he could to prevent the emergence of such ideas from any other source. He diverted political aspirations into economic channels, and he bore a large share of the responsibility for the perversion of political parties into economic interest groups. Above all, he injected into the public life of the country an element of cynicism and ruthlessness which could only poison the moral atmosphere and affect the life purposes of the nation.

Yet once this has been said, it must at once be added that the nation

*This paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association at New York on December 30, 1954.

itself failed to conceive of the state as a means by which life could be made fuller and richer. The ideals which its accepted spokesmen placed before it —devotion to the crown, loyalty to the country, admiration for the army— remained confined to the perspective of the state. They did not offer the individual greater opportunities for his self-realization; if anything, they had an inhibiting effect on him, politically and socially. (Or else, and worse, they diverted him from domestic aspirations into foreign political escapades, and these he pursued, unused to responsibility and restraint, in such reckless ventures as the Pan-German League.)

Yet if a state is to be more than an agency of protection and domination, it must be the nation which instils into it ideals transcending these functions. In this way America, England, and France developed into self-governing communities; in no other way could Germany have developed along similar lines. But the Germans lacked the qualities of true nationhood—a sense of community transcending social cleavages—, and thus they were unwilling to rally around such ideals. This was evident to many an observer already during the Bismarck period; it found its most pathetic expression in the experiences of the Progressives in the eighteen-eighties, when they sought to provide the future Emperor Frederick III with a new party advocating parliamentary government. That party was to serve as a broad national basis for the liberalization which Frederick was expected to bring about during his reign. It found out at once that it could never play that role; no election yielded it more than one-sixth of all seats in the Reichstag.[1] Yet, characteristically, the Progressives themselves bore a large share of the responsibility for their defeat by burdening their political ideals with a social and economic policy which could appeal to only a small sector of the population.

Thus the mighty presence of Bismarck and the impact of his momentous achievements do not alone account for the lack of political aspirations in his time. The person and policies of William II provide even less of an explanation for the absence of such aspirations during the Wilhelmian era. For William was no strong personality, and he could be made to yield, as was proved during the *Daily Telegraph* crisis of 1908. Nor could he claim credit for accomplishments such as Bismarck's which might have seemed worth the price of political impotence. On the contrary, his reign was dotted with costly and humiliating setbacks, and there was a growing feeling of uneasiness over his blunders, and much discontent with the anachronistic distribution of power. A determined and united opposition of all elements critical of the régime could have brought about changes, but no such opposition ever materialized. Middle class and labor, the two groups most outspoken in their criticism, were unable to close ranks against it.

Why was there no more effective opposition against a régime on whose serious shortcomings there was widespread agreement? Despite all mistakes, it must be remembered, Germany was enjoying a period of astounding pros-

[1]Andreas Dorpalen, "Emperor Frederick III and the German Liberal Movement," *American Historical Review*, LIV (1948-49), 24-26, 28.

perity, and all classes shared in the considerable advances it made. There were no economic crises, no large-scale unemployment, no famines or food riots which would have made immediate changes imperative. Nor was the country threatened by an acute social crisis. Unlike Russia, Germany was not perching precariously on a revolutionary volcano. Materially life was not without promise for most Germans; the prospects for the future looked indeed good. There was thus no sense of urgency, and without pressing need most people were unwilling to give up the habits of a lifetime. Preoccupied with their material concerns, they had come to accept government from above as the most convenient form of government; they did not care to shoulder the problems and responsibilities of parliamentary self-government.[2]

The course of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis bears on this point. That crisis broke out over an article in London's *Daily Telegraph,* in October, 1908, in which William II was revealed as the author of a number of astonishing indiscretions. In this one brief interview he managed, by rash and tactless assertions, to embarrass and antagonize Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and his own subjects as well. There was an outbreak of indignation in Germany such as had never before occurred, and there were even demands for the abdication of the monarch. Even the Conservatives, the standard bearers of the monarchy, openly voiced their alarm, and all parties expressed their grave concern over William's conduct in a heated two-day debate in the Reichstag. But no attempt was made to obtain a limitation of the powers of the Emperor and an increase of those of the Reichstag. The Reichstag contented itself with a statement from the Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, who promised that such blunders would not recur.

The failure of the Reichstag even to try to secure a constitutional amendment which would have given it greater power has been blamed on the Conservatives.[3] Certainly the latter were bitterly opposed to any amendment which would have reduced the power of the monarchy, for it would have affected the prerogatives of the aristocracy as well. Yet by themselves they could not have prevented such a move. It is of course possible that Prussia at their instigation would have vetoed any amendment in the Federal Council, but that body was never confronted with this question. The fact is that an amendment was never seriously considered in the Reichstag because the unwillingness of the National Liberals and the Center precluded any possible chance of success. The speeches of their representatives during the *Daily Telegraph* debate were not those of men anxious to take over the government. They made it quite clear, as one Progressive deputy pointed out, that they were in no way prepared to assume that responsibility.[4]

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[2]Max Weber, *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Munich, 1921), pp. 26-27; Gustav Schmoller, *Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Politik: 1897-1917* (Munich and Leipzig, 1920), pp. 183-89; Otto Hintze, "Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung," *Preussische Jahrbücher,* CXLIV (1911), 2, 399-401.

[3]See, for example, Arthur Rosenberg, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Republik* (Berlin, 1930), p. 55.

[4]*Verhandlungen des Reichstags.* Stenographische Berichte, XII. Legislatur-Periode,

There were ways, moreover, in which influence could be wielded informally and behind the scenes. William II was fairly easily accessible to leading bankers and industrialists, and so were most government offices.[5] Admission to the charmed circle of the court entourage carried other rewards too. Titles and noble status were readily available, and they converted potential opponents into enthusiastic supporters of the status quo. Others, again, preferred to swallow their dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs in anticipation of similar rewards in the future.

Walther Rathenau, subsequently the Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, recalls in his little book on the Kaiser a railroad trip he undertook with some industrialists in 1909:

> The subject of the Kaiser came up; as always at that time, there was bitter, unreasonable criticism.
>
> I said: "Isn't it unfair to hold the man responsible instead of the institutions? Has the Emperor ever gone beyond the limits of his constitutional prerogatives? You ought to limit these prerogatives; with your National Liberal Party you have the power to do so, the monarch accepts every *fait accompli*."
>
> "Why don't you write about this? You are writing books," someone suggested.
>
> "I write this twice every year," I said. "But let me ask you: If next time I should decide to raise this question in the form of a petition addressed to Kaiser and Reichstag—, would you sign?"
>
> "Why not?" "Of course," several men answered.
>
> "You are mistaken. Not one of you would. It would be the end of your hopes for an appointment to the House of Peers and a title. It would be the end of your son's career, all contact with court and dignitaries would be cut off."
>
> No one objected. They all knew it. The bourgeoisie knew and wanted it and contented itself with oral criticism.[6]

There was one other reason which prevented the middle class from asserting itself more actively; and though mentioned last, it was by no means the least important factor: The *Bürgertum* was quite concerned over the growing socialist movement. It was therefore doubly reluctant to weaken the monarchy; it feared that it might be unable to deal on its own with the lower classes and that unprepared to cope with them, it might ultimately be deprived, not only of all political rights, but also of its social and economic status. For this reason, too, it preferred to forego a parliamentary régime, for there was always the danger that the elections might play all

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I. Session, Nov. 10-11, 1908, pp. 5373-5439, especially Konrad Hausmann, on Nov. 11, p. 5424. See also Theodor Heuss, *Friedrich Naumann: Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1937), p. 345, and Friedrich von Payer, *Von Bethmann Hollweg bis Ebert* (Frankfurt-on-the-Main, 1924), p. 22.

[5]Rosenberg, pp. 41-42; Herbert Feis, *Europe, The World's Banker:1870-1914* (New Haven, 1930), pp. 160-88; Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor* (Chicago, 1935), *passim*.

[6]Walther Rathenau, *Der Kaiser* (Berlin, 1919), pp. 24-25. See also Theodor Eschenburg, *Das Kaiserreich am Scheideweg* (Berlin, 1930), p. 26, on the National Liberal leader Ernst Bassermann.

power into the hands of the numerically superior working class. Large parts of the bourgeoisie opposed even any but the most modest reforms of Prussia's three-class suffrage system; the principle of unequal suffrage, it must be emphasized, was upheld, not just by the Conservatives, but by many National Liberals and Centrists as well.

Shortly before the First World War it seemed for a moment as if there might be a change of attitude, in connection with the so called Zabern Affair. This proved a short-lived illusion, but just for this reason the incident deserves to be examined more closely.

In 1913 a young Prussian lieutenant, stationed in the little Alsatian town of Zabern, had called the Alsatians insulting names. He had suffered only nominal punishment for his offense, and there had been street demonstrations on the part of the furious townspeople. To stop them, the local garrison commander had arrested a number of civilians and had detained them overnight in the barracks—an action which was of course illegal. The incident provoked a heated debate in the Reichstag. In the end that body expressed its disapproval by passing a motion of censure. National Liberals, Centrists, and Progressives joined the Social Democrats in adopting the motion. It was an unprecedented move in Germany's parliamentary history, and it seemed to usher in a new era in German politics.

But this oppositional alliance disintegrated at once. As a matter of fact, it owed its short-lived existence only to a misunderstanding on the part of the National Liberals. The latter supported the motion merely because they assumed, erroneously, that the Chancellor found nothing objectionable in the attitude of the military. When the Socialists demanded the resignation of the Chancellor, the bourgeois parties opposed the demand. The explanation of the spokesman of the Progressives, the left wing party of the middle class, deserves to be quoted. His party, he pointed out, had merely been interested in a strengthening of the rights of the Reichstag. The demand of the Social Democrats, on the other hand, presupposed that a majority of the parliament be ready to take over the government. Yet, as everyone knew, there was no such majority.[8]

A committee which was set up to explore ways and means by which similar abuses of military authority could be prevented met a few times, but then adjourned indefinitely. There was a general feeling that it was better not to push things too far. After all, had not a socialist deputy urged during the debate that the nation take its fate into its own hands? With this prospect as an alternative, it seemed preferable to leave things as they were.[9]

If the middle class was distrustful of the Social Democrats, the latter showed no more confidence in the middle class. The history of the German Social Democratic Party still remains to be written—it will prove to be one of well meant aspirations and justified criticisms, but also of sound without fury, of revolutionary propaganda without revolutionary will, of a stubborn

[7]Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Conservatives and the Parliamentarization of Imperial Germany," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XI (1951), 196-98.

[8]Erwin Schenk, *Der Fall Zabern* (Stuttgart, 1927), pp. 47-52.

[9]*Ibid.,* pp. 89-90.

doctrinairism unrelated to the needs and interests of the labor movement. The lot of the Socialists had been a hard one during the Bismarck era; their persecution and prosecution under the anti-Socialist legislation of 1878 is a well known story and need not be retold here. Nor was their lot an easy one under William II. While their systematic persecution came to an end in 1890, they remained subject to political discrimination and social ostracism as well as to some measure of police persecution.

But the fact is that the Social Democrats themselves did nothing to allay the distrust on the part of the middle class which should have been their natural ally in the struggle against the existing régime. They indulged in revolutionary oratory long after the great majority of their leaders had ceased believing in it (if they ever did); they kept denouncing the revisionist wing of the party which proposed collaboration with other parties, while they were practicing such collaboration in innumerable city councils and in some state parliaments; they solemnly debated at their party congresses the question whether to call a general strike in case of war, though knowing that the workers might no longer heed such an appeal; and they shunned any personal contact with members of the middle class as assiduously as the latter avoided them. Gustav Noske, the first Reichswehr Minister of the Weimar Republic, complains in his memoirs that to be a workman in Imperial Germany meant to be a social outcast.[10] But Carl Severing, Prussia's Socialist Minister of the Interior during the Weimar era, relates the following incident in his reminiscences: In 1907 he and another Socialist deputy frequently shared a railroad compartment with the Free Conservative deputy von Oertzen on their way to Reichstag sessions in Berlin. They got to know von Oertzen quite well, and one day the latter invited them to spend a weekend on his estate. The invitation, Severing adds, was meant quite sincerely. But an acceptance was out of the question. Political prejudices, an intolerance bred by the dogma of the class struggle, precluded any such contacts.[11]

Or to mention another example: In 1912, after the Social Democrats had emerged as the largest party from the Reichstag elections, one of their leaders, Philipp Scheidemann, was elected first vice-president of the Reichstag. But he refused to be presented to the Emperor, as was customary for the presiding Reichstag officers, and he could therefore not remain in his post. Here, for the first time, a Social Democrat had obtained a national office, a tremendous boost to the prestige of the party, and from this vantage point he could have demonstrated the party's will to constructive and responsible participation in the nation's affairs. But the party, a prisoner of doctrinairism and prejudices, refused to take advantage of this opportunity.

Blunders of this kind helped to keep alive the impression concerning the Socialist Party as a party of aggressive radicalism which was actually quite misleading. They also served to obscure the fact that the gap between middle class and labor was in reality narrowing down. For while the Social-

[10]Gustav Noske, *Erlebtes aus Aufstieg und Niedergang einer Demokratie* (Offenbach, 1947), p. 3.

[11]Carl Severing, *Mein Lebensweg* (Cologne, 1950), I, 163.

ists were the most bitter opponents of the monarchy, their policy, like that of the bourgeois parties, had for some time been one of wait-and-see. And while the two camps had adopted it for fundamentally different reasons, to some extent they were both motivated by the same considerations—an overriding preoccupation with economic concerns and a basic unwillingness to forego the comforts of an opposition without responsibility. This parallelism was no mere coincidence; the fact is that labor tends to reflect middle class attitudes, spiritually and intellectually, and its political maturity has always been closely correlated with that of the bourgeoisie. The situation in Imperial Germany merely bears out an ever recurring experience.[12]

Socially, too, there was some rapprochement. As the workers improved their lot, which they rapidly did during those years, they adopted middle class standards in their way of life. This, too, affected the attitude of the Social Democratic Party, since most of its members were skilled workers and as such belonged to the labor aristocracy.[13] Just as the bourgeoisie longed for a chance to be presented at court (despite its professed distrust of the Kaiser), the workers longed to rise above themselves and become *Bürger* in their way of life. Prince Bülow tells in his *Memoirs* of a journalist friend of his who once congratulated a leading Socialist deputy on his amazing knowledge of domestic problems. Smiling sadly, the deputy answered, half seriously and half jokingly: "I would give all my knowledge to know whether fish and asparagus are eaten only with a fork or with a knife as well."[14] The story is not without its suggestive significance.

Under the circumstances one may well wonder why the Socialists kept professing a radicalism in which most of them no longer believed. Doctrinairism suggests itself as an answer, and it certainly was a causal factor. So, undoubtedly, was the belief in the propagandistic effectiveness of the radical approach. But it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the emphatic insistence on radical-revolutionary slogans was to serve also as a badly needed reminder that all was not yet well and efforts to improve labor's lot must not be relaxed. No matter what the explanation, the official radicalism of the party helped to keep it from exercising any influence on national affairs at a time when one third of the nation was looking to it for leadership.

In consequence, the existing régime continued in power, although it was clearly inadequate to respond to the needs and interests of the country. But the nation was not happy. Despite the prevailing lethargy there was a growing feeling of uneasiness, highlighted by the electoral successes of the Socialists. Bethmann Hollweg, the last prewar Chancellor, described it aptly in his memoirs as a sullen pessimism, a *Reichsverdrossenheit*, which was gripping the country.[15]

That the difficulties were not greater has been attributed to the nation's

[12]Rosenberg, pp. 48-49; see also Weber, pp. 26-28.

[13]Noske, p. 38; Schmoller, P. 99; Hugo Preuss, *Das Deutsche Volk und die Politik* (Jena, 1915), p. 69; Harry J. Marks, "The Sources of Reformism in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1890-1914," *Journal of Modern History* XI (1939), 334-56; William Maehl, "The Triumph of Nationalism in the German Socialist Party on the Eve of the First World War," *ibid.* XXIV (1952), 22-28.

[14]Quoted by Marks, *loc cit.*, pp. 348-49.

prosperity which eased the strain of the existing iniquities. But there was also the revealing fact that the state itself took the initiative in correcting some of its worst shortcomings. For these changes it succeeded in obtaining the combined support of bourgeois and labor parties. With their help a tax reform was carried through, with their backing an effort was made to integrate Alsace-Lorraine more fully into the Reich by granting it statehood and universal suffrage for national as well as state elections.

There could be no more disastrous testimony to the nation's political immaturity. Most National Liberals and Centrists were unwilling to grant universal suffrage to Prussia on their own initiative, but they did, at the request of the government, concede it to Alsace-Lorraine. Similarly, National Liberals, Centrists, Progressives, and Socialists were unwilling to collaborate with each other on their own, and they ridiculed the efforts of more farsighted leaders such as Friedrich Naumann who strove to effect such cooperation. But at the request of the very government of which they were all highly critical, they did join forces. Hegel, that protagonist of the state as the source of all moral energies, must have smiled in his grave.

Thus there existed serious fissures in the structure of the German Empire when war broke out in 1914. If there was nevertheless a spontaneous and genuine closing of the ranks, it was partly because many Germans hoped that the war would usher in a better social and political order. Characteristically, it was again the state rather than the nation which initiated whatever reforms were made, and the success of these reforms was assured only after the approaching defeat had sufficiently weakened the opposition of the bourgeois parties. There is an historical logic in the fact that Germany obtained a parliamentary régime in October, 1918, as the result of a "revolution from above," and not through the efforts of the nation.

The hopes for the creation of a true national community thus did not materialize, and with minor modifications the social cleavage continued through the Weimar era. But these hopes did not die down, and the inability of the Weimar Republic to fulfill them was one of the main reasons for its eventual collapse. Hitler, on the other hand, paid careful attention to them and put their fulfillment high on the list of his promises. There were many who took him at his word and joined him because they expected him to do away with the existing class divisions. With great skill he did at least create the semblance of a genuine national community; but actually very little, if anything, was changed. And as the experience of the Bonn Republic makes clear, the problem is still awaiting its solution.

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[15]Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, *Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1919-20), I, 95.

THE SECRET ANGLO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE BALKANS OF OCTOBER 9, 1944

by Stephen G. Xydis

TOWARD the end of World War II, the matter of the disposition of Great Power military forces in the Balkan military arena was resolved temporarily by secret Big Three negotiation, the details of which were successively and partly revealed in post-war writings of eminent participants in these negotiations or other persons in high political authority. After Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' short reference to an Anglo-Soviet agreement in October 1944 concerning Greece and Rumania,[1] Cordell Hull, in his *Memoirs* published in 1948, gave the first American authoritative, if incomplete, account of these secret talks which, as matters turned out later, established the demarcation line separating the West from the Soviet bloc in the Balkan peninsula.[2] Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins* followed with new details.[3] Then finally, in 1953, Churchill, in the last volume of his account of World War II, entitled *Triumph and Tragedy,* gave an authoritative account from the British viewpoint.[4]

Comparison and collation of these various official complementary accounts disclose that during these diplomatic exchanges involving Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, the United States Government in July 1944 gave its assent to an Anglo-Soviet arrangement whereby for a period of three months

[1]James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly,* New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 53. "In the fall of 1944 Churchill and his Foreign Minister . . . had visited Moscow and, while there was no formal agreement, we knew they had reached the informal understanding that, if the British found it necessary to take military action to quell internal disorders in Greece, the Soviets would not interfere. In return, the British would recognize the right of the Soviets to take the lead in maintaining order in Rumania."

This passage created a stir in the British Foreign Office which issued a denial that there was any Anglo-Soviet agreement on Balkan spheres of influence but admitted that "there was some discussion in 1944 between the big powers as to how best pressure could be brought to bear on the enemy. As a result, it was agreed that militarily it would be best for Britain to operate in and from Greece, leaving Rumania to the Russians. At best the discussions could be said to have ended in an agreement for co-ordinating military strategy." *The New York Times,* 18 October, 1947. This British denial, in its turn, elicited from Mr. Byrnes a statement saying that he had said nothing in his book about spheres of influence but had based his statement in his book on a message Churchill had sent to Roosevelt on 8 March, 1945, in the first paragraph of which, after deploring Soviet action in Rumania, Churchill said: "We have been hampered in our protests against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria, while we took the lead in Greece. . . ."

The Foreign Office, in conclusion, having received the exact text of Byrnes' statement in his book, said that there was no argument with Mr. Byrnes, reiterating that the only arrangement of spheres of influence was on military operations and influence in helping the countries to free themselves from the enemy. *Ibid.*

[2]Cordell Hull, *Memoirs,* II, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948, pp. 1451-1459. E. R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians,* 1949, cites and almost textually follows Hull's account.

[3]Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (Bantam Giant Edition), New York, 1948, II, pp. 468-473.

[4]Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War,* VI, *Triumph and Tragedy,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953, pp. 72-81, 226-235.

the Soviet Union would be responsible for war operations in Rumania while Britain would be similarly responsible in Greece. However, because of Soviet procrastination, no such arrangement was explicitly made during the three months that followed, until, against the background of new military developments, Churchill and Stalin, meeting in the Kremlin on October 9, reached an informal secret agreement, the United States Government reserving its position. This secret Anglo-Soviet agreement established for the Soviet Union a 90 per cent predominance in Rumania; a 75 per cent predominance in Bulgaria; a 50/50 share with Britain and "others" in Yugoslavia and Hungary; while Britain retained a 90 per cent predominance in Greece.[5]

But comparison and collation of official American and British accounts of these diplomatic exchanges and arrangements are not the only purpose of this study. By observing the effects of these exchanges on the area of Balkan politics, and particularly on Greek and Yugoslav politics, we obtain a better insight into the workings of Soviet foreign policy at a time for which we have no public sources, and we shall be in a better position to understand the rather cryptic argumentation of the Big Three representatives during the first discussion of the "Greek Question" in the UN Security Council, in 1946. Finally, by fitting together these large pieces of our jigsaw puzzle with those smaller ones of Balkan politics, we get a better understanding of local developments. For memoirs are memoirs, not histories. They provide material for the latter. But the histories of these tortuous times in the Balkans, if written by Britons, make scant reference, if any at all, to those great power diplomatic exchanges that led to a new post-war political configuration in the Balkans;[6] if written by Greeks, likewise fail to mention them, much less analyze their impact upon the local political scene;[7] and if written by Amer-

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[5]Winston S. Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 227. Churchill's account of the exchanges, in contrast to Hull's, makes it quite clear that the American consent dealt only with Greece and Rumania, not with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; that following this consent, Churchill expected an explicit agreement with the Soviet Government but that such an agreement was reached only in October, after the three-month trial period, when the Soviet Army had occupied not only Rumania, but also Bulgaria and was moving into Yugoslavia. Finally, Churchill gives different percentages of predominance from those mentioned by Hull, which were, in the favor of Soviet Russia, a 75/25 or 80/20 predominance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, while Britain would share influence with Russia in Yugoslavia 50/50. He does not mention any percentages for Greece. Otherwise in those parts with which both deal, their accounts tally.,

[6]The following British writers, some of whom published their books even after Byrnes' disclosure of an Anglo-Soviet arrangement for Rumania and Greece, and after Hull's detailed account of it, do not mention at all this agreement:
W. Byford-Jones, *The Greek Trilogy*, London, 1948, C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, London, 1948, Sir Reginald Leeper, Ambassador to Greece during that critical period of 1944, likewise makes no mention of the agreement in his book, *When Greek Meets Greek*, London, 1950, although from Hull's *Memoirs* we know that he was aware of it. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, p. 1456. H. Seton Watson, *The East European Revolution*, New York, 1951. Chester Wilmot, however, in *The Struggle for Europe*, London, 1952, p. 636, mentions the Anglo-Soviet agreement, following Hull's account in the main, but would make it appear that the U. S. Government's consent in July referred not only to Greece and Rumania, but to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as well.

". . . the Prime Minister proposed to Stalin (without the President's knowledge) that the 'controlling interest' in Rumania and Bulgaria should be exercised by the Soviet

icans or in America,[6] fail to convey the whole picture, for they base their studies only on Hull's version of these diplomatic exchanges simply because they were published prior to the appearance of Churchill's sixth volume on World War II, and because they deal very little with the question of their impact on local political developments.

Through our analysis, finally, we get a picture of the complex interweaving of Great Power decisions and expectations with those of smaller states or political groups, and we become aware of the complicated interplay of domestic and foreign affairs, and of the criss-crossing of factors constitutional and personal, of design and accident, which create the multicolored fabric of world politics.

The Red Army's imminent surge toward Central and Southeastern

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Union, and in Greece and Yugoslavia by Britain. When news of this proposal reached Washington, the secretive British aproach to Moscow was resented, and the plan was condemned by Hull . . . Roosevelt . . . agreed to give the arrangement a three-month trial . . ." B. Sweet-Escott, in the most recent British book on Greece, *Greece, a political and economic survey, 1939-1953,* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954, writes (p. 40) that no satisfactory answer to the question of why the communists in Greece did not attempt to seize power immediately the Germans left Greece before the British arrived has been given. The present study would provide an answer to this problem. The secret agreement is mentioned briefly in *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946,* edited by Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 684, the account being based on that of Hull.

[7]E.g. Library of Congress, European Affairs Division, *War and Postwar Greece, an Analysis Based on Greek Writings,* prepared by Floyd A. Spencer, Washington, 1952. (Photo-offset.) E. A. Stavrides, *Ta paraskenia tou KKE,* Athens, 1953. Also the Greek Encyclopedia, *Neoteron Egkyglopaidikon Lexikon tou Eliou,* Athens, 7, 1949. Greek sources, including a former Under-Secretary of State, who wrote a letter to the author of the present study in 1953, vaguely suggest that there was an Anglo-Soviet agreement about Greece since Teheran.

[8]Leon Dennen's book, *Trouble Zone,* New York and Chicago, 1945, p. 96, contains a pre-Byrnes mention of the agreement of October 1944, the journalist writing that, at the Moscow meeting of Churchill with Stalin, Bulgaria and Rumania were recognized as part of the Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans with Greece remaining within the British orbit. Regarding Yugoslavia, Dennen writes that Churchill would have liked a compromise but that Stalin had not agreed. W. Reitzel, however, whose book was published after Byrnes' reference to the agreement, refers to Dennen's statement as a rumor characteristic of the times, *The Mediterranean; Its Role in America's Foreign Policy,* Institute of International Studies, Yale University, New York, 1948, pp. 42-43.

See also W. H. McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma,* Philadelphia, 1947 (no mention of secret talks and agreement). L. S. Stavrianos, "The Truman Doctrine in Historical Perspective," *Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee,* edited by Dwight E. Lee and George E. McReynolds, Worcester, Mass., 1949, pp. 46-48, follows Hull's account but relates no agreement to Greek and Balkan politics. And the same author in his *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity,* blurs this correlation. see my footnote.[67] Mark Ethridge and C. E. Black, "Negotiating on the Balkans," in *Negotiating With the Russians,* edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass., 1951, p. 177, likewise follow Hull's account without entering into the arrangement's effect on Greek or Balkan politics. D. G. Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom,* Syracuse University Press, 1953, follows Hull's account, without considering the effect of the American consent on Soviet policy and consequently the tactics of the Communist Party of Greece during summer and fall 1944. This position is accepted by H. L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951, p. 265-269; as well as by W. H. McNeill, writing under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *America, British and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946,* Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 422-425; pp. 469, 495, and 613.

Europe in the spring of 1944[9] raised in the minds of American and British policy makers the question of Soviet political intentions in the Balkans, particularly since the Soviet Government had declared its intention not to revert to its frontiers of 1939 but to the expanded boundaries it had gained during its brief Hitlerian honeymoon.[10] The possibility arose that in its advance the Red Army might occupy the territory of the Balkan states and reach the Mediterranean's northern shores, thus impinging on a part of the war theater under British command, with political results of no little importance.

Among the Balkan States, Rumania was at war with the Soviet Union and its allies; Bulgaria was technically at peace with the USSR, while at war with Great Britain and the United States; Yugoslavia was an ally of the grand coalition and in domestic politics the balance of power was turning toward Tito, who since Teheran was getting support from the Big Three with little regard to the feelings of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile.

In Greece, likewise an ally, the most powerful resistance group was the EAM, the Greek equivalent to Yugoslavia's National Liberation Front. That organization, however, had received no Big Three blessing, and was galvanized by no Titoesque personality. On the local arena it had to compete with other resistance groups such as EDES, while outside Greece it had to deal with a Government-in-Exile whose position, because of British and American support and Soviet inscrutability, was relatively less weak than its Yugoslav counterpart. Although EAM comprised in its ranks many non-Communist Greeks and Greeks whose only desire was to harass, attack and expel the invaders,[11] the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which boasted it had set up the resistance organization after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, strictly controlled the organization.[12] As Germany's defeat approached, the KKE assumed ever more openly the posture of a vanguard to Soviet imperialism.[13] Already in 1943, in expectation of an allied landing, it had provoked civil war to exterminate its rival guerrilla bands.[14] Armed by the British and, after Italy's surrender, getting further weapons from Italians capitulating on Greek soil, EAM, in a pattern closely following Tito's gradual rise to power, set up in the mountains of Greece a provisional government (PEEA—Political Committee of National Liberation) in March 1944,[15] and the following month, by skillful propaganda and infiltration, managed to foment mutinies in the ranks of the exiled Greek Government's armed forces in Egypt[16] as they were getting ready to fight on the Italian front.

In the meantime the signs of Soviet intentions were more discreet but

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[9]Cordell Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1451.

[10]*Ibid.*

[11]The Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 64. C. M. Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 59ff.

[12]Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 49. Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 83. William Hardy McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 146. W. Byford-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[13]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 83. McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

[14]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 158ff.

[15]Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 66. Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 112 and 180ff.

[16]Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

nonetheless ominous. Soviet statements on Greek affairs often lagged behind American and British declarations, such as those advising unity rather than civil strife to the Greeks.[17] And Soviet press attacks against the Greek Government-in-Exile, particularly after the creation of the aforementioned shadow government of EAM-ELAS in the Greek mountains, underlined the Soviet trends of thinking.[18] Although Great Britain already by March 1944 had declared that the Allies would not barter Greek territory for any separate Bulgarian peace offer,[19] a similar Soviet statement was not made until two full months later, some organs of the U.S. press acclaiming it as perhaps the first positive proof for the United States and Great Britain of the political integrity of their Russian ally.[20]

For its part, the Greek Government-in-Exile, anxious about Soviet objectives with regard to Greek and Balkan political developments, sought to keep its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government as correct as the Soviet attitude permitted, and even more. But the Soviet Minister Novikov called neither upon Premier George Papandreou's immediate and short-lived predecessor, Sophocles Venizelos, who despite diplomatic protocol had called on him first, nor upon Premier Papandreou, who nevertheless had sent to him his Under-Secretary Lambrianides, a Russian-speaking refugee from South Russia, in a futile attempt to fathom the Soviet views.

But what was the United States position?

Reporting from Cairo on May 2, 1944, to the *New York Times* that the idea of an Anglo-American venture in the Balkans under American command had been rejected, Cyrus Sulzberger described the American diplomatic attitude in that area as one of "counselor" and "honest broker" "adjusting any contradictory points between the USSR and Great Britain."[21] That a similar view of United States policy may have prevailed in the British Cabinet councils is apparent from the fact that Churchill, on May 4, asked Eden to draft a memorandum on the "brute" issues between Britain and the Soviet Union in Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and "above all in Greece . . ."[22] and on May 5 Eden proposed to the Soviet Ambassador in London, F. Gusev, that they discuss a general suggestion that the USSR should temporarily regard Rumanian affairs as mainly their concern while leaving those of Greece to Great Britain.[23]

Eden's suggestion to the Soviet Ambassador on May 5 sparked a whole series of Great Power diplomatic exchanges, the story of which, untangled from Hull's and Churchill's accounts, is outlined below.

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[17]E.g. messages from Eden and Hull mentioned in Tsouderos' New Year's Eve statement, urging unity among the Greek guerrillas, *The New York Times,* 1 Jan., 1944. A similar note from the Soviet Government was given to the Greek Ambassador in Moscow on 12 Jan., 1944, *The New York Times,* 13 Jan., 1944.

[18]Woodhouse, *op. cit.,* p. 187. Tass charged the Tsouderos Greek Government-in-Exile with detaining 1,000 Greek soldiers in a Middle East concentration camp because of their anti-government views, *The New York Times,* 11 April, 1944.

[19]Statement by Anthony Eden, *The New York Times,* 23 March, 1944.

[20]*The New York Times,* 24 May, 1944 (Istanbul dispatch by Joseph Levy).

[21]*Ibid.,* 2 May 1944 (Sulzberger dispatch from Cairo).

[22]Churchill, *op, cit.,* pp. 72-3.

[23]Hull, *op. cit.,* p. 1453.

On May 18 the Soviet Ambassador called on the Foreign Office and declared that the Russians were willing to accept the British proposal for dividing Allied responsibilities in Greece and Rumania, but wished to know whether the United States Government had been consulted.[24] Accordingly, on May 30, Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, called on Secretary of State Cordell Hull and inquired about the United States Government's reaction to such an Anglo-Soviet agreement "during the military period."[25] The United States Secretary of State said he would give serious consideration to the British inquiry but told Halifax point-blank that such an arrangement would involve the abandonment of "broad declarations of policy, principles and practice" and therefore the matter should be carefully studied before any departures took place.[26] As Hull declared forcefully in his *Memoirs*:

> I was not, and am not, a believer in the idea of balance of power or spheres of influence as a means of keeping the peace. During the First World War I had made an intensive study of the system of spheres of influence and balance of power, and I was grounded to the taproots in their iniquitous consequences. The conclusions I then formed in total opposition to this system stayed with me.[27]

A day later, on May 31, Churchill cabled to Roosevelt directly asking for United States approval of the proposed arrangement which, he argued, would be a "useful device" for preventing any divergence of policy between the British and the Russians in the Balkans and would apply only to war conditions and "would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the Great Powers will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe." The British Prime Minister pointed out, too, that such an arrangement would be "a natural development of the existing military situation since Rumania fell within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece within the Allied Command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean." He also denied that by such an arrangement Britain wished to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence,[28] and in a humorous tone hinted that after all the United States too had its own sphere of interest in the Western hemisphere. Wrote Churchill:

> On the other hand, we follow the lead of the United States in South America as far as possible, as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton. On this we naturally develop strong views on account of the little we get.[29]

The President passed on to Cordell Hull this cable for consideration.[30] Hull's associates at the State Department agreed with the Secretary of State's

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[24]*Ibid.*

[25]*Ibid.*, p. 1452.

[26]*Ibid.*, Hull referred to the decision reached with Eden and Molotov at Moscow in 1943 to oppose, with regard to Europe, the principle of separate areas of responsibility or zones of influence, *ibid.*, p. 1298.

[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 1452-3.

[28]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-4. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1453.

[29]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1454.

[30]Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1453.

views expressed to Halifax on May 30 and the State Department prepared its reply to the British inquiry.[31]

On June 8 Churchill cabled Lord Halifax on the matter, adding Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the other two countries he suggested should be included in the proposed Anglo-Soviet arrangement, and denying again that the creation of spheres of influence in the Balkans was contemplated. Accordingly, Russia would deal with Bulgaria as well as Rumania, while Great Britain would do likewise in Yugoslavia as well as Greece.[32] Halifax handed this message to Hull, who, shocked at the envisaged territorial extension to the whole Balkans of the proposed agreement, thought it "more urgent even than before to oppose the arrangement which would bring one set of countries under Russia and another set under Britain."[33]

Roosevelt, on June 10, sent Churchill the State Department reply, which reiterated the American Government's opinion that regardless of Churchill's intentions, the proposed agreement would lead to the persistence of differences between Britain and Russia and eventually to the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence. To prevent these results, the President concluded, it might be good to establish consultative machinery for the Balkans.[34]

The next day Churchill replied to Roosevelt's message, forcefully expressing concern about it, and pointing out that the consultative machinery suggested would paralyze action while events were taking their course. Reverting to his first proposal which dealt only with Greece and Rumania, in accordance with his message of May 31, to which he referred, he proposed that the Anglo-Soviet arrangement apply to those countries only, and that it be given a three month trial, following which it would be reviewed by the Big Three.[35] Without consulting Hull, who had been resting for a few days at Hershey, Pennsylvania, and without informing the State Department,[36] President Roosevelt accepted this proposal on June 12, emphasizing again that no postwar spheres of influence were being established.[37]

Hull, in the meantime, the very same day of the President's acceptance, sent to the British Embassy in Washington a memorandum the chief executive had previously approved, outlining again the American arguments against the proposed Anglo-Soviet agreement, and proposing the setting up of consultative machinery for the Balkans.[38] And on June 14, Churchill replied to Roosevelt expressing his "deep gratitude" for the President's assent and informing him he had asked Eden to convey this information to Molotov and make clear the three month limitation had been agreed to so that there would be no pre-judgment of the question of setting up postwar spheres of influence.[39] This Eden did on June 19.[40]

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[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-5. Hull, *op. cit.*, pp. 1453-4.
[33] Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1454.
[34] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 75. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1454.
[35] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 77. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1455.
[36] Hull, *ibid.*
[37] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 77. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1455.
[38] Hull, *ibid.*

Meanwhile, Hull, still unaware of the President's decision, sent him on June 17, a draft of a message to Churchill in connection with Lord Halifax's second démarche of June 8. He stressed in it the extension of the proposed Anglo-Soviet agreement to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and noted that the British had approached the Soviet without consulting the United States.[41] On June 22, Roosevelt sent this message to Churchill.[42] A day later, on June 23, he received a message from the British Prime Minister re-emphasizing Greece and Rumania as subjects for the division of operational responsibilities between Great Britain and the Soviet Union respectively; referring to Turkey as a nation toward which Britain played the Allied hand, and revealing his plans for promoting a government of national unity in Yugoslavia, bringing together—perhaps on the Greek pattern of the Lebanon Conference—King Peter, Tito and Serbs.[43] Churchill, in this same message, refused to admit he had done anything wrong in not consulting the United States Government before approaching the Soviet Government in May, and pointed out a similar action of Roosevelt when he communicated to Stalin, without informing Great Britain, the results of his conversations with the Polish Premier, Mikołajczyk.[44] As Roosevelt was cabling back to Churchill on June 26,[45] sending him a copy of his cable to Stalin concerning Mikołajczyk,[46] the State Department received a cable from the United States Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-Exile stating that his British colleague in Cairo had informed him that the United States Government had agreed to the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet agreement with regard to the Balkans. Hull sent to Roosevelt a copy of this first intimation of the President's decision of June 12,[47] and June 30 received a reply from him simply enclosing paraphrases or extracts of the messages exchanged between himself and Churchill which disclosed the United States assent to the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet agreement.[48] Thus, after eighteen days (from June 12 to June 30), the State Department finally learned about an important foreign policy decision of the "sole organ of national government" in the conduct of foreign affairs.[49]

The Soviet Government also sought confirmation of the American Government's assent. On July 1, Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador in the United States, wanting to learn the United States' views on Greece and Rumania, sent Hull an *aide mémoire* outlining the situation to date, starting with the conversation of May 5 between Eden and Gusev and the Soviet answer of May 18.[50] The State Department did not give its reply until July 15 and,

[39]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 77. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1456.
[40]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[41]Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1456.
[42]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-8. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1457.
[43]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-8. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1457.
[44]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-8. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1457.
[45]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[46]Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1457.
[47]*Ibid.*, p. 1456.
[48]*Ibid.*
[49]C. Fairman, *American Constitutional Decisions*, New York, 1950, p. 299, referring to Judge Sutherland's decision in *U.S.* v. *Curtiss Wright*.

in the meantime, Churchill, on July 11, sent a message to Stalin confirming that Roosevelt had agreed to an Anglo-Soviet arrangement on respective responsibilities in Greece and Rumania, pointing out how important the coming three months would be for the Balkans, and urging the conclusion of such an understanding.[51] Stalin's reply to this message arrived the very day Hull in Washington was handing the American answer to Gromyko's memorandum, namely on July 15. In reply to Gromyko's memorandum, Hull confirmed that the American Government had agreed to the arrangement for an Anglo-Soviet division of responsibilities in Greece and Rumania, "our assent having been given in consideration of the present war strategy."[52] And in reply to Churchill's urgent letter, Stalin suggested it would be better to wait for the American reply to the Soviet inquiry.[53]

* * *

British and Soviet awareness of the United States' assent for a three-month trial division of military responsibilities between Great Britain and the Soviet Union had nevertheless profound effects on the movement and final disposition of British and Soviet armed forces in the Balkans, although it was not until October that Churchill and Stalin reached an agreement on the matter of respective strategic-political responsibilities in the Balkans.

Acting on Roosevelt's consent, in principle, that Greece should be within the sphere of British military operations, Churchill obtained on August 26 the President's approval for the dispatch of a British force to Athens when the Germans were to evacuate the country,[54] an arrangement confirmed in greater detail at the Second Quebec meeting between the Prime Minister and the President in September.[55] Simultaneously he brought great pressure to bear in the arena of Greek politics to make the KKE and EAM and satellite parties join the coalition government of Premier Papandreou.[56]

But the United States' assent to the conclusion of a still unconcluded Anglo-Soviet agreement on the Balkans for a three month trial period seems also to have affected significantly Soviet policy toward Greece and Greek affairs during that critical summer of 1944.

On July 25, i.e. nine days after Gromyko had officially heard about the United States attitude, a Russian airplane taking off from an Anglo-American base in Italy, on a flight authorized for training purposes, landed in Yugoslavia near Tito's General Headquarters and embarked ten members of the Soviet Military Mission there. Flying to Greece, it dropped two of them over Macedonia and landed the rest on a mountain aerodrome in

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[50]Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1457.
[51]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
[52]Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1457.
[53]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
[54]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12.
[55]*Ibid.*, p. 159.
[56]*Ibid.*, p. 109ff. Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom, Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953*, Syracuse University Press, 1953. P. 1333 refers in particular to the fact that on July 27 and August 2, 1944, Eden and Churchill respectively blasted EAM as bearing "the responsibility for the failure to bring about unity in Greek politics at this ultimate moment of the common struggle."

Thessaly. This operation did not become known to the other Allies until the eight members of the Soviet Mission to ELAS, under Colonel Popov, reached ELAS General Headquarters on the morning of the 26th.[57] This subterfuge created consternation among the British.[58] But Molotov, in reply to the British Government's protest, dismissed it with a shrug of indifference as a matter too trivial even to have been referred to his level of authority at all.[59] Observers on the spot interpreted the Russian move as having been motivated by the Soviet Government's distrust of the information on which British policy in Greece was based.[60] Judging, however, from the astonishing course of events that followed this Soviet mission's arrival in Greece, this was not its only purpose.

Within a fortnight of the Soviet mission's arrival, and "for reasons," as Woodhouse says, "which cannot have been unconnected with it," PEEA, the provisional Greek Government in the mountains, gave ground to the extent of offering to send five (no longer seven) representatives to serve under a Prime Minister other than Papandreou, whom they still attacked.[61] And in the middle of August it announced its readiness to join Papandreou's government on exactly the terms it had been denouncing for the last two months.[62] Then, on September 2, after advice from the Soviet Legation in Cairo,[63] six representatives of the KKE and its satellite parties were sworn into the Greek Coalition Government in Cairo, and the dissolution of PEEA was announced on the ground that it had completed its mission. Finally at Caserta, on September 28, ELAS, much to the disgust of its leader General Saraphis, who evidently was "raring" to fight even the British,[64] agreed to place itself, together with EDES and other guerrilla forces, under the Greek Government and at the same time, through the Greek Government, under the orders of the British General commanding the Allied troops for the liberation of Greece.[65] As Woodhouse writes: "Even the bellicose wing of the KKE had to submit to the fiat of the Soviet Government which may be presumed to have been transmitted through the Soviet Mission."[66] *This mission's aim when sent to Greece on July 25 must surely have been to convey to the communist-controlled EAM-ELAS guerrillas the authoritative expression of Soviet policy, conducted with the knowledge that the U.S. had assented to a division between the Soviet Union and Great Britain of*

[57]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-8. Not in August, as McNeill says, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
[58]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 198. Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[59]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
[60]*Ibid.*, p. 199.
[61]*Ibid.* Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
[62]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
[63]McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 144. Kousoulas, *op. cit.*, p. 113, without giving the source of his information, writes that "by the end of July, the First Counselor of the Soviet Embassy forwarded official instructions to the EAM representatives in Cairo, advising them to show less obstructionism and enter the Papandreou government." This would confirm again the present writer's view that the Soviet decision had been taken after the U. S. Government gave its assent to an Anglo-Soviet division of responsibilities in Rumania and Greece.
[64]Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-4.
[65]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 203. For text see Appendix H.
[66]Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

operational responsibilities in the Balkans for a three month trial period, and particularly with the knowledge of American assent that Greece should, during this period, remain wholly within the British operational sphere. The Greek communists would have to cooperate with the British and the Greek Government-in-Exile, infiltrating it in the process as a second-best course of action.[67] In the meantime the Soviet Union, without jeopardizing Big Three unity at the critical moment of the Anglo-American landings in Normandy, or depriving the Eastern front of too many Soviet troops, would secure its position in Rumania and Bulgaria which the Red Army was invading, and perhaps, through Tito, obtain control over Yugoslavia. In quantitative terms this would mean eventually Soviet control over a Balkan area of 134,000 miles with a population of 22,000,000 (Rumania and Bulgaria, an area which the British had been ready to recognize as within the Soviet operational zone) with the addition perhaps of Yugoslavia's 134,000 square miles and 16,000,000 people. For this prospective Soviet gain it was worthwhile conceding provisionally to the British control over the 50,000 square miles of Greece and over its 7,500,000 people, particularly since the American Government stood behind Churchill in this matter.

* * *

Although, as indicated, the American assent for a division of military responsibilities between Britain and the Soviet Union referred only to Greece and Rumania, and this assent, according to Churchill, was not immediately followed by such an Anglo-Soviet arrangement, rumors about an Anglo-Soviet agreement for dividing 50/50 their spheres of military responsibility in Yugoslavia were apparently circulating that summer and may have exerted an influence on the course of Yugoslav affairs.

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[67]Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-1; p. 74. As the analyst of Greek writings on the subject writes, the question was: Shall the KKE decide to consolidate its potential mastery of Greece by total violence before the liberation, or will the KKE consent to PEEA entering the Papandreou Government and taking Greece by infiltration? He ascribes the KKE's choice of infiltration to the following four factors:

1. The British Government's threats (p. 71).
2. The unknown strength of the British landing force.
3. The unknown strength of the force under General Spiliotopoulos that may have preceded the British troops into Athens during the month of August (pp. 71-2; 74; 76).
4. Humane consideration for the plight of the Greek people.

With regard to the Soviet military mission, the analyst follows Woodhouse's view, buttressing it by quoting General Saraphis of ELAS as having written that "to the very end we never received any assistance" from the Soviet mission (p. 77). Thus, he does not take into consideration the broader context of the Big Three negotiations on the Balkans of May-June 1944. With regard to factor 4, it should be remarked tha no humane considerations inhibited the Greek Communist Party in its rebellion of 1944, a few weeks after liberation. To say merely, as Stavrianos does, that the world-wide Communist "line" at the time was national unity against the Axis and that the leaders of EAM followed this "line" in a mechanical and rigid manner is too vague, particularly if, as we have shown, Moscow at this time had specific reasons to promote this co-operation in Greece to gain advantages in Rumania and elsewhere. And to add that "their decision probably would have been different if they had known that at this very time both Moscow and Washington were agreeing that Britain should 'take the lead' in Greece," appears to disregard the fact that they were careful, before joining the Government, to consult Soviet representatives. L. S. Stavrianos, *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity*, Chicago, 1952, pp. 118-9.

How far these rumors corresponded to any new diplomatic exchanges between the Big Three does not emerge from Hull's or Churchill's memoirs. If Churchill, after securing American assent merely on Rumania and Greece, sought by another approach to the Soviet Government that summer to settle the question of respective spheres of influence in Yugoslavia too, his latest volume refers to no such move.

Vladimir Dedijer, at any rate, in his *Diary* mentions that in June, 1944, i.e. at a time when Churchill, as shown by his correspondence with Roosevelt, was considering extending the area of Anglo-Soviet responsibility to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia too, with the latter within the Briitsh sphere of action,[69] an American journalist had told him that an agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and Great Britain dividing Yugoslavia into spheres of influence and that the negotiations between Subašić and Tito were the outcome of this agreement. The British, this informant added, had accordingly discontinued all propaganda work in Rumania, and intensified it in Yugoslavia. The Russians would stop all propaganda work in Greece. Although Dedijer wrote at the time that he answered he could not believe the Russians would ever make such arrangements behind the back of other nations,[70] the fact is that Tito's behavior during the months that followed appears to have been strongly motivated by a desire to avoid any British influence in his country. Thus despite the weakness of his partisan situation early that summer, and his taking refuge at the island of Vis, which was under British control;[71] despite his important political gains over the Yugoslav Government in London, in June;[72] despite the blandishments of meetings with Generals Wilson and Alexander and, finally, with the great Churchill himself on August 12,[73] Tito on his own initiative, but with obvious Soviet approval,[74] decided secretly to leave Vis and the British. On September 21, at eleven o'clock at night, accompanied by the chief of the Soviet Military Mission, General Kornieyev, by Ivan Milutinović of Supreme Headquarters and his secretary Mitar Bakić, as well as by his dog "Tiger" which refused to keep still, so that a sack had to be tied over its head to keep it quiet, he boarded a Dakota transport plane which took off from the small airfield at Vis.[75] Sentries were left at his cave in which he had had his headquarters, to pretend that he was still there.[76] After stopping at Krajova, the headquarters of General Tolbukhin, whose armies had made a junction with Tito's forces on September 6,[77] he flew with General Kor-

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[68]Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953, p. 223. The long footnote on that page refers to his Diary published in three volumes in Serbo-Croat.

[69]Churchill, *op. cit.,* pp. 74-5. Hull, *op. cit.,* pp. 1453-4.

[70]Dedijer, *op. cit.,* p. 223. Footnote. Also *Dnevnik,* III, pp. 190-1. It was this report about spheres of influence, says Dedijer, which made Tito extremely cautious in his approach to Subašić.

[71]*Ibid.,* p. 225. A. Lukacs, *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe,* also stresses Tito's helplessness at this time and his dependence on the British.

[72]*Ibid.,* p. 225.

[73]*Ibid.,* p. 227. Churchill, *op. cit.,* pp. 87-93.

[74]Dedijer, *op. cit.,* p. 230.

[75]*Ibid.*

[76]Churchill, *op. cit.,* p. 230.

nieyev to Moscow. From his talks with Stalin resulted a joint communiqué arranging for the entry of Soviet troops into Yugoslavia. But this was not all. In Tito's own account of one of his meetings with Stalin,[78] during which the Soviet dictator tried to persuade him to cooperate more closely with King Peter's government:

> . . . Molotov returned to the room, which he had left a moment back. He carried a telegram from a Western news agency reporting that the British had landed in Yugoslavia.
>
> I leapt to my feet: "That's impossible."
>
> Stalin, angrily: "Why impossible! It is a fact!"
>
> I repeated it was impossible and probably the agency was mistaken. . . .
>
> Stalin was silent, and then asked the direct question: "Tell me . . . what would you do if the British really forced a landing in Yugoslavia?"
>
> "We should offer determined resistance."
>
> Stalin was silent. . . .

"Obviously," commented Tito, "the answer was not to his liking. Was he at that moment pondering over the arrangements he had made for the division of spheres of influence in Yugoslavia?"

But, as we have seen, no such arrangement existed yet for Yugoslavia. Although Stalin appeared not to have liked Tito's vehement reply, the fact is that he had remained silent.

* * *

Against this political background, Marshal Tolbukhin's troops started on September 24 their advance into Yugoslavia.[79] And on October 3, in an operation which Churchill had described to Eden as "one of reinforced diplomacy and policy rather than an actual campaign . . ."[80] British troops landed on the west coast of the Peloponnese, occupying Patras on the 4th.[81] The three months trial period assented to by the United States Government for a sharing of operational responsibilities in Greece and Rumania between Great Britain and the Soviet Union was ending.

Churchill, Sherwood mentions, felt that another Big Three conference was necessary without delay.[82] But in the United States, the "sole organ" of the national Government in foreign affairs was facing the quadrennial is-

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[77]Dedijer, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

[78]*Ibid.*, pp. 233-4.

[79]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[80]*Ibid.*, p. 110. Lord Wilson of Libya (then General Wilson) was supreme commander at the time of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean and asked the combined chiefs of staff for a definition with regard to British and American responsibilities in Greece. He was told to centralize under himself all operations for the occupation of Greece in case of German surrender or withdrawal, and to pave the way for the establishment of a Greek Government; for the latter part of the plan he was to act purely in a British capacity. The directive also stated that the participation of United States forces in the Balkans would be limited strictly to relief in Greece, such as welfare, public services, utilities, and assistance to displaced persons and refugees. H. M. Wilson, *Eight Years Overseas*, Hutchinson: London, 1950, p. 231.

[81]*Ibid.*, p. 285. Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[82]Robert E. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

sue of the presidential campaign. While fighting the greatest war in mankind's history and emerging upon the stage of world politics as the most powerful nation history has ever known, the American people were in the throes of presidential and congressional elections. American governmental machinery was undergoing a severe test.

Although it was obviously difficult under these circumstances for the President and presidential candidate to attend in October 1944 the three-power meeting Churchill favored, he might have entrusted the Secretary of State, or a personal representative, with the conduct of the necessary negotiations, giving directives and generally keeping in touch with this representative through the modern communication media which facilitate considerably such an arrangement. In October, however, Cordell Hull was very sick and was handing in his resignation;[83] and Harry Hopkins who had often carried out special missions for Roosevelt, was at the time still under a cloud.[84] And the President did not, as Churchill suggested, consider it "practicable or advantageous . . ." to be represented by Stettinius or Marshall.[85] He would, he wrote Churchill on September 30, direct Harriman "to give any assistance" the Prime Minister would desire.[86]

The further definition of Harriman's exact rôle during the Churchill-Stalin meetings in Moscow that October was the occasion for an interesting instance of high level decision on the conduct of American foreign affairs.

Charles E. Bohlen, at the time State Department liaison with the White House, had pointed out that American non-participation might be interpreted in European countries as an indication that the United States was not interested in European political problems.[87] Roosevelt, however, as Sherwood mentions, had approved sending a cable to Churchill in which "he did, in effect, wash his hands of the whole matter, with the implication that he was content to let Churchill speak for the United States as well as for Great Britain."[88] At this point Harry Hopkins intervened. In a "quick and arbitrary action," on October 3, he took upon himself the grave responsibility of giving "orders to the officers on duty in the Map Room that transmission of the President's message . . . was to be stopped."[89] Hopkins then went straight to the President's bedroom—the President was shaving at the time—and told what he had done and the reasons why he had done it. Roosevelt listened to him very attentively and approving of Hopkins' initiative, drafted, when he had finished his shaving, directives to Harriman as well as a message to be delivered by Harriman to Stalin.[90] He also sent a message to Churchill.[91] In his directive to Harriman, not published in full by Sherwood,[92] the President cabled that there could be "no subjects that I

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[83] *Ibid.*, p. 472.
[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 452, 471.
[85] Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-17.
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[87] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 469.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 470.
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 470-1.
[91] Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-20 (October 4).

can anticipate that might be discussed between Stalin and the Prime Minister in which I will not be greatly concerned. It is important," he added, "that I retain complete freedom of action after this conference." And in his message to Stalin[93] Roosevelt wrote that it had been his hope that no important meeting would be held until all three could get together, but understood Churchill's wish to confer with Stalin now. He emphasized that there was "in this global war literally no question, either military or political, in which the United States was not interested." He explained further that he regarded the forthcoming talks of Stalin with Churchill "merely as a preliminary to a conference of the three of us, which can take place . . . any time after our national election." Finally, Roosevelt suggested to Stalin that Harriman attend the Moscow meeting as an observer but also emphasized that the United States Ambassador "could not commit this government relative to any important matters which may be discussed." The President's message to Churchill was of a similar tenor.[94] For the Balkans the net result was that it was not the Big Three who examined, after the three months period agreed to by the United States, the question of responsibility on that peninsula, but the Big Two, Churchill and Stalin.

* * *

The dramatic way in which the Anglo-Soviet agreement was finally reached on October 9 during the Churchill-Stalin meeting in Moscow—the famous "half-sheet of paper" on which Churchill put down the proposed percentages of "predominance" in the Balkans; Stalin's "large tick" with his blue pencil signifying his assent to this proposal—need not be recounted again here, for Churchill has vividly described this scene.[95]

The percentages agreed upon were as follows:[96]

Rumania	
Russia	90%
The others	10%
Greece	
Great Britain (in accord with U.S.A.)	90%
Russia	10%
Yugoslavia	50/50
Hungary	50/50
Bulgaria	
Russia	75%
The others	25%

The agreement thus not only dealt with matters of Greece and Ru-

[92]Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 471.

[93]*Ibid.* Sherwood mentions that Stalin expressed his appreciation of the President's clarifying message, saying he had previously been under the impression that Churchill would be authorized to speak for Roosevelt as well as for himself (pp. 471-2).

[94]Churchill, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-20.

[95]*Ibid.*, p. 227.

[96]*Ibid.*

mania establishing respectively British and Soviet "preponderance" in those two countries for the duration of the war, but also defined the respective percentages of British and Soviet preponderance in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary, likewise for wartime action. That is, it dealt with states not included in the American decision of June.

What was the exact meaning of these percentages of predominance? How could these percentages be expressed? Did they signify the ideal percentages of participation in the Greek, Yugoslav, Bulgarian or Rumanian governments, of representatives of pro-Western and pro-Soviet political groups and personalities? But then, various ministries have differing functions of control, and qualitative considerations would have to be taken into account. And in the case of Yugoslavia, did the percentage 50/50 have any territorial significance, as for instance, the secret Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 had in the case of Persia? Finally, what did the terms Greece, Yugoslavia, etc. mean territorially? Did they refer to those countries as territorially constituted prior to the outbreak of World War II?

According to Churchill:[97]

> The system of percentage is not intended to prescribe the numbers sitting on commissions for the different Balkan countries, but rather to express the interest and sentiment with which the British and Soviet Governments approach the problems of these countries, and so that they might reveal their minds to each other in some way that could be comprehended. It is not intended to be more than a guide and, of course, in no way commits the United States. . . . It may help, however, the United States to see how their two principal allies feel about these regions when the picture is presented as a whole.

Proceeding then to the percentages agreed on for each Balkan country Churchill wrote that Great Britain felt it right to respect Russian views about Rumania and Bulgaria, for Soviet Russia "quite naturally has vital interests in the countries bordering on the Black Sea." Similarly Soviet Russia would be ready to concede Great Britain's "long tradition of friendship with Greece," and its "direct interest as a Mediterranean Power in her future." Thus, on the one hand the Soviet Government fulfilled aspirations it had repeatedly expressed during the period of the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon (1939-1941), by securing Soviet hegemony over the Black Sea.[97a] And the British Government, on the other hand, which in July 1940 was apparently willing—if Molotov's account of Stalin's conversation with Sir Stafford Cripps is true—to relinquish in favor of the Soviet Union its preponderant rôle in the entire Balkan peninsula,[97b] was able to preserve at least its hold on the peninsula's southern tip, on Greece, and maintained its naval domination over the Aegean, which, in a sense, is the outlet of

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[97] *Ibid.*, pp. 233-4.

[97a] *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941,* Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, Department of State, 948, Publication 3023, Washington D.C., p. 161; p. 258-259.

[97b] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

the Black Sea—through the Turkish Straits—into the rest of the Mediterranean. For the Bulgarian Armistice of October 28, 1944, which followed the secret Anglo-Soviet agreement, by calling upon Bulgarian military and civilian authorities to withdraw from Greek Thrace and Macedonia, denied in effect the Bulgarian claims for access to the Aegean which the Soviet Government in 1940—witness the documents in *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*—favored and was prepared to guarantee.[97c]

Coming to Yugoslavia, the 50/50 percentage was intended to be, explained Churchill, the foundation of joint action and an agreed policy between Great Britain and the Soviet Union "so as to favor the creation of a united Yugoslavia after all elements there have been joined together to the utmost in driving out the Nazi invaders." In the case of Greece, as well as Yugoslavia, the aim of such agreement was to prevent civil strife between hostile factions in those two countries.

The change in the respective power positions of Britain and the Soviet Union in the Balkans since spring 1944 is particularly well revealed by the percentage of 50/50 for Yugoslavia. As we have seen, while Churchill in June was prepared to recognize the Soviet Union's preponderance in Bulgaria, a Black Sea neighbor, even before it had surrendered to the Red Army, he still hoped, by applying methods that proved successful in the case of Greece, to keep British control over Yugoslavia.[99] By October, however, he had to content himself with an equal share of influence in Yugoslavia, a percentage which in reality meant merely joint Soviet-British diplomatic attempts to enforce the Tito-Subašić agreement, inasmuch as Stalin was aware, since Tito's trip to Moscow mentioned previously, that the Yugoslav dictator was determined to resist by armed force any British landing in Yugoslavia.

Despite the U.S. Government's clear reservation of its position at the Anglo-Soviet conference, Harriman's presence at this momentous meeting[100] as an impotent observer cannot but have led the main actors to believe that the United States was less interested in that region of the world than in others, an impression that could be confirmed by the United States' initial assent to a three-month trial period for a division of military responsibilities in Greece and Rumania between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.[101] No one sits stoically by if his toe is suddenly stepped on!

Whether United States participation in this secret agreement at this stage might have modified the percentages of predominance agreed upon by Great Britain and the Soviet Union is a matter for speculation. One might observe on the one hand that by raising to three the number of parties to the deal, the Soviet percentage might have lessened with the result that the West in postwar times might have enjoyed a greater degree of political influence in the Balkans than it does now, particularly had a few token United States troops been sent on the spot to underline American interest.

[97c] *Ibid.*, p. 161; p. 245-256.
[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.
[99] *Ibid.*, p. 224; 228.
[100] Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1458.

On the other hand it should be emphasized that this climax on the highest Anglo-Soviet political level of diplomatic exchanges that had started on May 5, was merely a recognition of the military situation as it had developed since that date. While the Red Army had, since May, surged into the Balkans, occupied Rumania, declared war against Bulgaria and occupied it, and was now turning west into Yugoslavia, Roosevelt and Churchill, at their second Quebec Conference in September, 1944, had noted that "as long as the battle for Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except" for the two British brigades in Egypt "held ready to occupy the Athens area" and "the small land forces in the Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for Commando type operations."[101] This local shortage of military forces, the causes of which lay in the decision to carry out Operation Anvil—landings in Southern France—[102] would have precluded larger landings of token armed forces to underline western interest in a larger area of the Balkans than Greece. But, perhaps again, American diplomatic pressure at this junction, when the Russians were anxious to secure Western unity against the Germans, and the Second Front was under way, might have been enough to inhibit them in their attempts to get control over the entire Balkans and Southeast Europe with the exception of Greece.

Speculations aside, it is interesting to observe how a problem between the Big Three Allies on the matter of the position of Rumania and Greece within the arena of their military operations against the Germans who had control over those two countries, finally became a matter not of respective military operations but of respective "predominance," albeit for the war's duration. Hull, indeed, had been quite right in his prognosis of the consequence of such an agreement starting with Greece and Rumania, though he had been wrong in estimating the function of such international agreements among Great Powers concerning third parties, small states or regions lacking sovereignty. Such agreements, while indirectly they may be a prelude to war, witness the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939, do not necessarily entail war between the contracting parties but may contribute to a relaxation of tension between the powers concerned, witness the secret Great Power agreements before World War I, the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908 (which though unratified because of the Senate's non-consent, indicated, nevertheless, to the Japanese Government certain American intentions), or witness too the Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907 and 1917 dealing with Manchuria and Mongolia, after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904. And it was this *détente*-producing function that Churchill had stressed in pressing for the Balkan arrangement and which Roosevelt finally recognized in giving the United States' assent to it for a three-month trial period. And it was this same function that Stalin recognized too in October, 1944, by finally accepting the system of percentages of

[101]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[102]Hanson W. Baldwin, "Churchill Was Right," *The Atlantic*, July, 1954, vol. 194, No. 1, pp. 29-30.

predominance, although he was astute enough to conclude it at a moment when the cards were stacked high in his favor.

Thus, given the passive American diplomacy and its "legalistic-moralistic" approach to a very real problem, the Anglo-Soviet secret agreement of October 9, 1944, reflected the shifting of the local military balance from Germany to the Soviet Union rather than to Great Britain, and expressed the relative power of the two allied Great Powers and their expectations about future developments in the Balkans. Future changes in the relative hegemonic positions in this region would depend on the give and take among the Great Powers, expressed in further arrangements and conferences (Yalta, Potsdam), in the Councils of the Foreign Ministers (London, Moscow, Paris, New York), and in the peace treaties, and would depend not on local considerations but on considerations of a global scale. But sometimes, too, changes might occur through actions of local increments of power.

* * *

For Greece, where the Coalition Government of Premier Papandreou represented on the Greek political level something far less than the 90% figure of British preponderance, the secret Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 9, 1944, had important results, for it served to define the territorial area in which the landing British troops might exercise the control to which the United States had explicitly assented and the Soviet had previously tacitly conceded. Thus, it restored to Greece its prewar boundaries and served to bring about the withdrawal of Bulgarian military and civilian authorities from Greek Thrace and Macedonia, which Bulgaria had occupied during the war with views toward annexation. This withdrawal was formalized in the armistice terms the Soviet Union, "playing the Allied hand," granted on October 28 to the Bulgarian Government.

However, the very presence of General Tolbukhin's mighty forces just north of the Greek border as well as the local strength of the private army of ELAS which was under Communist control, as compared to the small size of the token British forces landing in Greece, had upon domestic Greek politics psychological effects leading to developments not quite compatible with the immediate aim of the secret Anglo-Soviet agreement, which, as aforementioned, was mainly the prevention of civil strife in the Balkans at that juncture of World War II.

As a former Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has pointed out,[103] at the time of the liberation of Greece one of the most agonizing questions was whether Tolbukhin's troops would stop at the Greco-Bulgarian border or enter Greece.[104] This army of great power was moving toward the frontier, and its political friends in Greece, to gain support among its doubtful followers, could use this occurrence to fan expectations that it would finally cross the frontier. When the Soviet Army stopped

[103]Eleftherios A. Stavrides, *Ta paraskenia tou KKE,* Athens: 1953. Although the author, at the time under investigation was no longer Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), he still had contacts with several of its leaders. This book was not, because of its later date, included among those analyzed in Library of Congress, *op. cit.*

[104]Stavrides, *op. cit.,* pp. 547-8.

at the frontier, the question arose: would it halt there provisionally or for good? The KKE leadership, apparently, as well as the party and the EAM, thought at first it had stopped there provisionally, but this hope was soon dispelled when Soviet liaison officers assured the KKE leaders that such a descent into Greece would not occur as long as Germany was still undefeated and the danger still existed that the Western allies might conclude a separate armistice with Hitler.[105] Believing, nevertheless, that the British had no other troops available to send to Greece, and hoping that should they intervene the Russians would do likewise, the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party decided to withdraw its representatives as well as EAM's from the Coalition Government, which had been studying measures for dissolving private armies as a preliminary to creating a regular military force,[106] and to launch an attempt to take over governmental power by naked force.[107] Consequently, despite the fact that the Russians may not have encouraged them to do so (though they would surely have approved had the rebels succeeded), the KKE, in December 1944, thinking it might still hold in its hands that crucial increment of power—the straw that broke the camel's back—that might serve to turn the scale in favor of the Soviet Union, or make the Red Army intervene, led its followers into a bloody venture which Churchill had no political qualms in repressing,[108] fortified as he was by his secret agreement with Stalin who stood faithfully,[109] but silently by.

* * *

"No more let us falter! From Malta to Yalta! Let nobody alter!" wrote Churchill to Roosevelt on January 1, 1945.[110] As the war in Europe approached its end the factors that had led to the secret Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 9 on the Balkans gradually ceased operating and tension arose between the West and the Soviet Union not only on matters concerning the whole postwar picture of Europe and the world.

At Yalta, the Big Three meeting that might have convened several months earlier but for Stalin's reluctance[110a] and the presidential elections in the United States, President Roosevelt, at the first day of the conference, on February 5, 1945, aroused Soviet expectations that the American occupation of Europe would be limited for about two years because of Congressional attitudes.[111]

The Declaration on Liberated Europe, the handiwork mainly of the

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[105] *Ibid.*, p. 551.

[106] Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 214ff. Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[107] Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 216ff. Library of Congress, *op. cit.*, p. 71. Also Kousoulas, *op. cit.*, p. 118, who mentions that the EAM slogan at this time was: "Now or Never."

[108] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 293; 305; 400; 420; 713.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

[110a] As the recently released records of the Yalta Conference show, Roosevelt, on July 17, 1944, sought a Big Three conference sometime in September of that year, but Stalin invoked the military operations as a reason against such a meeting at the time, *New York Times*, March 17, 1955, p. 47.

[111] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 353, says this statement was made at the first meeting. The record however, shows it was made at the second plenary session, *New York Times*, March 17, 1955, p. 56. However, both sessions took place on the same day.

American delegation,[112] was the only effort made to modify the psychological effects of the Red Army occupation of the whole of Eastern Europe except Greece. The chance for another arrangement on the Balkans had been missed in May and October 1944.

Although the Polish question was the main European issue discussed at Yalta, the Big Three also dealt with the Yugoslav question and, in a manner redolent of the 50/50 Anglo-Soviet deal, recommended the implementation of the Tito-Subašić agreement of summer 1944.[112a]

In two notes the British Government raised the matter of the Austro-Yugoslav and the Italo-Yugoslav frontiers, but the conference took no decisions on these matters.[112b] It was Tito's aggressive movements in Venezia Giulia (about which the British Government expressed apprehension in their two notes submitted at Yalta) that led the American Government to send to the northwest corner of the Balkans, to Trieste, in May of 1945, American forces[113] together with British troops rushing there to enforce the principle of American and British foreign policy of no territorial changes before the peace settlements, and, in the process, to protect Italian territory from communist inroads.

With regard to Greece, Stalin, at the conference's fifth plenary meeting on February 8, 1945, asked Churchill for information on what was going on there but stressed he had no intention either of criticizing British action there or of intervening. Furthermore, at the sixth plenary meeting on February 9, after joking that it would have been dangerous if Churchill had allowed other forces than his own to go into Greece—to which Churchill replied he would welcome a Soviet observer there—the Soviet dictator declared he had complete confidence in British policy in Greece.[113a]

For its part the British Government submitted at Yalta for the consideration of the Soviet and American governments several notes on Balkan affairs which, together and separately, testify to British efforts to adhere to the spirit of the Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 1944.[113b] While the note on Bulgaria dealt with the problem of the Allied Control Commission there, that on Rumania merely referred to oil equipment in that country. Furthermore, the document on Bulgaria made a clear distinction on the part of the British with regard to their attitude toward that country before and after the end of hostilities with Germany. During the first period, the British proposed that if the Soviet Government felt obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the armistice, this action should be taken on the sole responsibility, and in the name of, the Soviet Government. However, during the period after the end of hostilities, the British proposed full participation of the American and their own repre-

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[112]Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians,* New York 1949, p. 36; p. 88. Also *New York Times,* March 17, 1955, p. 71, which reveals that the original text was submitted by Roosevelt on February 9, 1945.

[112a]Part VII of the communiqué issued at the end of the Yalta Conference, *New York Times,* March 17, 1955, p. 77.

[112b]*Ibid.,* p. 72.

[113a]*New York Times,* March 17, 1955, pp. 66 and 70.

[113b]*Ibid.,* p. 72.

sentative on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria, with the right of direct access to Bulgarian authorities; and unanimity in decision-making, with the important provision that "if the Soviet High Command, being *de facto* in control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insisted on issuing directions to the local government, or taking action not approved by both the British and American representatives, they should act unilaterally in their own name."

The Yalta Conference adjourned, merely mentioning in its protocol the British Government's submission of these important notes. However, the aforementioned attitudes of the Soviet and British governments on Balkan affairs indicate that the Yalta Declaration did not supersede in their minds the secret *quid pro quo* arrangement of October 9, 1944.

This is confirmed by later references.

Thus, although, as he recounts, Churchill felt hampered by it when protesting Vishinsky's action, backed by the deployment of Soviet tanks and troops in the streets of Bucharest, in foisting upon Rumania a Soviet nominated administration in February-March, 1945,[114] he referred to it in a message to Stalin in June, 1945, after the war's end in Europe, despite the fact that he had assured his colleagues in October that the secret agreement was merely "an interim guide for the immediate wartime future."[115] On June 26, complaining that "the United States and His Majesty's Government had put in motion many hundreds of thousands of troops in order to prevent themselves from being attacked by Marshal Tito," he reminded Stalin of the 50/50 percentage of predominance in Yugoslavia agreed on in Moscow.[116] And he did likewise at Potsdam, on July 18,[117] Stalin counter-asserting that the proportions in Yugoslavia were 90 per cent British, 10 per cent Yugoslav and 0 per cent Russian interests, and countercomplaining that "he had been hurt by the Americans' demand for a change in government in Rumania and Bulgaria" and that since "he was not meddling in Greek affairs it was unjust of them to do so."

With war approaching its end in the Far East, the secret informal and wartime arrangement on the Balkans between Great Britain and the Soviet Union became gradually sucked up into the general European and global problems, the Yalta Declaration acting as a kind of catalyst. The United States Government, not bound by the Anglo-Soviet agreement, had, albeit indirectly, expressed its displeasure at the British intervention in Greece during the December 1944 revolt. Now it was free to do likewise with regard to Soviet intervention in political developments in Rumania and Bul-

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[114]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 420. Also see Byrnes, *New York Times*, October 18, 1947, and *supra*, footnote 1.

[115]*Ibid.*, pp. 234-5; p. 331.

[116]*Ibid.*, p. 560.

[117]*Ibid.*, p. 634. The United States delegation, on July 17, at Potsdam, submitted a memorandum proposing that internationally observed elections be carried out in Rumania and Bulgaria in the same way as France, Great Britain and the United States had agreed in the case of Greece, v. Bevin statement in the UN Security Council, United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records*, 1st Year, 1946, pp. 100-1. Also Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, pp. 53-58.

garia. And, while Britain felt inhibited, as aforementioned, in protesting about these developments, the Soviet Government countered American protests by bringing up the case of Greece. Here the British took a stand, and, with the Americans, pointed to the measures taken in Greece to implement the Yalta Declaration, such as internationally observed elections. Stalin soon tied up the problem of Poland with that of Greece and Belgium;[118] the problem of Greek elections to those in Finland;[119] the problem of the Polish Government to the Yugoslav solution.[120] He finally dealt it a *coup de grâce* when as a *riposte* to the Iranian Government's complaint on the presence of Soviet troops in Northern Iran, the Soviet representative on the United Nations Security Council raised the question of the presence of British troops in Greece, terming the situation as giving rise "to extreme tension fraught with the possibility of serious consequences both for the Greek people and for the maintenance of peace and security."[121]

However, the ghost of the secret Anglo-Soviet agreement floated about the Council hall, visible only to the Big Three representatives. Formally, the state of war which had brought it into being had not ended. Its spirit might still be invoked, and Bevin came close to doing so, while Vishinsky discreetly exorcised it.

More specifically, summing up Greek affairs of 1944 in a paragraph of superb brevity and cryptic casualness, Bevin said:[122]

> There was a meeting in the Levant . . . An all-party Government was formed including EAM. It was agreed there and later . . . that since no police, no army, and no civil service were left, British administrators and troops, in agreement with Marshal Stalin, should go into Greece.

Reverting to the Yalta Conference, he emphasized in defense of the military *status quo* that Stalin had expressed complete confidence in British policy in Greece,[123] and that whenever the problem of Greece had arisen in any negotiations with the Soviet Union, either at Potsdam, or in the London and Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers, in September and December 1945 respectively, it had always been when the Big Three representatives were discussing Rumania, Bulgaria, or Poland.[124] In his supplementary remarks, moreover, he underlined that it had been the United States Government which at Potsdam, on July 17, 1945, had submitted a memorandum on the Yalta Declaration dealing mainly with Rumania and Bulgaria and proposing for those countries free and unfettered elections along the pattern agreed upon for Greece by France, Great Britain and the United States. The same thing had occurred at the London meeting of Foreign Ministers in September, 1945, and on that occasion, Bevin stressed, he had taken no

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[118]Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 492.
[119]*Ibid.*, p. 499.
[120]United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records*, 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 1, Annex 3, pp. 73-4.
[122]1st Year, 1st Series, p. 81.
[123]*Ibid.*, p. 79.
[124]*Ibid.*, p. 79-80.

part in the discussion, "leaving it to the protagonists" Byrnes and Molotov.[125]

Vishinsky, for his part, attacking the military *status quo,* invoked a kind of *clausula rebus sic stantibus* to the secret agreement, while admitting that the Soviet Government "at one time" had fully agreed to the necessity for British troops in Greece because of the struggle against the Germans[126] (reminiscent of United States assent of July 12, 1944). "At the present time," he argued, there was no such need and the presence in Greece of British troops did not serve to protect lines of communication with British troops in defeated countries, as was the case of British and American troops in France, Belgium or Holland, or the British troops in Italy, or the Soviet troops in Poland.[127] Finally, Vishinsky denied that the Soviet Government raised the question of Greece whenever the problems of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland were being discussed, as Bevin argued; pointed out that the Soviet complaint against Greece submitted at Potsdam was based on the Yalta Declaration, and that the United States memorandum on Bulgaria and Rumania had stated that Eden subscribed to the American views, whereas the Soviet memorandum on Greece, also submitted at Potsdam, made no reference to Great Britain.[128]

Of course, in the debate, neither the British nor the Soviet representative would officially and publicly disclose their governments' secret agreement of 1944, for this would deal a grave blow to the morale, expectations and hopes of those political groups in Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece or Albania which were against the existing Great Power control over their respective countries and believed that their political aims might better be served by an exchange of British for Soviet hegemony or vice-versa or by the arrival of a third Great Power on the scene. Moreover, the public disclosure of the Anglo-Soviet secret wartime deal would nakedly reveal a Great Power approach to small state problems in a manner hardly compatible with the promises of the Atlantic Charter, the concert ideals of Yalta, or the UN Charter's Utopian principles, of which the Big Three were still the high-priests.

When, by August and September, 1946, the inter-Great Power tensions over the small states of Europe and other problems had increased and the Balkan and other European peace treaties were being thrashed out, no delegate's voice was heard making reference to the informal secret Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 9, 1944, in the Security Council discussion of the Ukrainian complaint, and Gromyko made his surprise statement requesting information on the disposition of foreign troops in Allied countries.[129] By then the agreement was completely dead, though its effects are still felt to this day, eleven years later.

New York City

[125] *Ibid.,* pp. 100-1.
[126] *Ibid.,* p. 79.
[127] *Ibid.,* p. 74; 77.
[128] *Ibid.,* p. 92.
[129] *Ibid.,* First Year, Second Series, p. 141ff.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY (PZPR)

by Richard F. Staar

WHO are the people actually supervising the day to day operations that take place in the central apparatus of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR-*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*)? How has this apparatus developed, since it was formalized at the end of World War II?

An attempt will be made here to answer the first question not only in terms of the five Secretaries who occupy the current policy-making positions in the PZPR Secretariat but also by analyzing, to a lesser extent, those individuals who transform the policies into concrete directives. In order to find a solution to the second problem, it was necessary to scan the Polish Communist press for a full ten year period (1945 through 1954). Biographic sketches appearing in these newspapers were very helpful, in that they provided valuable clues on the internal structure of the Secretariat. This personal data was most plentiful during four periods of time: preceding the two postwar elections to parliament (*Sejm*), in January 1947 and October 1952, as well as on two occasions when delegates were being selected for the PZPR Congresses of December 1948 and March 1954.

Although this type of data is necessarily incomplete, due to the customary reticence of the communists, it can provide the answers to questions about the nature of the apparatus worker. The biographies can tell us the ages of these "professional revolutionaries," their social class derivation, education, inter-war activities, where they spent World War II, how many years they have belonged to the Polish Communist Party, and whether they served prison terms for subversive activities against the pre-war Polish Government.

An inquiry into the nature of the apparatus worker should provide us with one of the keys to an understanding of the Polish communist movement. Such an analysis is also important, because certain of these bureaucrats will be recruited into the top leadership of "People's Poland" in the future.

(1) Duties and Importance

The new PZPR statute stipulates that the Secretariat of the Central Committee "directs current work, mainly in the field of organizing control over the implementation of Party resolutions and selection of cadres."[1] Edward Ochab (one of the five current Secretaries) declared in his speech at the Second PZPR Congress that the Central Committee would rely upon the Secretariat "for the direction of every-day work, especially in matters of organizing control and execution of Party decisions,"[2] while relying upon

[1]Article 30, "Statut PZPR zatwierdzony przez II Zjazd Partii," *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, March 19, 1954. Henceforth cited as *Statut PZPR*.

[2]E. Ochab, "O niektórych zadaniach organizacyjnych i zmianach w Statucie Partii," *ibid.*, March 17, 1954. In the course of this speech, Ochab revealed that (contrary to the 1948 PZPR statute) two Secretariats had evolved in the period 1949-54, one political and

the Political Bureau for direction of the activities of the Central Committee between the latter's plenary sessions.

The daily attention by the Secretariat to current organizational and executive problems involves not only active supervision over the work of the central Party apparatus but also a constant check on local Party organizations and officials, and vigilance with regard to the work and status of Party members everywhere. This and the continuous contact with the Political Bureau, on which three of the five Secretaries now hold membership, makes the Secretariat the hub of the Party and the focal point of control. The twenty-four currently identified sections (*wydziały*) that handle the daily work under the immediate supervision of directors (*kierownicy*) are shown on Chart III. Each of these sections is in turn subdivided into sectors.

(2) Formative Stage, 1945-48

The history of the Secretariat shows that it has changed and undergone expansion, commensurate with the increase of Communist control over the state apparatus. The original structure of the Secretariat between December 1945 and December 1948 is portrayed on Chart I, with the names of the initial directors appearing below the section designations. These designations indicate the fields considered most important by the Party leadership for the selection of trusted personnel. The key unit in the Secretariat at this time was the Cadres' Section (*wydział personalny,* subsequently redesignated *wydział kadr*), although the Section for Organization ranked just below it in importance.

CHART I

ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT, 1946*



*Polska Partia Robotnicza, *Statut Polskiej Partii Robotniczej uchwalony na I Zjeździe PPR, 1945* (Łódź: Zakłady Graficzne "Książka," February 1948), p. 15. This is where the Secretariat sections for the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), predecessor of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR), were found. The statute cited above was approved unanimously by the 1,000 delegates at the PPR Congress on December 6-12, 1945

Direction and responsibility for Party cadres during the period 1944-48 were in the hands of a militant communist named Zenon Kliszko[3] who was a trusted confidant of the Secretary-General, Władysław Gomułka. Born at Łódź in 1908 as the son of a textile worker, Kliszko was graduated from Warsaw University's law school. He was jailed for two years, because of leftist activities, prior to 1939 and spent some time at Lwów under Russian occupation. In January 1942, he became one of the co-founders of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR-*Polska Partia Robotnicza*) at Warsaw. For services in editing the clandestine PPR press, in July 1944 he was coopted into the Central Committee. After participation in the abortive Warsaw Uprising with units of the communist People's Guard (GL-*Gwardia Ludowa*), he reached Lublin and took over the Cadres' Section.

A brief analysis of the other persons occupying the first postwar section directorships under Władysław Gomułka indicates a similar background for the majority. With the exception of two (Gordon and Petrusewicz), who were apparently specialists in their respective fields and to whom the following generalizations do not apply, six of the remaining seven directors[4] already had become Central Committee members at the PPR Congress in 1945 and one (Edwarda Orłowska) was coopted soon thereafter. All seven were born at the turn of the century, i.e. between 1895 and 1908. The peasant and middle classes were represented by two persons each, the other three section heads being of worker parentage. Only three of the directors (Bieńkowski, Chełchowski, Kliszko) had remained inside of German-occupied

the other organizational. The former established policies which were submitted for approval to the Politburo. The latter dealt with membership and administrative questions. Distinctly inferior to its political counterpart, the Organizational Secretariat was entrusted mainly with the transmitting of Party decisions. While all members of the Political Secretariat simultaneously held membership on the Politburo, the same did not hold true for the Organizational Secretariat (e.g., Edmund Pszczółkowski). Ochab further disclosed that only one Secretariat would exist in the future, since "it appears pointless to maintain the current division of the Secretariat into political and organizational [parts]."

[3]His official biography appeared in *Głos Ludu*, Warsaw, January 16, 1947. Kliszko's career ended when he was relieved of all Party posts on September 3, 1948 and demoted to candidate membership on the Central Committee because he had supported the deviationist Gomułka. "Sprawy organizacyjne," *Nowe Drogi*, V (September-October, 1948), p. 205. A brief tenure as Deputy Minister of Justice (1948-49) and then as director of a department in the "Książka i Wiedza" publishing cooperative was but a prelude to expulsion from the Central Committee on November 13, 1949. Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnica, *III Plenum KC PZPR* (Warsaw: *Nowe Drogi*, 1949), p. 4. Kliszko was last reported at the parliament meeting of December 30, 1949 in the company of Gomułka. *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, December 31, 1949. They are both presumably still under arrest.

[4]Analyses of key personnel in the Secretariat have been attempted for the aftermaths of the three postwar Congresses (held in December 1945, December 1948, and March 1954 respectively). The scope of analysis has been restricted to those section directors who were full members, as opposed to candidate members, of the Central Committee for the following reasons: (1) membership on the Central Committee provides a criterion for measuring the importance of a section head, and (2) personal data, in the form of official biographies, is available from the communist press of Poland in full enough coverage only for the full members of the Central Committee.

Five of these seven 1945 section directors have been able to maintain their Central Committee membership to date. Władysław Bieńkowski was purged in September 1948, together with other followers of Gomułka. Cf. "Sprawy organizacyjne," *op. cit.* Edwarda Orłowska was not reelected to the Central Committee in March 1954 but instead was made a member of the Central Audit Commission. *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, March 19, 1954.

CHART II

ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT, 1949



Poland in the PPR and GL through the Second World War; the other four were in the Soviet Union during this time. Three were schooled vocationally (Chełchowski, Mazur, Witaszewski), while the majority received some higher education. All seven joined the Communist Party of Poland (KPP-*Komunistyczna Partia Polski*) in the period 1919-33, and all have prison records for pre-war communist activities in Poland.

(3) Transition, 1948-54

The organizational pattern of the Secretariat, as outlined above, remained in effect until 1948. At the Merger Congress of that year, which saw the absorption of the left wing of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS-*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) by the communists and the formation of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR), the Secretariat was reorganized—probably in anticipation of the Six Year Plan (1950-55). Cadres' responsibilities underwent decentralization within the Secretariat and the number of sections increased from nine to thirteen, with one larger unit (the Department of Education, Culture and Mass Propaganda) superior to three sections. This new arrangement is shown on Chart II. The new subdivisions for Economics, Trade Unions, and Communications were apparently new names for the former sections of Industry, Vocational (Training), and Railroads respectively. Complete innovations are represented by the units for Party Schools, Foreign (Affairs), Self-Government and Administration, and Culture.

It should be noted here that Zenon Nowak had replaced Kliszko in the key Cadres' Section already on November 3, 1948 (the directorship apparently had remained vacant during the two months immediately preceding this date), i.e. over a month before the Fusion Congress. Nowak held the position of cadres' chief until May 10, 1950, when he was elevated to full Politburo membership, without passing through the candidate stage, and became Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of manpower. In contrast to his predecessor in cadres' work, Nowak is a USSR-trained communist. He was born in 1905 at Pabianice near Łódź. His working class family fled to Russia in 1915 before the German advance. After returning to Poland, following the First World War, Nowak became a coal miner and in 1924 began full-time work in the Communist Party of Poland. An official biography states that he spent thirteen years in Polish prisons and that he became a member of the Party's Secretariat and Central Committee. During World War II, Nowak was in the Soviet Union.[5] He did not return to Poland until 1947, whereupon he served successively as Party secretary for Poznań and Katowice provinces.

[5]The newspaper account of his life (*Dziennik Zachodni*, Katowice, October 9, 1952) states that Zenon Nowak was at forced labor in the Sudetenland during World War II, joined the Red Army after liberation, and subsequently spent some time at Kiev in the Ukraine. This is either a deliberate falsification or a case of mistaken identity, possibly involving Roman Nowak (currently PZPR secretary for Opole province). Zenon Nowak is known to have been in USSR territory between the years 1939 and 1947, probably in a Soviet prison. For the individual fates of twenty-seven former high ranking KPP functionaries, who did not survive their Russian asylum, see A. Burmeister, "Tragedia polskich komunistów," *Kultura*, LI (January, 1952), pp. 101-109.

Despite the increase in units attached to the Secretariat by 1949 and the substantial left-wing Social Democratic (PPS) component in the new Party, only one former PPS member (Marian Rybicki) became a section director after the Fusion Congress. Two others (Kratko and Kowalczyk) hitherto have not been elected to the Central Committee, although the latter has held Party Control Commission membership since 1948. The following analysis pertains to the remaining eleven directors. All except Artur Starewicz (elected in 1954) were made Central Committee members at the 1948 Congress. The group as a whole was relatively younger than its 1946 predecessor, most members having been born during the 1903-18 period (except Ostap Dłuski, born in 1892). Only three persons had held directorships in 1946 (Chełchowski, Orłowska, Popiel). In terms of social extraction, the peasant and worker category dropped to one and two respectively; the other eight were brought up in a middle class milieu. Four directors had remained inside of Poland during the Second World War (Albrecht, Chełchowski, Kozłowska, Zółkiewski); the other seven had been in the Soviet Union. The great majority of the group has had some university education; the three exceptions (Alster, Chełchowski, Nowak) received vocational training. All but one[6] joined the Polish Communist Party in the years 1920-34 and have known pre-war prison records.

(4) Current Phase, 1954-date

During the period 1948-54, practical experience apparently forced the Secretariat to substitute for its hitherto functional approach a "production-branch" system for the purpose of achieving concentrated responsibility. The ensuing reorganization (see Chart III) represented an effort to adapt the structure of the Secretariat to pressing economic tasks. Thus, the former Cadres' Section was abolished[7] and its functions redistributed among the other existing sections within the Secretariat. On the other hand, the new sections for Heavy Industry (armaments), Light Industry, and Trade and Finances immediately upon establishment began to maintain their own personnel organizations. Other sections created by the Secretariat between 1949 and 1955 are those for Administration, General Affairs, Mass Organizations, Municipal Administration, Party History, Physical Education, Military Affairs, Science and Higher Education, Transportation, and Youth.

With the elimination of a separate unit for cadres' work, the Organization Section became all-important within the central apparatus. Originally

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[6]The exception is Stefan Żółkiewski who did not join the Party until May 1942 (see *Głos Wielkopolski*, Poznań, October 4, 1952 and *Express Poznański*, Poznań, October 8, 1952) and on whom no police record was found.

[7]Julian Tokarski (Minister of Machine Industry since November 1952) succeeded Zenon Nowak as Cadres' Section director for a short time in 1950 (identified in *Życie Warszawy*, Warsaw, July 10, 1950). The last head of this section (1950-52) was Kazimierz Witaszewski who became director of the Military Section over two years ago. *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, October 3, 1952.

In his report to the Second PZPR Congress, Bolesław Bierut (then the Chairman of the Central Committee) confirmed that the Cadres' Section had been eliminated in 1952. He stated that "in order to coordinate more closely directorial work in all fields of Party endeavor with the correct practice in the selection and placement of cadres, the Central

CHART III

ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT, 1955

First Secretary:
B. Bierut

Secretaries:
W. Matwin — J. Morawski
F. Mazur — E. Ochab

Sections:

Administration S. Matuszewski	*Culture* P. Hoffman	*General* B. Bendek	***Military* K. Witaszewski	*Party Schools* H. Kozłowska	*Trade and Finances* S. Kubiczek
**Agitprop* J. Morawski	*Economics* J. Kole	*Heavy Industry* E. Gierek	*Municipal Administration* L. Przysuski	*Physical Education* L. Motyka	*Transportation* S. Kujda
Agriculture M. Jagielski	*Education* J. Kowalczyk	*Light Industry* M. Marzec	*Organization* A. Alster	*Press and Publications* S. Staszewski	*Women* Z. Nowicka
Communications B. Kowalski	*Foreign* W. Góralski	*Mass Organizations* A. Starewicz	*Party History* T. Daniszewski	*Science and Higher Education* Z. Żemankowa	****Youth* H. Jaworska

NOTES

*This hitherto functional unit was demoted in rank, losing its former high administrative designation of "department" (*dział*) and taking the lower classification of "section" (*wydział*). This occurred in May 1950, when its head Jerzy Albrecht was removed from the departmental directorship for his war-time association with Władysław Gomułka. Propaganda work itself has been directed successively by Władysław Bieńkowski (1945-47), Stefan Jędrychowski (1947-48), Arthur Starewicz (1948-54), and Jerzy Morawski (1954-date).

**The full name of this section is "Main Political Board of the Polish Army" (*Główny Zarząd Polityczny Wojska Polskiego*). It functions as the Military Section of the Secretariat, although nominally under the Ministry of National Defense in which its director holds the rank of deputy minister. Article 55, *Statut PZPR*.

This section has been directed in the past by Marian Spychalski (1945-46), Eugeniusz Kuszko (1946-48), Mieczysław Wągrowski (1948-50), Edward Ochab (January-June 1950), Marian Naszkowski (1950-52), and Kazimierz Witaszewski (1952-date).

***The real name of this section is "Central Party Youth Group" (*Centralny Partyjny Zespół Młodzieżowy*). Established by a 1949 Organizational Bureau resolution, it first dealt only with academic affairs but later was extended to include high school students. Cf. "Uchwała BO w sprawie pracy ZAMP 'u i aktualnych zagadnień odcinka studenckiego," *Życie Partii*, V (July, 1949), p. 59. After the semi-autonomous "Union of Polnish Academic Youth" (ZAMP-*Związek Akademickiej Młodzieży Polskiej*) was liquidated in 1950, the section took over all youth affairs. *Sztandar Młodych*, Warsaw, October 27, 1950.

The current director of the Youth Section, Helena Jaworska, was only recently elected to the chairmanship of the "Union of Polish Youth" (ZAMP-*Związek Młodzieży Polskiej*), Cf. *Po Prostu*, Warsaw, October 31, 1954.

directed by Franciszek Mazur (1945-48), it was next handled by Antoni Alster (1948-50), then by Władysław Dworakowski (1950-52), and has since reverted to Alster again. Both Mazur and Dworakowski in 1954 were Secretaries of the Central Committee, and their backgrounds will be discussed later. Alster was also a member of the Secretariat at one time (September-December 1948). Born in 1903 at Rzeszów into a Jewish family, he became a printer by vocation. His communist activities date back to 1920, and an official biography[8] states that he was jailed for a total of nine years. In the USSR during World War II, Alster held an influential post with the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP-*Związek Patriotów Polskich*) and became chief of political education with the rank of colonel in the Second Polish Division attached to the Red Army. After the war he held Party secretaryships for Bydgoszcz and Warsaw provinces successively, prior to heading the Organization Section in the Secretariat.

Only fourteen of the twenty-four section directors[9] identified in 1955 are currently members of the Central Committee. This is a break with the pattern established in 1946 (seven out of nine) and continued in 1949 (eleven out of fourteen), when larger majorities of section heads were on the Central Committee. This may possibly indicate only that there are not enough positions on that body for all deserving communists. Five of these fourteen 1955 directors are candidate members of the Central Committee (Bendek, Jagielski, Jaworska, Kowalski, Starewicz). With the exception of Helena Jaworska, who recently became chairman of the Union of Polish Youth (ZMP), very little has been published about the backgrounds of these five individuals. The ensuing analysis pertains only to the remaining nine directors (Alster, Daniszewski, Gierek, Kole, Kozłowska, Morawski, Motyka, Staszewski, Witaszewski), since they are all full members of the 1955 Central Committee.

All of these nine were born between the years 1903 and 1918, similarly to the 1949 group, and are thus quite young. The worker versus middle-class derivation ratio is three to six (much lower for the middle-class than in 1949), with no peasant extraction represented. One of the directors (Edward Gierek) spent the war in German-occupied Belgium, three (Kozłowska, Morawski, Motyka) inside of occupied Poland, and the other five in the Soviet Union. The majority has a university education or at least part of one (Daniszewski, Kole, Kozłowska, Morawski, Staszewski). All but one[10] joined the Polish Communist Party back in the years 1923-34, and all but one[11] are known to have pre-war prison records for revolutionary activities.

Committee in November 1952 liquidated its separate Cadres' Section, since the latter had too often evaluated the cadres' problem not on the basis of requirements but according to [bureaucratic] formalism; the [Secretariat] simultaneously placed the responsibility for cadres' work upon all of its sections." *Ibid.*, March 12, 1954.

[8] *Gazeta Pomorska,* Bydgoszcz, October 3 and 23, 1952. The biographic data on Alster appeared in two installments, printed in separate issues of this newspaper.

[9] Just one of these twenty-four had been a section director in 1946 (Witaszewski), whereas five others held such positions in the 1949 apparatus (Alster, Kole, Kowalczyk, Kozłowska, Starewicz).

[10] The exception is Lucjan Motyka who joined the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in

(5) The Secretaries

Little is known concerning the composition of the Secretariat for the years 1942 through 1944. It is probable that this organ, during the underground period, consisted merely of a Secretary-General and one or more deputies for technical affairs. Careful reading of the available material on the subject has disclosed the names of only three such deputies (Fornalska, Kliszko, Zambrowski; the last person did not participate in clandestine activities but came to Poland with the Red Army) in this early stage. The position of Secretary-General was abolished at the 1948 Congress and the title of the Party leader changed to "Chairman of the Central Committee" (*przewodniczący Komitetu Centralnego*), presumably another name for the same office. Since the 1954 Congress, the titular leader's position has been called "First Secretary of the Central Committee." Table I gives a list of the twenty persons identified on the Secretariat since 1942, the periods of their tenure, and their present whereabouts.

TABLE I

SECRETARIAT MEMBERS, JANUARY 1942 - JUNE 1955

Name	*Dates on Secretariat*	*Current Status or Post*
1. Marceli Nowotko*	Jan.-Nov. 1942	dead; assassinated in Warsaw
2. Paweł Finder*	Nov. 1942-Nov. 1943	dead; shot by Gestapo
3. Małgorzata Fornalska	Nov. 1942-Nov. 1943	dead; shot by Gestapo
4. Władysław Gomułka*	Nov. 1943-Sept. 1948	under arrest
5. Zenon Kliszko	Nov. 1943-Sept. 1948	under arrest
6. Roman Zambrowski	July 1944-March 1954	Minister of State Control
7. *Bolesław Bierut**	Sept. 1948-date	no other position
8. Antoni Alster	Sept.-Dec. 1948	Director, Organization Section
9. Władysław Dworakowski	Sept.-Dec. 1948; June 1952-Dec. 1954	Chairman, Committee for Public Security Affairs
10. *Edward Ochab*	Sept.-Dec. 1948; May 1950-date	no other position
11. Jakub Berman	Dec. 1948-March 1954	Deputy Premier
12. Józef Cyrankiewicz	Dec. 1948-March 1954	Premier
13. Hilary Minc	Dec. 1948-March 1954	First Deputy Premier
14. Henryk Świątkowski	Dec. 1948-May 1950	Minister of Justice

1932, was jailed by the pre-war Polish Government at Bereza Kartuska (1937) and by the Germans at Auschwitz (1942-44), and came into the PZPR with other left-wing Socialists during the 1948 merger. *Robotnik*, Warsaw, January 11, 1947; *Dziennik Polski*, Kraków, October 3, 1952.

[11]The official biographies of Jerzy Morawski do not mention imprisonment for pre-war communist activities, a part of one's past to be proud of and highly publicized in contemporary Poland. For his sketch and sources, see the end of the following section.

15.	Aleksander Zawadzki	Dec. 1948-March 1954	Chairman, Council of State
16.	*Franciszek Mazur*	May 1950-date	Deputy Chairman, Council of State
17.	Zenon Nowak	May 1950-March 1954	First Deputy Premier
18.	Edmund Pszczółkowski	March 1953-March 1954	Minister of Agriculture
19.	*Władysław Matwin*	January 1955-date	no other position
20.	*Jerzy Morawski*	January 1955-date	Director, Agitprop Section

NOTES
*Successive heads of the Secretariat
Italicized names are those of current Secretariat members

Apart from the First Secretary, Bolesław Bierut, the Secretariat as elected in March 1954 included only three other men: Edward Ochab, Franciszek Mazur, and Władysław Dworakowski.[12] However, at the end of that year Dworakowski was appointed to the chairmanship of the newly created Committee for Public Security Affairs and simultaneously relieved of his Central Committee secretaryship.[13] The third plenum of the new Central Committee (January 21-24, 1955) enlarged the Secretariat to include two additional men: Władysław Matwin and Jerzy Morawski. This total of five individuals, as of June 1955, managed the Party apparatus by supervising the work of the various sections, discussed previously and shown on Chart III. Only the initial three members of the current Secretariat have had previous experience on that body, as indicated on Table I, and only these three are also members of the Political Bureau. One of the five (Ochab) has admitted middle-class origin, whereas two (Bierut, Mazur) claim peasant and two (Matwin, Morawski) worker parentage. The career profiles of the five Secretaries reveal records of loyal and disciplined service in the Party apparatus extended over many years.

Bolesław Bierut, from the very beginning of his work as a "professional revolutionary," displayed the traits of a perfect apparatus worker. His gifts and interests were primarily organizational. Originally a member of the left wing of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS-*Lewica*), he reportedly came with it in 1918 at the age of twenty-six into the Communist Party of Po-

[12]In this order, as listed by *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, March 18, 1954. The true ranking, based upon importance and influence, was most probably (1) Mazur, (2) Ochab, and (3) Dworakowski.

[13]*Ibid.*, December 9, 1954.

Simultaneously, Politburo member Stanisław Radkiewicz was transferred from the post he had held since July 1944 as head of public security to the less formidable position of Minister for State Farms. This reorganization of security forces in Poland was probably necessitated by the defection to the West of Lt. Col. Józef Światło, former deputy director of Department X (combatting subversion in the PZPR) in the Ministry of Public Security. See *The New York Times*, September 30 through October 2, 1954. The defection of Światło has brought about the purge of many high ranking officers in the secret police, as evidenced by the recent arrest of Col. J. Różański (chief of investigations) and the expulsions from the PZPR of Gen. R. Romkowski (Deputy of Public Security since 1949 and a full member of the Central Committee) as well as Col. A. Fajgin (Światło's immediate superior). *Ibid.*, January 27, 1955.

land.[14] As early as 1927, he was made a member of the Secretariat, "highest organ inside of the country."[15] Most of Bierut's pre-1939 underground activities took place in the areas of Łódź, Warsaw, and the Dąbrowa-Silesian coal mining basin. Six of these years, he claims to have been incarcerated in Polish prisons. After spending the first part of World War II on Soviet territory (1939-43), Bierut clandestinely returned to Poland. He was probably Moscow's contact man with the communist underground until the end of the war. For several years thereafter he pretended retirement from Party affairs, while filling the chairmanship of the provisional legislature or National Council of the Homeland (KRN-*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*) and after 1947 the Presidency of the Republic. "Called back" to Party work in the fall of 1948 as a replacement for Gomułka (both as the Secretary-General and member of the Political Bureau), he supervised the purge of the latter's followers. Bierut's reelection to the top Party post of First Secretary in March 1954 came as no surprise in view of his undeviating loyalty to Moscow.[16] His function in the Secretariat is apparently that of coordinator for all section activities involving the implementation of high policy.

Edward Ochab's official biography states that he was born in 1906 into a government official's family (*w rodzinie urzędniczej*).[17] He is the only one among the five Secretaries with a completed pre-war higher education, having been graduated from Kraków University in cooperative studies. After a novitiate in the Union of Polish Communist Youth (KZMP-*Komunistyczny Związek Młodzieży Polskiej*), Ochab joined the Communist Party of Poland around the year 1929. His activities were never conducted above the province level, on which he was Party secretary from time to time in most areas of Poland. He claims to have been jailed for a total of eight years in pre-war Polish prisons. After spending World War II in the Soviet Union, Ochab returned as a political officer with the Polish units attached to the Red Army. He has since served in a wide variety of posts: Deputy

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[14]When introducing his candidacy (the only one) for the Secretary-General's post on September 3, 1948, Politburo member Jakub Berman told the plenum of the Central Committee that Bierut had belonged to PPS-*Lewica* from 1912 to 1918. "Sprawy organizacyjne," *op. cit.*, p. 206. Bierut's official biography in book form speaks of the period 1914-18, concerning his PPS-*Lewica* membership, which is probably correct. J. Kowalczyk (ed), *Bolesław Bierut—życie i działalność* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1952), pp. 26-31. Berman also contradicted this book, when he declared at the same meeting that Bierut joined the Communist Party of Poland in 1921.

[15]That is inside of Poland, as contrasted with the Politburo which remained abroad (in Germany prior to 1933 and in the USSR after that date) during the inter-war period. J. Kowalczyk (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 52.

[16]Bierut retained the office of President from 1947 until 1952, when the Presidency was eliminated by the new Stalin-type constitution. He then served as Premier. Despite his formal resignation from the Premiership on March 17, 1954 Bierut de facto still occupies the highest ranking position in the country as "first citizen." He continues to reside at the Belvedere Palace, officially and traditionally the residence of the chief of state; occupies the first seat, in front of the chief of state Aleksander Zawadzki, at sessions of parliament; and even signed a decree introducing price changes, which was published in *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, May 1, 1954.

[17]Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, *Kalendarz Robotniczy na 1951 Rok* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, December 1950), pp. 142-43. A later biography appearing in *Dziennik Zachodni*, Katowice, October 3, 1952 does not make any mention whatsoever of Ochab's social extraction.

and then Minister of Public Administration, where he reorganized the prison system; in the Central Committee apparatus, which later detailed him as Party secretary for Silesia; director of the peasant "Społem" cooperative organization; chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions; chief of the Main Political Board of the Polish Army; and finally since 1950 as Secretary of the Central Committee. Ochab was promoted to full membership on the Political Bureau at the March 1954 Party Congress; he had previously been a candidate member of that body since November 1948.

Franciszek Mazur, of Ukrainian extraction, is unique on the Secretariat (and indeed on the Central Committee itself) in that he claims to have participated at the age of twenty-two in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. After returning to Poland in 1919, he immediately joined the recently founded Polish Communist Party. His pre-war revolutionary activities were concentrated in South-Eastern Poland (the area now forming the western part of the Ukrainian SSR). Mazur's outstanding organizational abilities secured his election in 1930 to the Central Committee.[18] He claims to have spent at least seven years in Polish prisons at various times, escaping to the USSR after his last release in 1938 which had been obtained "because of his poor health." Since all of Mazur's biographies contain a gap for 1938-45, it is possible that he was in a Soviet prison (like Zenon Nowak) during this period. He returned to Poland after the war to become governor of Warsaw province. From 1945 to 1948, Mazur directed the Organization Section of the Secretariat.[19] In 1950, he was officially appointed a Secretary of the Central Committee. Mazur's election to candidate status and subsequent promotion to full membership on the Political Bureau were identical with those of Edward Ochab.[20]

Although the son of a coal miner, Władysław Matwin was nevertheless graduated from secondary school (*gimnazjum*) in 1933 at the age of seventeen. He studied economics at Poznań University for two years until arrested and jailed for "anti-fascist activities."[21] After his release, Matwin worked briefly as a KZMP activist, then enrolled at Brno Polytechnicum but soon after Munich was arrested by the Czech police. He returned to Poland in time to see the outbreak of war and in December 1939 fled to the USSR.

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[18]This occurred at the Fifth KPP Congress, according to the biographic data on Mazur which appeared in *Gazeta Robotnicza*, Wrocław, September 19, 21, and 26, 1952. More complete sketches of Mazur are available in the official "Workers' Almanac" (*Kalendarz Robotniczy*) for the years 1948 through 1952. It is interesting to note that later issues of this annual publication (1953 through 1955) no longer provide biographies of Politburo members.

[19]Mazur worked in the parliament (1948-50), where he was elected deputy chairman of the PZPR parliamentary deputies' club. *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, December 31, 1948. He played a prominent part with Władysław Wolski and Edward Ochab in the negotiation and signing of the 1950 Church-State Agreement. See "Protokół wspólnej komisji rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Episkopatu w związku z zawarciem porozumienia," in H. Świątkowski, *Stosunek Państwa do Kościoła w Różnych Krajach* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1952), pp. 132-37.

[20]For some interesting personal observations about Ochab and Mazur, as well as other Politburo members, see J. Światło, "Niektórzy ludzie politbiura," *Za kulisami bezpieki i partii* (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1955), pp. 11-12. Courtesy of Dr. Jan Nowak, RFE, Munich.

A charter member of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow, he later served as a political officer with the First Polish Army. Matwin has occupied increasingly important posts since the war: counselor of embassy at Moscow; Party secretary for Wrocław province (1946-49); chairman, Union of Polish Youth (1949-52); PZPR secretary for Warsaw province (1952-54); and editor-in-chief of the principal Party daily newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* from March 1954 until his elevation to the Secretariat early this year. This thirty-nine year old apparatus worker was coopted by the Central Committee as a full member in 1946, when he returned from the Soviet Union.

Even younger than Matwin is Jerzy Morawski, born in 1918 reportedly of working-class parentage.[22] He joined the KZMP att he age of sixteen and during incomplete university studies spent his extra-curricular time as secretary of the communist dominated "Life" (*Zycie*) student organization. After the establishment at Warsaw of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) in January 1942, Morawski worked in the editorial collegium of its press organ *Trybuna Wolności* until July 1944 and "liberation" day. For the next six years, he was assigned to various top policy-making positions in the youth movement. Next came a Party secretaryship at Poznań province (1950-52), followed by a transfer into the central apparatus as deputy director and then as director (since February 1954) of the Section for Agitation and Propaganda. Morawski was first elected to the Central Committee in 1948 as a candidate member. At the March 1954 Congress, he was promoted to full membership.

(6) Conclusions

Available information would seem to indicate that the Secretariat of the Central Committee is currently responsible for the overall supervision of government, economy, and society in Communist Poland. Although the Secretariat's apparatus is only one of the principal instrumentalities of the PZPR, with special functions mainly in the fields of personnel as well as checking on the implementation of central directives, the responsibilities of the Secretariat sections may very well be unlimited in scope.

Two general patterns of organization have been tried out for the Secretariat. The "functional scheme" concentrated cadres' activities in one center, the Cadres' Section, and facilitated a certain flexibility in the disposition of personnel. It also economized on personnel, probably eliminated some friction, and strengthened the "one-man management" principle. This gave way in November 1952 to the now employed "production-branch system" which is organized around branches of industry. It permits an adaptation of Party control to an increasingly differentiated economy and could bring with it the growth of expertness in the character of supervision.

This supervision is being conducted by the most responsible workers

[21]Biographic data on Matwin has appeared in *Gazeta Ludowa*, Warsaw, June 23, 1949; *Dziennik Zachodni*, Katowice, October 7, 1952; and in *Sztandar Młodych*, Warsaw, October 13, 1952.

[22]The information about Morawski has been pieced together from *Głos Wielkopolski*, Poznań, October 3, 1952 as well as *Express Poznański, Poznań*, October 5-6 and 21, 1952.

in the Party's central apparatus, i.e. the section directors. Their official biographies indicate that the majority have served apprenticeships on lower levels of the PZPR organization, usually in the provincial organs. These men who today are section chiefs should be regarded as the most promising in the Party's ranks. Certain of them will eventually follow in the footsteps of Chełchowski, Dworakowski, Mazur, Nowak, and Ochab (all of whom are post-war apparatus graduates) into the Political Bureau itself.[23]

Although the possibility for such advancement certainly exists, competition is becoming keener. This is indicated by the decreasing ratio of Central Committee members (full or candidates) who are simultaneously section directors as against those directors who are not on the Central Committee: seven to two (1946), eleven to three (1949), and fourteen to ten (1955). If the analyses of biographic data for these three sample groups (full members of the Central Committee only) can be considered roughly applicable to those directors who were not on the Central Committee, then the managerial level of the Secretariat's apparatus may be characterized in the following terms:

(1) The average age of the section director in 1955 is about forty-five years, i.e. the same as it was in 1946. Thus the trend is to recruit for these positions from among the relatively young or the middle-aged.

(2) Directors with an intellectual or middle-class background now outnumber those of working-class extraction by two to one, with very few or possibly even no peasant derivation represented in the group. The original tendency of favoring persons from working-class families has been reversed, perhaps due to necessity.

(3) A majority of the individuals occupying directorial positions have always had at least some university education.

(4) All directors have proven their loyalty to the communist cause by actively working for the Party either before the war (the great majority) or at least in the war-time underground. With the exception of the two former Socialists (Matuszewski and Motyka), the average section chief of 1955 has been in the Polish Communist Party for at least twenty years; almost all have pre-war prison records.

(5) From the very beginning in 1945, even under Gomułka's Secretary-Generalship, most of the directors have been Soviet trained; these have received the most responsible posts in the central apparatus of the Party.

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[23]For a detailed analysis of the Politburo, see Richard F. Staar, "The Political Bureau of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR)," *The American Slavic and East European Review* (December, 1955).

NOTES

The Polish Historical Institute at Rome (*Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae*) has been in existence since November 10, 1945, and has published a number of bibliographical monographs, concerned mostly with sources for Polish history to be found in the libraries and archives of Rome and the Vatican. The Institute has just (1954) published the first number of a periodical, *Antemurale,* which plans to cover the whole Central European area. The predominant, though not exclusive, trend is that of ecclesiastical history. This first number, for example, contains an article by Msgr. Aloisio Tantu on "Basarab il Grande, fondatore del primo stato romeno indipendente (1310-1352)." The officers of the Institute are: Walerian Meysztowicz, President; Józef Warszawski, and Piotr Naruszewicz, Vice-Presidents; Stanisław Jezierski, Secretary of the Institute, Władisław Kujawski, Editorial Secretary. The Institute is located at 284 via degli Scipioni, Rome.

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The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropa of Stuttgart, publishers since 1951 of *Osteuropa,* have begun semi-annual publication of *Osteuropa-Recht* (I, 1, March, 1955) focussed upon the problems of law and the legislative process in Russia. The German world, nearer to this area, and therefore more likely to be involved, has every reason to wish precise information concerning the laws with which they have to deal in commercial, political and personal matters. This journal is therefore timely. The Editor has compiled a list (pp. 79-83) of institutes throughout the world which offer instruction in Soviet and related law. In the United States, Columbia, Fordham, Harvard, Syracuse, California (Berkeley) and Yale; Netherlands, Leiden and Peoples' University, Amsterdam; France, Paris, Faculty of Law; Austria, Innsbruck; Germany, Berlin Freie Universität, Munich, Göttingen; Great Britain, Glasgow. There are several other centers where library facilities for research are available, but by and large this important subject is very modestly handled. This journal should be of material help.

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The Department of State has deposited in the National Archives in Washington an additional 117 reels of microfilms, containing approximately 100,000 pages, of documents from the files of the German Foreign Office for the period 1914-1919. This group of microfilms supplements a large collection on the first World War filmed by the German Documents Project and previously released to the National Archives by the Department. This latest group of films to be released was made under the auspices of St. Antony's College, Oxford; German relations with Austria-Hungary and the Balkans are particularly well represented in the collection. A further group of films, for the years 1914-1919, made under the auspices of the University of California, is also being obtained for eventual deposit at the National Archives. The National Archives will then have a complete set of the films made of German Foreign Office files relating to the first World War, amounting to several hundred thousand pages.

BOOK REVIEWS

KIRCHNER, WALTHER, *The Rise of the Baltic Question*. Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1954. Pp. 11 and 283.

This is a timely and useful piece of work, devoted chiefly to the tangled events of a single generation—the third quarter of the sixteenth century. It is the more useful in that the author does not include the whole "area" but takes the key position of what was known as Livonia (the Latvia and Esthonia of our days), and analyzes its development and "destiny" (Meinecke's theme for all historians), while its more powerful neighbors were all engaged in trying to get possession. As he says at the start, the book is "an analysis of the policies which all competing nations have followed and of the interests they had, and still have, in the Baltic struggle."

The "Livonians" soon found that their fortunate position on the map was a source of enduring misfortune. First the Germans, whether the merchants or the Knights of the Cross; then the Russians, the Danes, the Swedes and the Poles—all of them became committed to "conquest," and the arts of diplomacy and war were invoked in turn. The useful chronology given at the end of the book shows the complexity of the picture.

What the competing powers may well have regarded as part of the natural pursuit of trade certainly amounted to invasion and subjection for the native-born. Three elements were mixed up together—money interests, missionary effort, and political expansion. Within the last of these were to be found personal or dynastic ambitions; and the second was made more mischievous by the fact that after the triumph of the Reformation in northern Europe three "Faiths" were competing in Livonia: Catholicism, brought in by the Order, and now nurtured by the Jesuits; the new Lutheran confession; and Orthodoxy, backed by the dynamics of Muscovite politics. The Danish role, says Kirchner, "was one of many intentions, little deeds and negative results." Far more functional, though nurturing the seeds of its own decay, was the régime of the Knights of the Cross, the German "empire-builders" of the east, whose expansion was to threaten the whole Slav world. At bottom our author seems to think that the contribution of these people was at least more substantial than that of any rival contestant, and he may well be right.

From the point of view of business (and the sixteenth century was the heyday of overseas enterprise) the possession of the two fine seaports of Riga and Reval was the thing most desired. Tsar Ivan knew this well, but after taking the latter from the Danes he had to give it up to the Swedes (1561). As for Riga, the seat of ecclesiastical authority, it fell to the able Transylvanian prince, Stephen Bathory, who had succeeded to the Polish throne in 1574. This success marked the culmination of Polish-Lithuanian expansison in the northeast; Bathory met an early death and his successor was a bungler if not a deceiver.

One chapter is devoted to the interest shown by the Atlantic seaboard powers in Baltic affairs—of France largely in order to forestall the Empire, of the Dutch for the wealth accruing from the carrying trade, and of England for the exchange of goods with the rising power of Muscovy. In his brief concluding pages, the author sums up the story of this tiny but precious corner of Europe, caught geographically

> "Between the fell, incensed points
> of mighty opposites."

The social and political structure built by the Knights of the Cross, on alien territory might have matured, had time permitted, into something like a "national

state"; but the ambitions and "manifest destiny" of stronger neighbors would not be denied. Livonia became a "bone of contention," taken by Peter a century after Bathory's conquest; and swallowed up in our own day by Peter's successors. Will this be accepted by the rest of Europe? Only the future can tell.

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PINSON, KOPPEL S., *Modern Germany. Its History and Civilization.* New York: Macmillan, 1954. Pp. 637. $10.00.

Modern Germany, covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, merits a superior rating in many ways. Unlike numerous similar works, it does not drop the curtain on the morning of 1933. Pinson's analysis of the historical currents and the complex forces which accounted for the Hitlerite régime and continue to confront contemporary Germany will command the respect of scholars, though they may disagree with some interpretations. The chapters on the emergence and history of the Weimar Republic are especially lucid and satisfactory. The nineteenth century specialist, moreover, will find that Pinson gives an adequate and understandable picture of the varicolored intellectual, religious, social, and economic forces which molded modern Germany, or kept her from following other, more desirable, paths.

Throughout the work there is an evident lack of emphasis on political and diplomatic history *per se,* on the safe assumption that the latter areas have been adequately covered in any number of books or monographs. The author frankly states that his "selection of data, the emphasis and evaluation" of materials, was influenced by his *Weltanschauung,* slanted along liberal, democratic, and humanitarian lines. It must be said, however, that this has not kept Pinson from giving the Devil his due, in the way of an honest analysis of the forces which operated in opposition to the author's ideals. The reviewer is impressed by the scholarly honesty of the work.

In a work of unquestionable merit, it may appear trivial to sort out omissions or statements of dubious fact. Hitler, however, certainly did not strike at a "completely unprepared Red Army" (p. 521) in June, 1941. *Deutschland über Alles* may have been "the old anthem of Bismarckian Germany" (p. 568) in a restricted sense, but it did not become the official anthem until under the Weimar Republic. Though it contains some penetrating analyses, Pinson's chapter on 1848 is probably the weakest in the volume. He devotes several pages to the activity of Marx and Engels in that fateful year, certainly an unwarranted emphasis in view of their limited influence on the course of events. He falls into, and helps to perpetuate, the common error when he credits Marx and Engels with an unusual perspicacity in diagnosing the basic forces which gave direction to the course of the revolution. The comments of Marx and Engels, some drafted in retrospect, were the commonplace observations of scores of others, as emerges from a study of the contemporary sources.

When all is said, nevertheless, *Modern Germany* stands out as a sound and superb achievement. The author speaks of a *"Zerrissenheit,* or cleavage," as a central theme in German history. His account goes far toward giving a clearer picture of the conflicting currents, which produced that *Zerrissenheit. Modern Germany,* more than any other similar work, will add to an understanding of the German problem.

The volume includes a number of useful appendices on the results of all *Reichstag* elections between 1871-1912 and 1919-1933, together with the party com-

position of the cabinets during the Weimar Republic. The formal bibliography is brief. More complete are the bibliographical citations and suggestions appearing in the *Notes*. The lack of a single map is inexplicable.

Montana State University OSCAR J. HAMMEN

GRIEWANK, KARL, *Der Wiener Kongress und die Europäische Restauration 1814/5*. Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1954. Pp. 408. DM 10.50.

The first edition of this book appeared in 1942 under a slightly different title: *Der Wiener Kongress und die Neuordnung Europas 1814/5*. It was given little publicity in Germany and few people abroad knew of its appearance. A comprehensive review of it from the pen of Kurt von Raumer appeared in *Historische Zeitschrift* only in 1953, shortly before Prof. Griewank's death. We assume that the text of the second revised edition represents the author's real point of view, and that no anonymous hand was allowed to change the original conclusions.

There is no abundance of scholarly works dealing with the Congress of Vienna. Peacemaking seems to be a less intriguing topic than either storm brewing or frantic efforts to avert, by spectacular gestures, the catastrophe when normal diplomatic procedures had failed. German specialists in modern history were, on the whole, less concerned with tedious conversations around the conference table than with the rise of nationalism or with the progress of German unification. Professor Griewank's book should be viewed as an earnest attempt to re-evaluate the work of statesmen and diplomats assembled in Vienna. He quite naturally looked at it from a different angle from that of the two British authors, Charles K. Webster and Harold Nicolson. Problems pertaining to Prussia and to Central Europe in general stand in the forefront and were given more space than other controversial issues.

The third chapter of the book, entitled The Polish-Saxon Conflict and the Crisis of the Congress covers about sixty pages and deals mostly with the efforts of Prussian representatives in Vienna to secure for their country the dominant position among the German states. An outright annexation of Saxony was regarded by them as the best guarantee of Prussian primacy, partly because of the geographical position of that state, partly because it was predominantly German. In this respect the patrimony of the Wettin House differed favorably from the Polish lands, annexed by Prussia in 1772-1795, especially from the purely Polish territory which had been seized by Frederick William II in 1795. The Slavic people who survived in the rural areas of both Upper and Lower Lusatia were too insignificant to get any consideration from the ruling circles. By the acquisition of the entire Saxon territory the Hohenzollern control would have spread out from the Baltic coast to the mountain chains of Bohemia. The boundary between Prussia and the Austrian Empire would have become far longer than the Habsburgs could accept without demur or fear. Professor Griewank sketches the tenacious counter-offensive deployed by Metternich and his efforts to stem at the same time the Prussian expansion toward the south and the Russian penetration westward.

Professor Griewank concentrated on the principal points placed on the agenda by the strategists of the Congress. Abstaining from colorful details or social gossip he was able to produce a lucid, though somewhat dry story in which the light and shadow are distributed without prejudice or concession to popular taste. He was guided primarily by sources which in many instances had not been consulted by any other historian. He published ten important documents as an appendix to his outline.

The book on the Congress of Vienna is a melancholy epilogue to Professor Griewank's researches in modern German history. He revised the original version at Jena where he held a chair of history from 1947. He was probably able to see the new edition through the press but his earthly career ended before its publication. His death in October 1953 gave rise to speculation and conjectures but apparently only his intimate friends knew the true reasons for his decision to leave this world.

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

Stopedesetogodišnjica Ustanka u Srbiji 1804-1954. Reprinted from the *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve,* no. 7-9, 1954, Ulica 7 Jula, Belgrade. Pp. 99. $1.

Among the various revolutionary upheavals since 1789, the First Serbian Insurrection is one of the least known. Its two-fold significance was missed both by students of revolutionary movements and by those who lived in a Europe immersed in the Napoleonic Wars. The Insurrection, however, proved to be the first successful revolt of a Balkan people, preceding the Greek War of Independence by seventeen years, and unlike the revolutions of 1789, 1848 and 1917, it broke out in the countryside and recruited most of its leadership and rank-and-file among the peasants. It thus opened a new era in the history of those nations which the Turks had conquered in the latter Middle Ages, and it brought to the forefront a class whose lowly position in the Turkish empire was noticed by all the travellers passing through Serbia in the preceding centuries.

The tribulations of the Serb people under the Ottoman rule and during the Insurrection were shared by its clergy, composed of parish priests and monks who were recruited among the peasantry and resided in the countryside. It was largely due to their efforts that the image of the medieval Serb state in its full glory was preserved among the peasants, whom they often led in armed fighting against the Turks. Death at the stake and by beheading at the hands of the Moslems was the price paid for such activities.

The Serbian Orthodox Church commemorated the First Serbian Insurrection (1804-1813) with a valuable symposium consisting of contributions by fourteen laymen and clerics. Dr. D. Stranjaković, a leading authority on the subject, provides a learned introduction and examines critically a long letter by Karageorge to the Czar. Writing in 1816, the leader of the revolt gives a personal account of the Insurrection. The same author also gives short biographies of those Serb clerics who had played an important rôle during the Insurrection. His Beatitude the Patriarch of Serbia contributes an article on Archbishop S. Stratimirović who, as head of the Serbian Church in the Habsburg Empire, was able to render great services to his fellow-countrymen across the border. The Rev. B. Cisarž gives a well-documented account of the religious life in Serbia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Dr. Lj. Durković-Jakšić, an expert on modern Montenegrin history, discusses the participation of the Montenegrin clans in the struggle against the Turks, and provides new material on the help the Serbian merchant community in Trieste gave to the insurgents. The then extant religious affiliation determined the varying attitudes of the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Moslems, all speaking the same language, towards events in Serbia itself, and are referred to in S. Dušanić's article on Bosnia and Karageorge's insurrection. Other studies range from reflections on Serbian history by the veteran scholar N. Radojčić, to the ballads of the Insurrection, the death of Karageorge, Anglo-Serbian relations in 1807, etc. Extracts from the dispatches of Dutch and Swedish diplomats at Constantinople, re-

ferring to events in Serbia, are also published in Serbian. Finally, the symposium includes a number of anecdotes and short stories culled from various sources and throwing a vivid light on the mentality of the insurgents and their leaders.

Nuffield College, Oxford University IVAN AVAKUMOVIC

FALK, HEINRICH, S.J., *Das Weltbild Peter J. Tschaadajews nach seinen acht Philosophischen Briefen.* Ein Beitrag zur russischen Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. (Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München, Band IX.) München: Isar Verlag, 1954.

In the twenty years since five of Chaadaev's eight *Philosophical Letters* were rediscovered in the archives of the USSR Academy of Sciences and published in *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo,* that complex and important thinker has attracted the renewed attentiton of English, French, and German scholars. As Father Falk points out, few Russians have studied him; his scorn for his native tradtion has not endeared him to many emigrés, while his religious bent rendered him a dangerous subject for Soviet students. The author's claim is tenable that neither foreign nor Russian scholars have previously given Chaadaev's thought, as distinct from its background and author, the re-examination it deserves on the basis of the letters recovered a generation ago.

The book begins with a brief account of Chaadaev the man, and of the literary sensation, perhaps unparalleled in Russian intellectual history, caused by the appearance of the first *Philosophical Letter* in a Moscow magazine in 1836. There follow a summary of the contents of the five rediscovered letters, an analysis of their philosophical sources and antecedents, a criticism of Chaadaev's philosophy as revealed therein, and a concluding chapter. A German text of the five letters (II, III, IV, V, and VIII) is appended—which makes one sigh for the author's intention, since though he wrote in French the letters have been printed only in Russian and now in German translation. Father Falk himself notes with sympathy that Alexandre Koyré in his study of 1950 had to retranslate his citations into French with no means of knowing how closely he had approached the original.

As Father Falk is a philosopher, he plunges into direct analysis of Chaadaev's fundamental tenets. While sympathizing with his effort to demonstrate the unity of religion and philosophy, Falk attacks his "pantheism" which denies human individuality, and criticizes his mistrust of human reason and his confusion of natural and supernatural revelation. These objecttions, as well as Falk's strictures on Chaadaev's assessment of the Western Middle Ages as being based on externals rather than an understanding of the philosophy of that age, will evoke agreement in circles broader than Roman Catholic ones.

Falk's conclusion is that the "old" picture of Chaadaev as a man primarily interested in the philosophy of religion and of history is strikingly confirmed by the rediscovered letters while the interpretation—which Falk traces to Herzen—of him as fundamentally some kind of revolutionary has been finally disproven. What the author means is the Chaadaev was not primarily interested in political and social problems, which is true, but one might add that Christian philosophers can be "revolutionary" in a profound sense without putting such interests first. Whatever Chaadaev's intention historically he gave tremendous impetus to the Russian revolutionary movement.

This book by its extreme clarity of style and organization and its thoughtful

treatment of important issues merits the study of anyone concerned with European intellectual history.

University of Washington DONALD W. TREADGOLD

WINTER, EDUARD, *Russland und die Slavischen Völker in der Diplomatie des Vatikans. 1878-1903.* Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950. Pp. 186. DM 13.50.

Little has been done on the question of the attitude of the Vatican toward the Slavs and specifically toward Russia. The book of Eduard Winter on this subject is welcome. The author holds the chair of History at the University in the Russian sector of Berlin and has previously published studies on Josephinism and Panslavism.

Winter's inquiry into the Vatican diplomacy holds double merit in that he makes great use of Russian source-publications which escaped the notice of Western Church historians, and he read the previously unstudied diplomatic correspondence in the *Staatsarchiv* in Vienna.

The book concentrates on the reign of Leo XIII. While the fact of the interest of this pope in the Slavic world was known, as were his plans for bringing back Russia into a union with Rome, the details of Leo's and his collaborators'—outstanding among them the cardinals Rampolla and Ledochowski—concepts and actions are here disclosed for the first time. Also the opposition which this sphere of the papal activity met at the court of Vienna may be learned from the account given by Professor Winter. It is—not only for the Slavic historian—an interesting problem and light is shed on such personalities as Pobědonoscev, the powerful procurator of the Holy Synod under Alexander III, the Croatian bishop Strossmayer and on the astute Isvolsky who began his diplomatic career at the papal court.

However, probably in conformity with the position the author holds at present, Professor Winter's book is passionately biased. It is generally known that Leo XIII was much interested in political problems; but Winter's *Leitmotiv* is the claim that to the pope and his court politics was the primary concern. This verdict the author does not support by much evidence except by remarks of diplomats who were thoroughly opposed to the Vatican like those of St. Petersburg; those who tell the story otherwise, as the Austrians, lack, according to the author, in the basic understanding of the Curia.

While Professor Winter occasionally makes an effort to see the Slavic attitude of Leo XIII as part of the general policy of this pontiff—*e.g.* in the discussion of the part the Vatican held in the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance, on which the last word probably has not yet been said, the author does not attempt to present the political activity of the pope as a part of his reign and aims; he hardly sees this problem.

As one may expect, style and presentation lack in shades. There are some errors in detail and a goodly number of exaggerations; but what really mars the value of the book, however much the merits of its inquiry may be stressed, is the historian's basic approach on which the merit of the presentation depends, as always, in the last instance.

The Catholic University of America FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

HUNT, R. N. CAREW, *Marxism Past and Present.* New York: Macmillan, 1954. Pp. 180. $2.75.

Mr. R. N. Carew Hunt presents here in somewhat enlarged form the series of

lectures which began in the summer of 1953 at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. It represents what perhaps amounts to a lifetime of study devoted to Marxism as a theory of history, a concept of society, and a way of life. In this book the author has also sought to take the measure of more latter day exponents of "Marxism," not least, one Joseph Stalin.

Into less than 200 pages Mr. Hunt has packed a lot of strong meat. It is material which is hardly to be digested by the uninitiated. Some orientation into the whole of eighteenth and nineteenth century thought is indispensable, but for such a person the reading should be rewarding. Perhaps there are too many present-day experts who insist that all of Soviet motivation can be explained by easy reference to isolated quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. On the other hand, Mr. Hunt may stress unduly the significance of Marxism as a whole body of thought. This reviewer is persuaded that judgments on "Communism" would have greater validity if they were checked, in part at least, against the kind of material to which Mr. Hunt has given such devoted attention. What is not important is the fact that ultimately Mr. Hunt comes up with an indictment of Marx as a philosopher and of Lenin and Stalin as practitioners. What is important is the fact that he has evaluated the whole corpus of their thought.

There are several penetrating pages on "dialectics," its use and abuse by Marx and Engels, and Hunt agrees with Sidney Hook that its abuse is as frequent as its use. "What Marxist-Leninists do," he writes, "is arbitrarily to select any two dissimilar phenomena and then represent them as logical contradictions to which the laws of the dialectic apply, thus contravening the principle of formal logic that while propositions and statements may be contradictory, things and events cannot be." (p. 13). Such practice could lead nowhere, and everywhere, and Hunt is persuaded that it did.

In his sections on materialism and determinism Hunt summarizes the basic postulates, and credits Marx with having made a substantial contribution. And yet he singles out the inner conflict engendered by Marx's insistence upon the "will of man" as a decisive factor. Do men make history? Hunt implies that there is a lot of casuistry in Marx's statement that " 'men make their own history but they do not make it under conditions chosen by themselves.' " (p. 45).

The section on substructure and superstructure is particularly interesting because of the treatment that this subject got subsequently at the hands of Joseph Stalin. Interestingly enough Hunt implies that the new prominence which Stalin, particularly in his "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," gave to the superstructure was largely a reiteration of ideas long ago propounded by Engels.

The book concludes with a summary of Marx's achievements, and he does not deny the frequent flashes which pointed toward the good society. He does object, however, to the pursuit of an abstract good, and he denies the evil which has resulted from the forceful application of these principles in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. ". . . .Those countries must be accounted the most fortunate which contrive to resolve their problems by other and less desperate expedients." (p. 175). This is a sagacious observation by a wise observer.

University of Nebraska ALBIN T. ANDERSON

BENCKENDORFF, COUNT CONSTANTINE, *Half A Life. The Reminiscences of A Russian Gentleman.* London: Richards Press, 1954. Pp. 319. 25s.

While Count Benckendorff's memoirs do not claim to add to our knowledge of *die grosse Politik* in the years before 1917, they contribute what is sometimes of

greater value to the historian, an understanding of the milieu in which it is carried on. Moreover, they contain unusual glimpses of the fate of that milieu during the Bolshevik revolution and its aftermath.

Count Benckendorff was an outstanding member of the old ruling class of Russia. His father, the last Imperial ambassador in London, bore a distinguished name; his mother was a Shuvalov, his maternal grandmother a Naryshkin. His father's mother was a Princess Cröy, whose family stood high in the Austrian service. Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, was his father's first cousin, Prince Alexander Hatzfeld, attached to the German embassy in Tokyo at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, his own. Besides, he was related to Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador in London, and to leading members of the British aristocracy. A man of such pedigree, one should think, was predestined for liquidation by the Revolution. Yet his memoirs, told with the charm and restraint appropriate for an English-bred daughter who helped to write them, reveal a different destiny.

He chose the Russian navy for his military service and fought valiantly at Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese war. Next he became a demonstratively liberal Marshal of the Nobility in the Tambov gubernia, where he also helped to introduce Stolypin's agrarian laws. In 1916 he was the commanding officer of the newly opened port of Murmansk, and in the following year he served as chief liaison officer to the Allied Military Missions, until the treaty of Brest-Litovsk demobilized him. The first year of the Civil War he sat out at, or near, his family estate, or in jail. Yet in the spring of 1919 he was drafted into the Red Navy, headed then by one of the leading lights of the Imperial admiralty. He was promoted, even during prolonged periods of arrest, to the post of Assistant Chief of the Red Navy's General Staff. By 1922, however, *Cheka* suspicion rendered his position untenable. Two years later he made his exit from Russia as a flute-playing husband of a famous harpist, then on leave from the Moscow Conservatoire.

In reading this tale one is sometimes tempted to regret that in the author's life as well as in his memoirs the empiricist (and the bon-vivant) was apt to prevail over the philosopher. He asserts that all his conscious life he was aware that Russia stood on the eve of a profound change; the revolution did not come unexpectedly. Yet he does not say how he reached that conclusion; anyway, it does not seem to have affected his life very profoundly. His orientation was patently pro-peasant. For this reason he is able to offer many valuable conclusions on peasant life. (His comments on peasant history, however, should be taken with caution.) But on the whole, he skips rather lightly with a touch of the old-fashioned aristocratic unconcern, over the most weighty questions of his time. He was essentially a drifter, not a trimmer.

On the other hand, the peculiar value of this book lies in just the fact that the author was a gentleman and not an intellectual or a scholar (or a statesman). His enjoyment of life, even though it may have seemed rather too accommodating at times, enabled him to write vividly of his environment, whether a *battue* at the Hatzfelds, a Russian horse fair, the management of his estate, an English house party, or a heart-to-heart talk with Joffre. His experiences in Soviet jails may seem particularly interesting. He felt that during his days the Red Terror was never an avowed policy or an established official practice. It existed locally as a panic, as a result of the security organs getting out of hand. Such evidence, although limited, should not be entirely overlooked. Certainly, the author knew how to make the best of even those trials. On the whole, he proves that a sensible man, who had been fortunate enough to remain outside the vicious give-and-take between the old

and the new masters, could enjoy a fair degree of immunity, despite a highly compromising name.

At the end, however, one is left wondering what assets this ruling class, as described here, possessed in the competitive struggle for leadership in twentieth century Russia. Count Benckendorff himself admits, in connection with his activities as Marshal of the Nobility, that his group of liberals—perhaps one should call them *frondeurs*—was caught in a vain oppositionist gesture which lacked a constructive program. But one might go further and say that they, so absorbed in their cosmopolitan good life, had hardly any insight into the novel problems of urban-industrial society or even of the contemporary economic position of the Russian Empire. Although they enjoyed considerable freedom of action in this matter and had access to all the affairs of state, they can not be said to have prepared themselves for the future needs of their country.

Such ponderous reflection, however, should not detract from the merits of this fine self-portrait of a Russian gentleman. Its honesty and close attention to first-hand experiences provide an unusual insight into those crucial years of Russian and European history. It is an insight which runs counter to all the standard clichés—which, apart from its other good qualities, makes it excellent reading for all students in Russian history courses.

University of California THEODORE H. VON LAUE
Riverside

WARTH, ROBERT D., *The Allies and The Russian Revolution; From the Fall of The Monarchy To The Peace of Brest-Litovsk.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1954. Pp. viii, 294. $4.50.

This competent and well written study traces the turbulent courses of Russia's relations with its wartime allies from a peak of democratic optimism, following the replacement of the monarchy by the Provisional Government, to their nadir, with the ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It outlines the unequal struggle over the definition of war aims, conducted between Miliukov, first Foreign Minister of the new government, and the moderate Socialist majority of the Petrograd Soviet, and the efforts of the latter through the abortive Stockholm Conference to find some common ground for a non-annexationist peace. The impact of the Kornilov uprising and of its defeat on Russia's fighting ability is well recounted. The hope for an early peace, promised by Lenin, is shown as a major factor in mobilizing support for the "second revolution" and in paralyzing potential opposing forces.

Professor Warth has pulled together with great skill the story of the cross-purposes and confusions which determined the relations between Russia's former allies and the new Soviet régime. Only fuller access to Russian, British, French and Japanese archives is likely to modify this picture in essentials. Perhaps he has underestimated the willingness of the non-Bolshevist groups in early 1918 to accept extremely severe terms of surrender, provided this step would enable them to supplant Lenin and govern the country. In general, drawing on a large number of collections of private papers, especially of Americans concerned with Russian events, the author has added many vivid and clarifying details to an account which does not greatly change the essential outline of Russian and Allied diplomacy of these twelve months.

The approach which Professor Warth has adopted has one major weakness: it makes the problems of foreign policy appear to dominate and determine the

clashes of political and social forces more than is historically justified. The treatment chosen tends to over-emphasize the effects of allied diplomacy on the course of revolutionary events, and hence its "responsibilities." Yet it is true that war weariness vastly intensified the social strains within Russia and narrowed the range of political maneuver which was open to the moderate forces.

Some statements, made in passing, fall to one side of the mark. It is more than doubtful that the press is "a valuable governmental ally in every country . . ." (p. 76), or that by July 1917, the Bolshevik Party was supported primarily by ". . . the politically alert elements of the working class" (p. 110). The author exaggerates considerably the "efforts" which Kerensky and Tereshchenko made to persuade Britain and France to convoke a conference for revising allied war aims (p. 149). He over-simplifies the attitudes and expectations which Trotsky brought to his post as the first Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs (p. 167). His summary of the significance of the elections to the Constituent Assembly (p. 220) would have benefited by consulting Oliver H. Radkey's authoritative *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917.*

Council on Foreign Relations PHILIP E. MOSELY
New York City

PIPES, RICHARD, *The Formation of the Soviet Union; Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. xiii, 355. $6.50.

Another important gap in the story of the establishment and consolidation of the Soviet régime has been filled with the publication of this study by Richard Pipes, research associate of the Harvard Russian Research Center. An incredibly complex series of simultaneous events which led to the creation of the various non-Russian (and usually anti-Soviet) régimes from the ruins of the Russian Empire is treated in a systematic and remarkably objective manner.

In an introductory chapter the pre-revolutionary nationality problem is sketched together with a very succinct summary of the views of the various Russian political parties and especially of the Bolsheviks on this question. Although much of the contents of the first half of the volume has appeared elsewhere in print in English, recapitulation in this particular context is both worthwhile and necessary in view of the neglect which the problem has suffered at the hands of Russian area specialists. Pipes makes his real contribution in the second half of the study. Here the reader will find the story of the remarkable Tatar Communist. Sultan-Galiev, as well as an account of the Basmachis of Turkestan who plagued the Soviet régime in the early 1920s and might rightfully be regarded as the originators of modern guerrilla warfare. In discussing the Soviet subjugation of Transcaucasia, Pipes deals with Lenin's disagreement with Ordjonikidze and Stalin in February 1921 regarding the advisability of an attack on Georgia and the policy to be pursued there.

Bolshevik policy toward the non-Russian peoples was developed on a trial by error basis, and the twists and turns as well as the blunders committed originally by the Soviet leadership are charted by the author. The tactical flexibility of Bolshevik policy which ultimately enabled Moscow to obtain control of the non-Russian territories is thoroughly treated here. The techniques included temporary alliances with the Armenian Dashnaks in Baku and, ironically, with the Chechen and Ingush tribes against the Terek Cossacks. Moscow recognized the independence of Ukraine, Georgia, Bukhara, and Khiva by treaties only to violate them. In the case of Georgia it sent Sergei Kirov to Tiflis as ambassador in the summer of 1920

with a huge staff for the purpose of undermining the Menshevik government by constantly protesting its activities and waging a general war of nerves.

Dr. Pipes is to be commended for having written this study, but several shortcomings might be noted. A serious weakness is the inadequate treatment accorded events in Byelorussia to which the author devotes only six pages. On page 142 he overstates the degree of Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary defection from the Directory Government. This reviewer usually ignores typographical errors—and this study has almost none—but he cannot resist the temptation of noting that on page 108 it is stated that Lenin "fragrantly disregarded his previous pledges." The notes to the study are to be found at the back of the volume rather than at the bottom of the page where they belong. Harvard University Press has been one of the worst offenders in this respect and it is time that this annoying practice be terminated.

The documentation, though a chore to locate, is very impressive, and the study has been enriched by the use of the Trotsky Papers deposited at the Harvard Library. Of special interest are the notes for a projected article which Lenin prepared in late December 1922 as a result of the disagreements in Georgia over nationality policy. This document reflects the final differences in views between the dying Lenin and the grasping Stalin. It contains Lenin's severe criticism of Stalin, Ordjonikidze and Dzerzhinskii as well as the revealing observation that "assimilated non-Russians always overdo in the matter of hundred per cent Russian attitudes." This remarkable document could never be published in the Soviet Union and is available to us only because of the rôle which it played in the Stalin-Trotsky rivalry and in the Twelfth Party Congress (April, 1923) which was a victory for Stalin's oppressive centralist nationality policies.

Dr. Pipes' study assumes a unique place in the English language literature on the Soviet Union. He has performed a singular service in writing an indispensable volume which should be required reading not only for scholars who study Communism and the Soviet Union but also for Foreign Service officers as well as other public officials.

Princeton University JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

EYCK, ERICH, *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik,* Bd. I. Erlenbach-Zürich and Stuttgardt: Eugene Rentsch, 1954. Pp. 472. DM. 13.50.

The author, a German trial lawyer turned historian when he became an exile from the Third Reich, has, prior to this book, published a monumental Bismarck biography, the life histories of the Pitts and Fox, of Gladstone and of William II. His earlier works excelled by qualities which illuminate also the best pages of this history of the Weimar Republic: an ability to bring the *dramatis personae* to life, to explain their inner motivation without dubious psychologcal probings, to cut through a wealth of documentary material by highlighting what is truly significant.

Also in his new book Mr. Eyck remain essentially a biographer and for that reason alone fails to do full justice to the exciting and decisive period of German history encompassed by the flight of the emperor in 1918 and the election of his field-marshal as president of the ill-begotten republic less than seven years later. There is much merit in the author's treatment, when he goes over well known material here by adding fresh color, thereby engaging in crisp polemics with some of the memoir literature that appeared after the fall of the republic and especially with the whitewashing attempts undertaken since the war by men such as Hjalmar Schacht. The legal insight and experiences of the author show up to great advantage in his description of certain aspects of the Weimar constitution, of the

basis and practice of parliamentary investigations, of political trials and of the reparation settlements.

Yet the general political analysis fails to come off, is shallow in part and nowhere improves on the earlier works by A. Rosenberg and S. W. Halperin. In part this might be due to the deliberately narrow focus which the author has chosen: the deeper causes for the weakness of republican institutions in Germany cannot be scrutinized by a consideration of the political stage alone and of the actors thereon, but calls for a probing of the socio-economic structure on which the republic was built.

Superficiality of judgment ensues. The "cardinal mistake" of the peace settlement of Versailles was in the author's view "the destruction of the Austrian-Hungarian state" (p. 147). While Mr. Eyck acknowledges the disastrous rôle played by the *Reichswehr* and its leaders in the German republic, his heroes are nevertheless Messrs. Noske, Ebert and Stresemann who either contributed to the prominence of the military or closed their eyes to secret rearmament. To a large extent post-1918 developments take an aspect of ineluctability, whether the author intends to convey this impression or not. Little is said about the rôle of the *Junkers* or of the high bureaucracy. The intricate questions connected with the foreign policy orientation of the young republic are over-simplified: the Rapallo episode, for instance, would certainly have deserved a less perfunctory treatment. On the other hand, fairly insignificant anecdotal material is given far too much space.

With all this even the author's style, for which his earlier works were rightly praised, wears out. There are passages which have all the characteristics of a political tract rather than those of a historical work. Elsewhere a naive and often homely moralizing sets in, which is rendered hardly more bearable by the interspersing of ample quotations from Goethe's *Faust*.

University of Colorado HENRY W. EHRMANN

BENEDIKT, HEINRICH, ed., *Geschichte der Republik Österreich*, by W. Goldinger, F. Thalmann, S. Verosta, A. Wandruszka. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1954. Pp. 630.

This work, well edited and introduced by Professor Benedikt, consists of four parts. These are: the history of the Austrian republic up to the time of its restoration in 1945, by Walter Goldinger; an essay on Austria's political structure or, more precisely, a political sociology of her party system and its historical origin by Adam Wandruszka; an ably and brightly done sketch of the Austrian economy by Friedrich Thalmann; and a lucid, in its legal interpretation convincing, essay by Stephan Verosta on the problem of the legal continuity of the Austrian state and its European function.

The very essence of the work rests in the two first sections. Here it is gratifying indeed to welcome in Goldinger's extensive chapter the first history of the Austrian republic which can be considered as fully objective in intent and largely so in achievement. The author has wisely avoided answering Gulick's passionate plea with a brief from the other side. He has held successfully to a middle line without revising Gulick's account as radically as many may have expected. Style and organization are simple, well measured and, up to the beginning of the discussion of the authoritarian course in 1933, quite clear. The narrative of this confused period and the analysis of problems (as for instance that of church-state relations under the authoritarian course and at the beginning of the Hitler era in Austria) presents extraordinary and not fully overcome obstacles. On the other hand, the

lack of color—though not of discernment—in Goldinger's presentation seems to be fully justified and even commendable in view of the difficulty in writing objectively at such close range on a nearly contemporary topic. Indeed, this excellent study may for some time to come remain the authoritative work on a difficult subject.

Decidedly original, but somewhat more controversial, is Wandruszka's analysis of Austria's party structure. He stresses the in many ways common origins of the three "camps," the Christian social-conservative, the national, and the socialist, as the heirs to dying 19th century Austro-German political liberalism. He then proceeds to compare the ideological premises of each group with the political contingencies of the day, and considers the impact of individuals on historical action. As far as possible, the author has done equal justice to the claims, motivations and often violently conflicting actions of the various political movements throughout the tragic history of the republic.

Disagreement as to points of emphasis are inevitable. Thus the assumption of an organic connection between Josephine *étatism*, controlled economy of the last World War years, and the later socialist administrative policies seems to be somewhat far fetched. Even less convincing is the attempt to credit a major part of the liberal heritage to the moderate section of the national camp. Ideological associations, to be sure, exist almost everywhere. Yet those linking the political philosophy of the great Old-Austrian liberal parliamentarians like Herbst, Plener, and Suess, to that of subsequent politicians like Waber, Winkler, Wottawa, evaporate into thin air.

The conclusions of this truly brilliant essay are that the internal policies of the republic after 1945 proceed so much more smoothly than those between 1918 and 1938 because "the faith which still penetrated Seipel, Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, that Austria could be a model for the economic, social and political new order of Europe, is just as little shared by the leaders of the Peoples' Party of today as the present socialist leaders share in Otto Bauer's messianic faith in the future." The coalition parties of today may have traded missionary political zeal and its corollry, intolerance, for domestic peace.

Rutgers University ROBERT A. KANN

STOCKHAUSEN, MAX VON, *Sechs Jahre Reichskanzlei, Von Rapallo bis Locarno, Erinnerungen und Tagebuchnotizen. 1922-1927.* Bonn: Athenäum, 1954. Pp. 279. DM. 14.

The author of these reminiscences was the recorder of the minutes of the Reichs Chancellory, and personal aide to five chancellors in the stormy days of the Weimar Republic. Descendent of a Catholic family of Prussian nobility, Stockhausen began his career as a public servant a few years before World War I. These memoirs give an account of his service in the cabinets of Wirth, Cuno, Stresemann, Marx, and Luther. Stockhausen married the daughter of Franz von Papen in 1926 and the following year accepted the post of *Landrat* (County Councillor) in his native Westphalia. In 1933 he advanced to the position of *Regierungs-präsident* (highest official in the county) of Arnsberg. Hitler issued orders for Stockhausen's removal from this post in 1935.

The present work is based on notes, calendar entries, and some personal letters. Walter Görlitz, who has written a biography of Stresemann, is the editor of this book. In a foreword he emphasizes the importance of these records in the absence of published memoirs by any of the chancellors of this period. Several well-

chosen illustrations evoke memories of the political horizon. Footnotes, chiefly of a biographical nature, and an index of names are included.

After an introductory chapter, in which Stockhausen sums up his early career and traces the political scene at the time of his entry into the Reichs Chancellory, the book is divided into chapters coinciding with the successive cabinets of the chancellors under whom the author served. A narrative thread weaves the sometimes meager notes, which are given verbatim, into a unified account of the turbulent events recorded. They include the murder of Rathenau, the inflation, the occupation of the Ruhr, the suppression of Communist uprisings, the steps leading to Locarno, Germany's entry into the League of Nations, and above all the difficulties in forming a cabinet in the critical days of the Weimar Republic. The book ends with a paean to the typical German civil servants of the old school, who worked prodigiously and maintained the highest integrity. From their ranks emerged the men who were liquidated after the 20th of July, 1944, uprising, like Freiherr von Lüninck, Dr. Karl Goerdeler, and others.

In this reviewer's opinion Stockhausen's memoirs do not contribute substantially either to our knowledge or to our understanding of this fateful and troubled period of German history. They furnish a rather superficial account of political events, and they purport to give revealing glimpses of the men in charge of the destiny of the Republic. The work does refresh and enliven our view of the epoch; it does not, however, deepen nor alter our conception of the major characters in the drama.

Hoover Institute and Library HILDEGARD BOENINGER
Stanford University

GATZKE, HANS W., *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954. Pp. 132. $3.00.

In this monograph Professor Gatzke, drawing upon the unpublished Stresemann *Nachlass* in the National Archives, substantially strengthens the argument that the Weimar Foreign Minister was a Bismarck without weapons, and that doing without them was not his own choice. Gatzke reveals that important Stresemann papers were omitted from the published *Vermächtnis,* and that some of those which were included were "mutilated." Gatzke's conclusions are often at variance with the only other scholarly survey of Stresemann's policy yet based upon the unpublished *Nachlass,* Henry L. Bretton's *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles, a Fight for Reason* (Stanford University, 1953). Gatzke and Bretton agree that Stresemann knew of military violations of the Treaty of Versailles, though he assured western diplomats that such violations were either unimportant or nonexistent. Bretton writes (p. 13) that Stresemann "went to Locarno as a German" but "returned as a European." Gatzke insists that Stresemann negotiated the Locarno pact to relieve western Germany of Allied occupation, calm French fears of German rearmament, and win a free hand in the East; his conclusion (p. 115): "We might say he was as good a European as Bismarck had been. . . ." Bretton contends (p. 49) that Stresemann "was not directly involved in the actual rearmament of Germany by clandestine means." Gatzke shows that Stresemann aided rearmament by: 1) making no effort to force the generals to conform to the treaty restrictions; and 2) securing through his diplomacy a free hand for German violations of the treaty. Bretton (p. 102) suggests that Stresemann, in pursuance of a "good neighbor" policy with Briand, forced General von Seeckt to retire from the Army High Command in 1926. Gatzke (p. 59) successfully rejects this thesis.

Bretton (p. 11) states that Stresemann viewed "the military aspects of a close alliance with the Soviet Union—as was envisaged by the leadership of the Reichswehr—with grave concern." Gatzke insists (p. 79) that "the Foreign Minister was never a hindrance and at times was quite a help to Russo-German military collaboration." While Gatzke is usually convincing, this reviewer believes his judicious conclusions do not sustain the unfortunate title for chapter five, "The Perfecton of German Rearmament."

The study at hand is, on the whole, an excellent one, based upon careful research and well written. It does not pretend to be definitive. It leaves many questions unanswered. Could Stresemann have coerced the military leaders, even had he sought to do so, in view of their power within Germany? Was Defense Minister Otto Gessler a conscious or an unconscious front for secret rearmament? What exactly was Stresemann's part in, or relationship to, Russo-German military collaboration? These and other questions cannot be answered definitively, if ever, until the captured papers of the Weimar era's Foreign Ministry are opened to scholars. More basic questions, those of interpretation, will likely persist indefinitely. In view of the refusal of Germany's neighbors to disarm, was Stresemann's reluctant acceptance (or positive promotion) of German rearmament efforts inconsistent with his advocacy of general disarmament? Gatzke clearly thinks it was. Whether one agrees with this or not, it will be difficult for Stresemann apologists to contest the major thesis that emerges from Gatzke's useful study, that Stresemann was "a great German statesman," who placed the interests of his nation above those of Europe as a whole.

Tulane University JOHN L. SNELL

BUTTINGER, JOSEPH, *Am Beispiel Österreichs. Ein geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Krise der sozialistischen Bewegung.* Köln: Verlag fur Politik und Wirtschaft, 1953. Pp. 672.

This volume, which was apparently written by Gustav Richter, chairman of the Central Committee of the Austrian Revolutionary Socialists before 1938 and the chairman of the Foreign Board of the Austrian Socialists, is the German edition of a work published in the United States in the same year by Praeger entitled, *In the Twilight of Socialism. A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria.* Before publication the manuscript, which had been completed in 1948, was circulated by the author among a number of his Socialist frends in Austria and Germany, who greeted it with a storm of abuse. They insisted that his criticsms were too personal. He had aired too many petty quarrels in public and had too pointedly attacked the political mistakes and lack of organizational talent of the leaders of the Socialist party.

The above criticisms summarize quite well the matters emphasized in the book. Not only does the author castigate Dollfuss and Schuschnigg for destroying Austrian democracy and for essaying to arrive at some workable compromise with the National Socialists, but also he points out the mistaken tactics of, the dissension among, and the ideological conflicts between the Austrian Socialists after the February, 1934, civil war. Standing out like a red thread are Richter's accounts of how the Revolutionary Socialists fought the machinations of the Communists to gain control of the Austrian labor movement and how they managed to hold the sympathies of many workers nominally members of the official trade union movement.

Naturally the volume, which deals to a considerable extent with Richter's illegal activities, is also an apologia justifying Richter's policies and tactics. It also

pays tribute to Muriel (Mary) M. Gardiner, a wealthy American divorcée living in Vienna (to whom the American but not the German edition is dedicated), who befriended Richter and various other Revolutionary Socialist leaders.

The above volume can hardly be described as impartial. Instead, it is an account of the comings and goings, strivings and shortcomings, aims and prejudices of the leaders of the Socialist underground in Austria. As such it is profitable reading for anyone wishing to understand the trials and tribulations of the Austrian Socialists and of the Austrian workers between 1934 and 1938.

University of Texas R. JOHN RATH

HESSE, FRITZ, *Das Spiel um Deutschland.* Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1954. Pp. 444. DM. 12.80.

For those who search the rapidly expanding lists of German publishers for scholarly and critical studies on the immediate German past the recent spate of books written by avowed and unavowed apologists of the National Socialist régime may justly cause some measure of serious concern. In this species of historical literature the volume of Fritz Hesse occupies a special place. It is true, it does not exhibit the same perverted intelligence or appalling moral erosion nor quite the deliberate historical falsification of Peter Kleist's recently published *Auch Du Warst Dabei.* Even for the gullible reader blessed with a modest critical acumen the similarity between the basic concepts of Kleist's clever but specious apologia and those of Adolf Hitler is too obvious to escape instant detection. Yet Fritz Hesse's readable volume, partly because of its pretense at overt objectivity, is, perhaps, even more dangerous still.

Like Kleist, Fritz Hesse's central theme is Hitler's foreign policy. Unlike Kleist, however, he was not a member of the Nazi intellectual élite or even a party member. He is careful to emphasize his own critical attitude toward the Nazi régime dominated as it was by "brutal adventurers." Yet, in spite of Dr. Goebbels' repeated efforts to have him recalled as a "defeatist" and the Party's denunciation of him as a "reactionary enemy of the régime," Hesse continued to serve this régime without apparent qualms, caught as he alleges, "like all good Germans in a patriotic trap." If he survived, this was chiefly due to the protection of Ribbentrop and Walter Hewel, two men of Hitler's immediate entourage and his two principal sources of information. So far as can be ascertained, Hesse's political outlook is that of a conservative Hugenberg Nationalist or a member of the *Herrenclub,* and, just as Hugenberg sought to make Hitler politically viable in 1933, Hesse now seeks to blunt the sharper edges of the postwar condemnation of Hitler. No doubt, Hesse was in a key position from which he could survey the course of events not only as the London representative of the German news agency (DNB), the press adviser of the German Embassy, and a frequent go-between for Sir Horace Wilson and Ribbentrop before 1939, but later when he became a special adviser on British affairs attached to Ribbentrop and lived at the Führer's headquarters where he came into continuous contact with his chief and Hewel. What he proposes to offer the reader is not his personal self-vindicating memoirs—a category of postwar German literature for which he exhibits an unconcealed contempt—but an impartial and objective history which, he states with a tranquil confidence that is characteristic of him, will come nearer to the actual "historical truth than any of the previous accounts." What he professes to write then is an inside history written with the impartiality of a disinterested outsider.

Even a rapid perusal of the first hundred pages is sufficient to indicate that

Hesse is neither impartial nor a disinterested outsider, is, in fact, still a captive of the psychology of his former entourage and limited experience. The first thing that strikes the reader is the author's breezy self-confidence and his slipshod composition. Hesse's account literally teems with errors, errors in spelling names (Vansittart is consistenly spelled Vansittard), errors in dating the sequence of events, and with demonstrably erroneous and insupportable statements. Thus, it is incorrect to say that Hitler had nothing to do with the Nazi *putsch* against the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss in July, 1934; false to state that the French Government had promised Hitler not to ratify the treaty of 1935 with the Soviet Union; erroneous to contend that the Nazi intervention in Spain was begun without Hitler's knowledge or consent; false to say that the original purpose of the Four Year Plan was not rearmament but to solve the currency problem; wrong to say that Hitler marched his army into the Rhineland in 1936 with the serious intention of replacing the old Locarno system with a new security system; wrong to say that Goering ordered the invasion of Austria in 1938 without the knowledge or consent of Hitler who must, therefore, be largely exculpated from this action or to contend that Hitler's intervention in the Sudetenland was a sudden improvisation while remaining silent on Hitler's instruction to Henlein on March 28 to demand the impossible; it is wrong, finally, to say that a treaty of alliance existed between Great Britain and France at the time of the Czech crisis or to say that Great Britain "betrayed" France. This syllabus of errors that crowd the pages of Hesse's book could be indefinitely prolonged.

Most of these errors and untenable statements must be attributed to Hesse's irrational and nationalist prejudice against and indifference to the overwhelming mass of documentary materials already published. Not only does he throw out of court the documents of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg as "misleading," but he passes over in silence the entire collection of German Foreign Office documents published by "the enemies of the Third Reich," and refers to it only when it serves his special purpose. In view of the isolation of the German Foreign Office from Hitler's immediate circle, the limited source value of this document collection has long been a matter of common knowledge. On the other hand, it cannot be brushed aside or be completely ignored. Nor can the impartial historian ignore, as Hesse does ignore, the whole vast body of British and Italian documents. One may feel inclined to agree with Hesse that all these documents cannot replace those secret reports of the SD or of the *Abwehr* which provided the immediate background for Hitler's actions. But most of the materials of the Reich Chancellory were destroyed by Hitler's adjutant, Schaub, and the vague and imprecise substance which Hesse offers his readers cannot replace it either, although the hope that he was doing just this is the thought which provided the chief inspiration for this volume. What is the result of this highly subjective attitude toward the sources of historical evidence? In his solicitude to destroy what he calls the 'Nuremberg legend,' he is subtly and suggestively proposing another legend, the legend of a half-way reasonable Hitler, who usually began with a moderate program, but who, finding no understanding but only opposition, was driven to violent extremes; briefly, the legend of the driven rather than the driving Hitler, the Hitler who was usually sorry over his acts of violence and became an inhuman monster only when, racked with disease, he suffered the disaster of Stalingrad.

There is no intention here to create the impression that everything that Hesse says is distorted in the light of well authenticated evidence. To be sure, like many other non-Nazi German collaborators, Hesse regards the famous Hossbach protocol of the conference of November 5, 1937, as the chance product of a passing mood

and, therefore, not to be taken literally. But no one, not even Dirksen, has provided a more detailed account of Neville Chamberlain's last attempt at appeasement at the end of July, 1939, in which Sir Horace Wilson and Hesse played the principal roles, although in the transmission the latter garbled the former's terms. This reviewer wishes to acknowledge that Hesse's judgment of the British position with regard to German aggression in the East was basically accurate and sound not only in 1939 but throughout the war. What Hesse has to say about Hitler's decision not to complete the victory at Dunkirk in the hope of facilitating an eventual peace with Great Britain also merits serious consideration. Although Hesse's account of the German resistance of July 20, 1944, is a travesty on the facts, his critical discussion of the basic foreign policy assumptions of the opposition is valid enough. Perhaps, Hesse's best contribution lies in his unvarnished portrait of Ribbentrop whom he regards as lacking in the stuff of which fanatics are made, but also lacking in character, ability and reasonableness. He quotes Walter Hewel, who had every reason to know, as saying that Ribbentrop was never in the good graces of Hitler who treated him contemptuously as a private secretary and retained him only because he executed orders faithfully and slavishly repeated all Hitler's directions.

In any final assessment of Hesse's rather readable book it must be said that this study, coming from a non-National Socialist but critical collaborator, contributes neither to an unflinchingly honest confrontation with the realities of Hitler's régime nor in any sense to international understanding. When, toward the end of his volume, Hesse takes occasion to criticize the stupidity of the policy of the Western Allies to wreck Germany as a Great Power, thereby drawing the Soviet Union into the heart of western Europe, there are many, though not all of us, who can join him in deploring this policy. The realization, however, that this policy became a tragic necessity precisely because Hesse and his non-National Socialist associates of the German Right, who were critical of the régime, served Hitler with undeviating loyalty down to the bitter end, thereby incurring a responsibility in the final result, is a thought that is utterly alien from Hesse's mind.

Ohio State University WALTER L. DORN

WANKLYN, H. (Mrs. J. A. Steers), *Czechoslovakia: A Geographical and Historical Study*. New York: Praeger, 1954. Pp. 446. $6.25.

Books of this nature, dealing with Czechoslovakia, are unfortunately rare in the English language. But here is one which sets the political history and economic development of Czechoslovakia against its geographical background and which does so with much clarity and precision. Its author, Miss Wanklyn, a Lecturer in Geography at Cambridge, deserves the gratitude of both the student and the general reader.

The chapter headings give a fair idea of the approach and the content of the book. Two chapters on "Regional Geography" and "Climate" form the base on which the rest are built and, in technique and substance, they have much to teach the more orthodox historian. Next comes one on "Vegetation and Soils," including forests and forest industries, the first of several to utilize effectively both the descriptive and the historical approaches. Following it is one on "History," which is more an interpretive essay on Czechoslovak history than a comprehensive digest. Then come four descriptive and historical chapters on "Farming," "Industry and Trade," "Communications" and "Population and Settlement." Together these form a most interesting little economic history of the Czechoslovak area, particu-

larly for the last century. The final chapter in the book is a useful survey of Sub-Carpathian Russia, which formed part of the First Republic.

One of the main virtues of Miss Wanklyn's book is that it brings out the differences between western and eastern Czechoslovakia. These are numerous, in part historical, in part economic. But they are basically geographic. That this is so emerges right at the beginning of the book. 'The Czech lands to the west lie in what is known as 'Hercynian Europe': eastern Moravia and Slovakia belong to the Carpathian arc of Alpine Europe" (p. 5). It is also obvious throughout in the division of each chapter into two sections, one on Western Czechoslovakia and the other on Slovakia. It must be said at once, of course, that this does not mean that Miss Wanklyn favors some sort of political division. On the contrary, if some of the more extreme Czech and Slovak nationalists in the past had but viewed the differences with a little of her rationality, there might well have been less political division than there has been. Nor does Miss Wanklyn confine herself to this one important geographical peculiarity. She has much to say on the "geological borderlands" (p. 5) of Moravia-Silesia and on other lesser regions as well.

There are a number of mistakes and misprints in the book, but these are more than compensated by the excellent maps, of which there are about eighty, and by the photographs. There are also some very good tables. Miss Wanklyn's sources are mainly French, German and English, and it is a pity she appears to have been unable to use Czech sources other than those published outside of the Czech language. However she seems to have compensated for this by first-class if brief fieldwork and personal observation.

In conclusion, Miss Wanklyn's book can safely be recommended to all who wish to understand the contemporary situation in Czechoslovakia. The land and the people do not change very quickly.

University of Pittsburgh WILLIAM V. WALLACE

BIERSCHENK, THEODOR, *Die Deutsche Volksgruppe in Polen, 1934-1939* (Beihefte zum Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität, Königsberg/Pr., X, "Aus dem Göttinger Arbeitskreis") Kitzingen-Main: Holzner-Verlag, 1954. Pp. 405.

As the son of a German Evangelical pastor in the little town of Sompolno in former Congress Poland, Theodor Bierschenk experienced the forcible closing of the German *Gymnasium* which his father had founded there. He does not single out this act of repression at the hands of the Polish Republic, nor does he report it in vivid fashion, in the long and endless train of abuses which he recounts on behalf of the Germans of Poland. Yet this personal touch helps a little to understand the cold bitter anger with which he piles up his evidence like a prosecuting attorney demanding an indictment. There is little of the British or American scholar's pose of calm objectivity and neutrality; the painstaking distribution of blame and guilt is not for him. Those of us who have never said good-bye to our native land, nor seen it made over by a foreign conqueror or a hostile political force, may find it hard to comprehend the nationalist passions described by Mr. Bierschenk. It is not the abstract ideas of nationalism which move the people he describes, but the hatred, fear and despair which men feel at the loss of their homesteads, their jobs, and their children's schools. Like so many East Central Europeans before and after them, the men and women of German speech and culture whom he describes faced the tragic quandary: "Shall I leave my home town, my village, or my farmhouse, or shall I stay and fight on? And if I stay, what am I to fight for, who will be my allies, and what methods must I use?"

Only the last third of this rather long, heavy book is specifically devoted to the history of the minority after the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 1934. The first part presents the *Volksgruppe,* both before and after 1934, its remarkably divided nature, geographically and politically, its history, its economic, political and cultural institutions. The second part presents the Poles as a people, their changing government and its official and unofficial policies of expulsion and assimilation before and after 1934, as well as the immediate and remote agents of persecution, from the notorious anti-German Western Marches Association to the Polish scholars who "established" the Polish character of East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania. Although rather repetitious of events after 1934 already recounted in earlier parts, part three is noteworthy for its thesis that the Nazis did the German *Volksgruppe* no good, either by the pact of 1934 or by the Minorities Agreement of November 1937, and in some ways did less than the less nationalistically-toned Weimar Republic did through the League (which was precious little). Another interesting thesis is his picture of the would-be "authoritarian" régimes of Piłsudski and his epigones, too politically insecure to create a popular atmosphere really favorable to a German *rapprochement,* and ultimately driven into competition with the worst chauvinist slogan-makers. Mr. Bierschenk offers especially well detailed accounts of the vicissitudes of German school and church life under Polish repression.

What is ominous about this book is its resemblance to the better Nazi scholarship, upon which it so heavily depends. The *Volksdeutsche* have a *Mutterland* (Germany); thye are engaged in *Festigung deutschen Volkstums;* almost no distinction is drawn between *Reichsdeutsch* and *Volksdeutsch.* In his introduction Mr. Bierschenk warns of the "unreality" of all plans for the future which are not based on sharp insight into "the relationships and problems of the recent past." Yet he "does not think it appropriate" to go into Hitler's reasons for his *Volksgruppenrecht* propaganda, and he absolves the camouflaged *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (*VoMi*) of all importance in the life of the Germans in Poland with one reference from volume V of the *Documents on German Foreign Policy* where the "leaders" of the *Volksgruppe* rejected a *VoMi* suggestion that they combine their efforts. All other references to *VoMi* in this collection are omitted, as well as all references to the relevant Nuremberg documents regarding both *VoMi* and the *Auslandsorganisation.* To what extent was the often-defended *Jungdeutsche Partei* of Rudolf Wiesner a Nazi organization? Mr. Bierschenk has written in good faith, but his one-sidedness and partisanship is regrettable in so important a task. The book is photo-offset and paper-bound, but neither process is very well done. An index of the names of persons and organizations would have been a great help.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology ROBERT L. KOEHL

SWEET-ESCOTT, BICKHAM, *Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, 1939-1953.* London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954. Pp. viii, 207. $4.00.

During the Second World War Mr. Bickham Sweet-Escott was Finance Officer with the Middle East Forces (British), and his experience in Greece provided him with the incentive to write a book on the complex political and economic problems of that country during the crucial years 1939-1953. It must be stated at the outset that his book, taken as a whole, is clear, concise, and well-integrated. After a brief introduction, which includes essential background material, he divides his work into two approximately equal parts: I. Politics, and II. Economics and Fi-

nance. He concludes the volume with interesting appendices, presenting the Cyprus question, Greece's northern frontiers, and varous statistical data, and with a brief bibliography listing the major recent works on the subject.

On examining Part I more carefully, however, one will notice that much of the account is conventional, run-of-the-mill narrative, showing no desire to deviate from the "official" British point of view, reflected in the works of Winston Churchill, A. P. Wavell, C. M. Woodhouse, Reginald Leeper, and others, who have tried to justify British policy in Greece since the outbreak of the Second World War. The story of the Metaxas dictatorship, the Italian invasion, and the Greek resistance and its consequences is again told, with no attempt to penetrate into the underlying causes or to inter-relate basic phenomena. The author relies upon documents published by H.M. Stationery Office, but he is only superficially acquainted with Greek bibliography, and Greek documentary sources have not been explored. The political section is also inadequate as far as motivation is concerned. To be more specific, there is a certain naïveté on the part of the author when he states that (p. 33) the main object of the British landing in October, 1944, was "to make it possible for relief to reach the country," and that (p. 49) in 1946 "the object of British intervention was simply to hold the ring and to prevent the Right from obtaining an unfair advantage, just as a year before it had been the British object to prevent the Left from doing so."

In Part II, which is by far the best of the two sections, the author describes the losses of Greece during the war, the reconstruction with British and American aid, and the problems of trade and finance as affected by the Greek civil war. The author's statements are substantiated by statistical material, which he handles with the facility of an expert. As a financial expert, too, he concludes with the suggestion that the Greek government would do well to resume payments on the service of the country's foreign debts in order to bolster up its international credit, in view of the fact that United States aid is decreasing and will at last be discontinued. At this point the author says nothing about Greece's military responsibilites under NATO, which involve 56% of her revenue from Greek sources. Despite the enormous military expenditure, however, the Greek government has signified its willingness to start service on the loans, within the limits of the country's abilities.

In Appendix I, presenting the Cyprus question, the author repeats the worn out and irrelevant statement that Cyprus has never been a part of a Greek state since the end of the twelfth century, forgetting that the same thing can be said of Athens for a period of more than six centuries (1204-1821). But, on the whole, the author gives a fair estimate of the strength of the *enosis* movement. There is no reference, however, to Sir George Hill's *A History of Cyprus,* vol. IV, which is the most authoritative work on the British domination over the island as well as on the movement for union with Greece. Appendix II discusses briefly the problem of North Epirus, the Macedonian problem, and the rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.

The reader will be grateful for the author's inclusion of short biographies of Greece's political leaders, given in the form of footnotes. Also, the initials of the long names of resistance groups and other bodies are given fully and correctly in Greek and in English translation in the footnotes, except in the instance of EP, which is *Ethnikè Politophylakè,* or national Militia (p. 35, n. 2). The present reviewer is of the opinion that the titles of foreign books, especially in such a language as Greek, should appear in English translation when they are cited for the first time. Mr. Sweet-Escott gives the translated Greek titles, but not in the case of every book cited.

A few minor corrections, for the second edition, might be mentioned. IMRO, on page 173, line 28, should be rendered as the Internal (or Interior) Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and ELD (p. 44, n. 2; p. 82, n. 2) is, more correctly, Union of People's Democracy. In line 12, page 174, the Greek portion of Thrace, occupied by the Bulgarians during the war, is Western, not Eastern, Thrace. The *Hieros Lochos* is more accurately translated as the "Sacred Company," as it is mentioned in connection with the Greek Revolution in 1821, though "Sacred Battalion" may also be possible today. "Sacred Squadron," used by Mr. Sweet-Escott, is hardly acceptable. Constantine Tsaldaris (p. 53) is the nephew of the other statesman, Panaghis Tsaldaris, who died in 1936. The largest minority in Greek Thrace (p. 175) is not the Pomaks, but the Turks, who were not included among the exchangeable populations at the Lausanne Conference. And finally, a misprint: the word *after* should be added after the word *immediately,* on page 40, line 34. None of these minor matters—it must be pointed out—detract from the value of this very interesting and very useful book.

University of Kansas G. G. Arnakis

Kállay, Nicholas, *Hungarian Premier.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. Pp. xxxiv, 518. $6.

Mr. Kállay's account of his premiership is basically in accordance with similar previous publications of Hungarian refugee-statesmen, especially Admiral Horthy's memoirs, but it is certainly the most comprehensive in scope and richest in details of the period concerned (1942-1944). If the reader is willing to give credit to this highly convincing presentation, the familiar picture of Hungary in our wartime propaganda as an obedient German satellite ruled by Quislings, must be essentially modified. Hungary, until the German occupation in 1944, preserved a surprisingly high degree of independence, carried on an effective large scale economic sabotage against rising German demands, did everything possible to retain friendly relations with the Western Allies, and, moreover, offered to them, when German power was still intact, unconditional surrender much before the fall of Mussolini. The full stumbling block in the way of the successful conclusion of the negotiations was the increasing Soviet influence on western planning on how to conclude the war and arrange a lasting peace. In explaining the overly compliant western attitude toward the Soviets, Kállay is probably not for from the truth in stating that the possibility of a sudden Russo-German reconciliation hung like a sword of Damocles over the Western Powers. The Hungarian government made repeated and desperate efforts to depict for the West the true color of Soviet politics together with the fatal consequences of the docile acceptance of Russia's wishes. Not only was this endeavor utterly fruitless, but ultimately the Western Allies ordered Hungary to negotiate directly with the Russians.

Hungary thus rebuffed was still ready to support a Spanish-sponsored peace proposal based on ideas worked out by the Pope, and responded favorably to a Turkish approach for the formation of a "Block of Order" aiming to keep the Balkans safe from Communist infiltration; but after Mr. Eden had vigorously warned Turkey against all anti-Russian moves, the plan collapsed. When direct connection was established with the British, Hungary—despite her warning and protest—was forced to deal through an agent of dubious character who turned out to be a faithful Muscovite. After Tito managed to secure for himself the full and exclusive support of the Allies, Hungary sent documented proof of Tito's real aims in the Balkans, but the message was promptly labeled as Goebbels' propaganda.

The change of atmosphere, indicating the deliverance of Hungary to Russia, became especially conspicuous after the Teheran conference. The plan of an Allied invasion through the Balkans—the last hope of Hungary—was abandoned upon Stalin's insistence. The existing official, but secret, channels between Hungary and the West were used exclusively for the promotion of espionage and sabotage while the same powers declined any political commitment in behalf of Hungary.

Mr. Kállay's tone is at times frankly apologetic but it is fairly certain that not all who are themselves acquainted with the problems of East-Central Europe will entirely share his views. Perhaps his greatest mistake was his stubborn refusal to believe that Soviet Russia would emerge as the only nation dictating the terms of the postwar arrangement east of Germany. Nevertheless, it is highly questionable that he could have changed his country's fate by throwing himself into the arms of the Soviet; Beneš did it, yet Czechoslovakia is now just as firmly under Russian control as Hungary.

Canisius College
Buffalo, New York
LOUIS J. LEKAI

KIRK, GEORGE, *The Middle East, 1945-1950.* London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. vii, 337. $7.50.

A volume of the *Survey of International Affairs,* and issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, this is the sequel to Mr. Kirk's previous work on *The Middle East in the War, 1939-1946,* and is organized and presented in much the same manner.

Part I treats of the interplay of great power politics—the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France especially—upon the basic problems which developed in the Middle East immediately after the Second World War, and provides a fitting synthesis to introduce the more detailed treatment which follows in topical arrangement. Part II treats essentially of the "northern tier" of the Middle East, namely, Turkey and Iran. The author discusses in some detail the development of the Soviet "war of nerves" against Turkey during the years 1945-1947 and the final enunciation of the "Truman Doctrine" of March 12, 1947, with regard to Greece and Turkey, in particular, and the Middle East in general, and follows with a discussion of the Turkish problem, including that of the Straits, in the ensuing period down to the year 1950. The story of Iran centers on Soviet policy concerning Azerbaijan and the attempt to subvert the Iranian Government (1945-1946), the Iranian repudiation of the Soviet oil demands during 1945-1947, the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy and the failure to reach a settlement of this troublesome issue during the early period of 1948-1950.

But the largest part of the volume (Part III) is properly devoted to the Arab countries and the Western Powers, in view of the significance of the area and of its very important problems. After a brief note on the end of European ascendancy in the Levant States of Lebanon and Syria, the author plunges into a detailed account of Anglo-Egyptian relations, and particularly of the controversy concerning the Suez Canal and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Anglo-Iraqi relations and the British régime on the Island of Cyprus. Almost one-half of the volume is devoted to the development of the problem of Palestine through the end of World War II, the handling of the issue in the United Nations and the question of partition, the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of Israelian independence, and the Arab-Israeli conflict and controversy down to the year 1950.

Although dealing with the Middle East in world affairs, the author does not

neglect the serious political, economic and social problems of the area. While it contains little essential information unfamiliar to serious students of the Middle East, Mr. Kirk's volume should serve as a very interesting background for a survey of the contemporary Middle Eastern scene, especially in the light of the subsequent settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy concerning the Sudan and the Suez Canal Zone (1953-1954) and of the oil controversy with Iran (1954). His discussion of the Cyprus problem is also very useful and well balanced, in the light of more recent developments in that question. Mr. Kirk is very critical of both American and British policies concerning Palestine during this troubled era, and is not sympathetic with Zionism. There will be those who differ fundamentally with him on this subject. Nevertheless, his is a point of view which deserves very careful consideration. All told, this is a highly authoritative volume, very well written and organized, and constitutes a fitting companion to Mr. Kirk's earlier work.

Arlington, Virginia HARRY N. HOWARD

CIUREA, EMILE C., *Le Traité de Paix Avec la Roumanie du 10 Février 1947*. Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1954. Pp. 284.

As Professor Bastid remarks in her preface to this monograph, the "devaluation of peace treaties" is one of the most striking features of international relations in recent years. Especially is this true of the peace treaties with the so-called German satellites after the Second World War. Signed in 1947 and immediately overshadowed by the "cold war," they carry none of the authority, real or symbolic, of the treaties of 1919 and 1920. Nevertheless, they warrant attention, and M. Ciurea has performed a useful service in his conscientious examination of the treaty with Roumania. Although the author's intention is to trace the numerous "juridical, philosophical, political, economic and social elements" which influenced the terms and formulation of the treaty, the bulk of the text—following an analysis of the armistice of September 12, 1947, which set the lines of much of the treaty—is an article-by-article commentary, nearly half of which is devoted to a discussion of the clauses concerned with economic issues, reparations, and restitution.

The reader who is not primarily interested in international law may feel that the method is too formal and legalistic. The author's repeated disquisitions on such matters as the rôle of preambles or the principle "nulla poena sine lege" tend to be distracting, especially since the Roumanian treaty by itself is not really a very satisfactory medium for an essay on treaties and treaty-making. Moreover, this rather formal treatment, which seems to be a product of the discipline, inhibits the author from fully developing the political context though he is fully aware of its importance. The Yalta agreement, for example, about which there is now a good deal of information, could profitably have been discussed more extensively. The developing Soviet-Western antagonism, an antagonism well reflected in the debates at the peace conference, deserves more thorough examination. (For a resumé of these debates the reader may consult the recent volume edited by Amelia Leiss in cooperation with Raymond Dennett, "European Peace Treaties After World War II," World Peace Foundation, 1954.)

Upon finishing the book, the reader, while welcoming the information given him, may wonder what it all adds up to. In his conclusion the author suggests that the scientific interest of the treaty as a stage in the development of the law of nations exceeds its importance in practice. While one may grant the relative ineffectiveness of the instrument, it is hard to believe that the Roumanian treaty, or the other treaties of 1947, will prove to be major landmarks in the international legal

order. And while the author is successful in showing the gap between the enunciated principles which purported to underlie the treaty and the realities displayed by the actual terms, this raises, but does not answer, the question of the weight which should be given to such wartime statements of goals and aspirations as the Atlantic Charter.

Columbia University HENRY L. ROBERTS

DRAGNICH, ALEX N., *Tito's Promised Land.* New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954. Pp. 333. $5.75.

This is a descriptive account of the political, economic, and social structure of Tito's Yugoslavia, based primarily on the author's own field study of that country where he first went as the United States cultural attaché. (The author is himself of Yugoslav origin (Montenegrin) and speaks the native language fluently.) He later revisited the country to collect more materials for his research. He has traveled throughout the country and talked to many people. The study is based also on official sources which the author quotes extensively. The author first discusses how Communists seized power in Yugoslavia. He explains the conditions which favored the rise of Communism, particularly the internal struggles and the war policy of the Allies. Then he discusses Tito's dictatorship and its effect upon the masses, as well as on the economy of the country. Finally, Professor Dragnich gives a summary of accumulated evidence that Yugoslav Communism does not differ in any essential aspect from Soviet Communism. This being so, the author asks a pointed question, "How good an ally is Tito?" His answer is that as good Communists, the Yugoslav Communists earnestly hope "to be able to rejoin the ranks of international communism . . . they also believe that sooner or later, communism will be victorious in other countries (e.g. in Western Europe)." Therefore, the author does not believe that the West should trust Tito as an ally.

This is a very good exposition of contemporary Yugoslavia under Communist rule. The author shows with much evidence what the "promised land" really looks like. Instead of freedom, enslavement of the masses; instead of prosperity, impoverishment and hunger. In the short historical part of the book there are certain omissions. The author for instance writes about massacres and misdeeds of the Ustashi and the Partisans, but fails to mention the massacres of the population perpetrated by the Chetnik. Occasionally he tends to idealize the past, such as in the question of the acceptance of Yugoslavia by its various component nationalities. But he makes an effort to be objective and as detached as possible even when discussing questions which are full of emotional involvement.

The recent developments in Yugoslav foreign politics, particularly the "normalization" of Yugoslavia's relation with Moscow and other satellites, including resumption of diplomatic relations and foreign trade, as well as reestablishment of close cultural ties, and consultation with Moscow on questions of foreign policy, indicates that Professor Dragnich's predictions might be correct. His book is well written and should be read by all who are interested in problems of Communism, and in the relations between the Communist orbit and the free world.

Indiana University D. A. TOMASIĆ

ALMOND, GABRIEL A., *The Appeals of Communism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. Pp. xix, 415. $6.00.

This volume is a significant addition to the growing body of literature which

uses psychological concepts to enrich our understanding of social problems. Though Almond's book is freer of jargon than many psychocultural works, more than enough is retained. Nevertheless, the reader will be amply rewarded for the annoyance of translating the terminology.

The first part of the study utilizes quantitative analysis to compare the portrait of a Communist painted by Lenin and Stalin with the picture drawn by the *Daily Worker* and other popular publications of the Party. The two pictures differ sharply. Lenin and Stalin describe the ideal Communist as a totally absorbed power tactician. The Party's mass periodicals, however, tend to play down the Communist as a power-seeker-at-all-costs, and present him as a person dedicated to the achievement of humanitarian goals and a destroyer of evil.

The study then proceeds to the results of 221 depth interviews with former Party members in the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy. Additional material is provided by 35 case studies contributed by psychoanalysts who had Communists as patients. Here the reader is treated to a fascinating description of the social and psychological characteristics of persons attracted into the Communist movement.

Illustrative of the wealth of interesting material provided by Almond's respondents are data such as these: Party members came from middle and low income groups rather than from poverty-stricken homes; skilled workers, teachers, students, and journalists were attracted to the movement in far greater numbers than unskilled workmen; those who enter the movement usually do so at an early age—49% before the age of 18; the Party in the United States is heavily weighted with foreign-born and first-generation Americans, but the British, French, and Italian Parties are composed of native stocks.

Emotional maladjustment as a factor influencing adherence to the Communist movement seems to be especially characteristic of American and British middle-class intellectuals. A neurotic may join to satisfy his unconscious need to express hostility, or the Party may offer to the person who feels isolated and alone the illusion of being related. It appeals to individuals who feel rejected.

Another section of the volume examines the reasons for leaving the Party. Among the causes of defection were cases where membership hampered a respondent's career, party activity required violation of personal standards of conduct, or it interfered with one's loyalties to family, friends, or other groups.

Dr. Almond is cautious about generalizing beyond his 221 cases, and he avoids the conclusion that certain sociological and psychological factors "determine" that an individual will become a Communist. He shows that the appeal of Communism differs from place to place, from class to class, and from time to time. He demonstrates convincingly that a Party member is not necessarily the stereotyped monolith which he is so widely believed to be. This is only one of the many reasons why *The Appeals of Communism* is worthwhile reading for the official, policy-maker, or citizen concerned about dealing with the Communist threat.

Social Science Foundation C. DALE FULLER
University of Denver

KLIMOV, GREGORY, *The Terror Machine*. Trans. by H. C. Stevens. New York: Praeger, 1953. Pp. 400. $4.00.

Gregory Klimov is a Russian by birth and a Soviet citizen by education. He was born some time in the first days of the Bolshevik revolution, went through the Soviet school system, received training in engineering, served his country as an

officer during the war and as an expert in charge of an important section of the Soviet military administration in the occupied East Germany. After a prolonged struggle with his Russian soul and with the spectre of fear he sought and found freedom in the West.

Mr. Klimov, in the Author's Note, qualifies his book as a report "on the Soviet man of the present day," and as honest as his reporting appears to the reader it assumes major significance in the study of his particular type of Soviet man, namely the member of the young intelligentsia class which serves the Soviet régime with all the implications of fettered will, feelings, thoughts, and conscience.

We are now acquainted from numerous scholarly studies with the many complexities of Soviet life, its abysmal hopelessness and basic moral rottenness. But Klimov's story brings the argument home with more convincing clarity than statistics can do. It projects the Soviet life into the reality of individual experiences. It pictures a generation of millions of people who strive for survival by subjecting their views to the "cause," for they have no choice. They see the terror of the secret police without letting their conscience be disturbed; rather concentrating their efforts upon evading its ubiquitous tentacles. They witness the robot-like impact of the Soviet bureaucracy upon any achievement, but, without impulse for improvement, use its channels for the satisfaction of personal ambitions. They experience the struggle between the old and young generations, between the city and the village, the party controllers and the masses of controlled, but for all the love for their country they would not dare, they could not, swim against the stream of enforced uniformity. More particularly, Mr. Klimov and his colleagues, who were ordered to administer East Germany, are instruments of a policy of pillage, enslavement, exploitation, but find an outlet in cynicism to silence the voice of conscience and responsibility. Yet at the bottom of this cruel reality seems to rustle a whisper of the better part of human nature. In spite of all the fear, suspicion, and control, it finds escape in romance, friendship, and laughter. In the case of the author it burst into a longing for freedom.

Mr. Klimov's career appeared bright after he had completed his education. He had powerful friends, hs technical skill predestined him to important positions. He served his country during the war with patriotic zeal and in the hope that its victorious end would bring to the Russian people political and material improvements; he avoided joining the ranks of the Party. However, the suffering continued and the circle was closing around him. He broke it by crossing the border and entering the Western sector of Berlin. He brought with him a story, which may at places read like a Dostoevsky fiction analysis, but which on the whole faithfully relates to our discouragement the terror machine of the régime over the Russian people, and to our hope their spirit of survival.

University of Denver JOSEF KORBEL

GRACHEV, S., *Pemoshch SSRR narodam Chekhoslovakii v ich borbe za svobodu i nezavisimost, 1941-1945 gg.* [The Help of USSR to the peoples of Czechoslovakia in their Struggle for Freedom and Independence, 1941-1945.] Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953. Pp. 238. 3 r. 80 k.

There are Soviet historians who can—while observing marxist historical methodology and the current shibboleths of Soviet historiography—write reasonably objective history. Grachev, unfortunately, is not one of them. This smoothly written book conforms completely to the party line on foreign policy as laid down not during World War II when the events described in this book took place, but

during the cold war when the book was written and published. Consequently, the great villain of this piece is not the "Hitlerite annexionists" but the "monopolistic beasts of prey of U.S.A." (p. 24). The Nazis were merely foolish—though vicious—puppets, cleverly manipulated by the Anglo-American imperialists.

Another lackey of the Anglo-American imperialists and an old enemy of the Soviet Union was the old bourgeois politician Eduard Beneš. Under his direction Czechoslovakia was one of the last capitalist countries to recognize the Soviet Union. And even then he conspired to enter secretly into "a criminal agreement with Hitler" against the Soviet Union (p. 16). Hitler rejected the overture, working already on the "plan of full subjection of Czechoslovakia with the aid of England, France, and U.S.A." (p. 16).

At Munich, England, and France and "the imperialists of U.S.A. standing behind their backs" sold out Czechoslovakia to Hitler "as payment for the obligation to begin war with the Soviet Union" (p. 17). The Soviet Union alone, "as a consistent fighter for peace and a sincere friend of the Czechoslovak people," offered to defend Czechoslovakia, but "the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in the predatory interests of saving their economic advantages threw overboard the banner of national independence . . . and made a filthy deal with the aggressor" (p. 18). The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia alone raised this banner and with the aid of the Soviet Union carried it to victory (p. 55).

In spite of his toadying to the Anglo-American imperialists, Beneš failed to gain full recognition for his exiled government in London until after the Soviet Union recognized it on July 18, 1941. Nothing of course is said about the fact that the Soviet Government had previously recognized the German Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia and established full *de jure* relations with Tiso's government of Slovakia. One would never guess from this book that a Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and a period of Nazi-Soviet cooperation ever existed.

In spite of the Soviet friendship Beneš continued to intrigue against the Soviet Union by proposing to create a new *cordon sanitaire* after the war in the form of a Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation. This was fortunately frustrated by the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of December 12, 1943. After this Beneš tried to save his political skin by inviting the western imperialists to occupy Czechoslovakia jointly with the Soviet Union. This manoeuvre, too, was fortunately frustrated. The Red Army alone completed the task of liberating Czechoslovakia, while the U.S. Army stood by and observed with approval the Nazis slaughtering the insurgents of Prague (p. 209). Nothing of course is said of the fact that the U.S. Army was held at Pilsen at the urgent request of General Antonov, the Soviet Chief-of-Staff, to give the Red Army the honor of liberating Prague and the Communists the opportunity to organize its future government.

This is not serious history. Space is lacking to refute all the errors of this book. Suffice it to make certain general observations. The theory of the great and seemingly perpetual capitalist conspiracy against the Soviet Union, directed centrally as if by an electronic eye from Wall Street and the London City, is historical nonsense. The application of the marxist theory of class struggle to Czechoslovak history is singularly ill-fitting. The remarkable fact of modern Czech, if not Slovak, history is not existence of class struggle but the very large degree of inter-class solidarity in the face of the German menace. In both World Wars the Czechs closed their ranks; traitors were quite rare. The attribution of the role of the exclusive banner-carrier of resistance to Hitler to the Communist Party is untenable.

As Hugh Seton-Watson pointed out in *The East European Revolution,* this banner-carrier was the Czech and Slovak intelligentsia who were, by marxist classification, mostly bourgeois. The working class, particularly in industrial Bohemia, was relatively passive.

Another reproach that one must make to this book is that it contains no explanation of the motivation of Soviet policy towards Czechoslovakia beyond a quotation from Stalin's speech of November 6, 1941 about the "liberating mission" of the Soviet Union towards the peoples enslaved by Hitler's Germany (p. 25). As all Soviet books on recent history outside of the Soviet Union, Grachev's book is written almost exclusively from foreign sources, mainly Czech Communist literature. No archival materials, either Soviet or Czech, appear to have been used. The book contains references to its sources in footnotes and has a table of contents but no bibliography or index.

Florida State University VICTOR S. MAMATEY

Aus Geschichte und Politik. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ludwig Bergstraesser. Edited by Alfred Hermann for the Commission for History, Parliamentarism, and Political Parties. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1954. Pp. 326.

This collection of essays is a *Festschrift* to Professor Ludwig Bergstraesser on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The scholar so honored has long been known as one of the leading German historians. But his best claim to recognition stems from the fact that he is an historian and a political scientist at the same time. His study of the history of political parties in Germany is the standard work on the subject and has gone through seven editions. Moreover, Professor Bergstraesser has broken new ground and successfully pioneered in the neglected field of the evolution of German parties. He has also introduced this important subject in its combined form of history and political science at German universities.

Very fittingly, the *Festschrift* reviewed here contains a great variety of essays on topics in both disciplines by eighteen historians and political scientists. The result varies both in quality and quantity. The essays presented range from rather obscure to most significant issues. The only overall pattern, dimly discernible, is an approximate division between the essays dealing with historical problems and those concerned with political parties and theories.

The first part, which includes the historical essays, contains two articles on the subject of European federation. One of them is written by Professor Treue and deals with plans for European federation up to the end of the eighteenth century. The other essay attempts a comparison between the federated-Europe idea of Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi. Neither article offers anything new, with the possible exception of the point that Briand was as much interested in economic as in political integration.

The essay by the editor of the *Festschrift,* Professor Hermann, deals with a subject and a person still quite controversial: the rôle of Stresemann as "a good European." Unfortunately, the author glosses over such disputable statements of the late German foreign minister as those concerning Germany's 1919 eastern frontiers, which Stresemann was never willing to accept, and to the rectification of which his policies *vis à vis* the West remained subordinated. Hermann's encomium doubtless requires such correctives as indicated by Professor Gatzke in his bibliographical article and his book on Stresemann.

Of interest to the American reader is also the article by Professor Fischer on "Objectivity and Subjectivity: a Doctrinal Study in American Historiography."

The author refers to the controversy, somewhat exaggerated by him, between the "straight" objective historian and the subjective historian of the "social science" school. In the latter he places Beard, Becker, and Schlesinger, Sr., while Morison and Schuyler are put in the other camp where they enjoy the ideological support of Ranke and Meinecke. Fischer concludes that the "objective" historian in American historiography is on the defensive and likely to stay there for a considerable time.

In the second half of the *Festschrift,* that devoted to political science, there is an article on American issues. Professor O. Flechtheim deals with American parties and their future in an essay which is always interesting and almost always accurate. Professor Conze's article on recent French studies in the sociology of parties and elections is another valuable contribution to the history of French parties. The essay on the "Theory of Party in the older German Liberalism" is somewhat of a counterpart to the other two essays, but more restricted in scope.

As may be gathered from the highly selective references above, the essays in this volume include articles of juristic, economic, and intellectual as well as political and historical character. It might have been better to restrict the contributions in number and topic. But if there is anything more difficult than writing a brief review of a *Festschrift,* it must be the job of editing it. Everybody wants to contribute something of his own choice and design; and, as with so many other birthday presents, there are those which one likes to get and those which one would like to see returned to the sender.

Rutgers University F. Gunther Eyck

Weinberg, Gerhard L., *Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954. Pp. 218.

The volume under review—the first in a new series of "Studies in East European History," edited by Professors Werner Phillipp and Peter Scheibert, in collaboration with Father Ammann, Dr. Fritz T. Epstein, and Professor Michael M. Karpovich—is a thorough-going documentary analysis of the era of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. To it, Dr. Gerhard L. Weinberg, of the University of Chicago, brings an excellent acquaintance with the problems and sources involved. The copious documentation (though excluding Russian-language sources) is obvious (and to any future student, exceedingly useful) evidence of the author's extensive labors, which were prompted in large measure by the appearance of valuable new materials in recent years, such as the British and Italian diplomatic documents, and the largely untapped evidence prepared for the Nuremberg Trials. Indeed, it is a testimony to the author's accomplishment that Volume VIII, series D, of the *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C., 1954), published since Dr. Weinberg's study went to press, scarcely alters any of the findings offered by him.

Intended primarily as a documentary study, the book indulges in comparatively little speculation. At the same time, it presents a consistent framework of generally sound interpretation of German and Soviet policies during the Pact period, which the author himself summarizes briefly as "two great powers plodding fitfully along the path of expediency; one motivated by vast schemes of conquest, the other by the hope of protecting what it has and adding what can safely be picked up." It is in the nature of the available sources and their angle of vision that the materials should lend themselves far more readily to an authoritative interpretation of German motives and objectives than to an analysis of the aims and purposes of

the Soviet leadership. The book's focus, as a result, is on the German rather than Soviet side.

The account of events leading up to the agreement of August 23, 1939 is entirely credible. While some doubt must remain over the precise time when the decision to conclude a pact was reached in Berlin and Moscow—the author suggests mid-July, while others have placed it a fortnight or so later—the evidence is convincing on the lateness of the decision in either capital. The author, after thoroughly discussing the treaties themselves, stresses the residue of friction and suspicion that remained in spite of the new alliance—a facet often overlooked yet quite apparent even during the Polish campaign. Very useful and rather novel are the details on Soviet-German economic cooperation, which were considerably more important than had previously been assumed. Dr. Weinberg further confirms the significance of German-Soviet naval collaboration. After a sound discussion of the Finnish problem, the author traces the fundamental change in German attitude in the wake of the French campaign and the impending duel with Britain in July 1940, a change evidenced not only in long-range military plans but (as the author well shows) in German relations with Finland and the Balkan states. While it fails to discuss (as it well might have) a similar shift in basic strategy on the part of the Soviet Union in July 1940, the volume presents provocative materials on the blind-alley into which Moscow had maneuvered itself by early 1941 and from which it was unable to escape—short of courting war with Germany or making tremendous concessions to the Reich.

Dr. Weinberg's view of Hitler's decision to attack the USSR, which he—in this reviewer's opinion, quite properly—dates as of late July 1940 (subject though it was to later confirmation or emendation) has been the subject of a recent debate in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich), in which the interpretation given in the present book clearly prevailed over its critics'. The immediate political motivation of the Reich is likewise well presented, though long-range consideration of German and Nazi *Drang nach Osten* are somewhat submerged in what is largely, and perhaps inevitably, a study in diplomatic relations. The number of slips and errors is trifling, and the completeness of research impressive.

War Documentation Project, ALEXANDER DALLIN
Columbia University

SHORTER NOTICES

PREIDEL, HELMUT, *Die vor-und frühgeschichtlichen Siedlungsräume in Böhmen und Mähren.* Südost-europäische Arbeiten 40. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1953. Pp. 192.

Preidel's work on the archeology of the Bohemian lands has always been careful and suggestive. The present work was begun in 1939, but destroyed during a bombing of Munich in 1943, and had to be rewritten *de novo* in the post-war period. It has thus benefitted from the copious Polish and Czech work published in the meantime. The author emphasizes the novelty of his approach, in that he starts from the standpoint of the social potential of an area, rather than from the individual persons and their survival. He makes an interesting case showing, with elaborate maps, how the archeological finds, from earliest times to the late Bronze era, i.e. over a period of 3000 years, are essentially from two or three areas regardless of what race or people were then dominant. He confirms this by reference to Czech dialectological studies. His basic position would appear to be that it is the resources and livability of an area, and not accidents of conquest or colonization, that determine the movement and performance of peoples.

S. H. THOMSON

CARSTEN, F. L., *The Origins of Prussia.* N. Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 312. 30s.

In the words of the preface, "this volume is not another history of Prussia, but its purpose is to describe the growth and decline of the classes and the institutions which formed the basis of the later Prussian state." It does not replace the well-known standard works on the origins and development of the lands that were united in the eighteenth century kingdom of Prussia, but assumes that the reader is acquainted with the traditional accounts and with the general European background, with "rulers and reigns, foreign and military events."

The sixteen chapters are divided into three groups. The first describes and analyzes the colonization and agrarian organization of Brandenburg, Pomerania, and Prussia. The second deals with the decline of the towns, the rise of the junkers, and the binding of the peasants to the estates. The third, much of which has appeared in the *English Historical Review* (April 1947, April 1950, April 1951) shows the foundation of the Hohenzollern "despotism," the conflicts of the Elector with the Estates of his realms, and the alliance of the ruler with the junkers who had come to dominate society and state in north-eastern Germany. There is an appendix on prices in Prussia between 1395 and 1461, and an outline map showing the location of the towns from the Old Mark by the Elbe to Memel beyond the Niemen.

The foundations for this book were laid by the generations of scholars, mostly German, whose source collections, articles, and books are listed in the selective bibliography and cited in the footnotes. The author has distilled the results of their work, supplemented it with his own study of unpublished records of the Estates of Prussia, now at Göttingen, and chosen with judicious independence between controversial interpretations. He has shown, to take a few examples, that the *Drang nach Osten* was not always conquest by iron and blood (p. 8ff.); that the herring did not desert the Baltic in the fifteenth century (p. 134); that "the evidence available from Prussia does not point to falling agrarian and rising industrial and import prices, which allegedly created such great economic difficul-

ties in the fifteenth century" (cf. pp. 133, 135). The Great Elector did not begin his reign with superhuman clarity of vision and sureness of tactics; he learned from experience, but even late in his reign there were frequent examples of indecisiveness. The Estates, Carsten feels, had a vitality and strength quite different from those of France. "The possibility of their transformation into a more modern representative assembly ceased to exist" as the consequence of policies and actions here described, but unlike most German historians, Carsten is not entirely convinced "that Brandenburg and Prussia would have gone the way of Poland if the Estates' power had not been broken and if their centrifugal tendencies had not been subordinated to a larger whole." (p. 274).

University of Minnesota LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

HUDAK, ADALBERT, *Die Kirche unserer Väter. Weg und Ende des deutschen Luthertums in der Slovakei.* Stuttgart: Hilfskommitee für Evangelisch-Lutheranische Slovakeideutschen, 1953. Pp. 92. DM 7.50.

In the Introduction to this sketch the leaders of the German Lutherans in exile express the hope that this book will not be forgotten by the refugees and their children. The second and third generations in a foreign country however, easily and sometimes eagerly, forget the family origins.

There was a place for such a book as this, and it might have been a valuable document. But the author should have realized that those who read the book may have access not only to his but to other sources which give a quite different picture from that which he paints.

It is hardly possible that everything in the Slovak Lutheran Church was as immaculate as he attempts to portray it. It is hardly credible, for example, that everything German Lutheran in Slovakia was good and all things stemming from Prague were evil, including the Hussite influence in Slovakia. How can a church historian reduce the Hussite movement to a mere "looting march." Hudak writes that the Hussites did not come to Slovakia to spread their views, but to loot. The autonomous state of Slovakia under the ledership of J. Tiso, who was a willing tool of Hitler, is very highly praised, but the author has no good words for the Masaryk Republic.

There are several well written passages about the persecution of the German Lutherans in Slovakia during the Counter-Reformation. Such passages are worthy to be offered as examples of what a deep-rooted faith can accomplish. It is to be regretted that the narrative elsewhere suffers from remarks which do not manifest an objective historical spirit. The bibliography is useful, if not exhaustive, and the book is enriched by photographs of Slovak Lutheran schools and churches.

New Hartford, Connecticut JOSEPH NOVOTNÝ

FISHER, HAROLD H., *The Communist Revolution: An Outline of Strategy and Tactics,* Hoover Institute Studies, Series A, General Studies No. 2: Stanford University Press, 1955. Pp. 89. $1.00.

The author would be the first to disclaim that there is anything "original" in this little book, but he can be rightfully proud of the way he has handled the complex subject matter. He has prepared a comprehensive outline into which he has poured a substantial amount of theory, historical reference, and detached analysis. Withal, this study is written in the calm, clear, and sometimes pithy style which characterizes all of the published works of Harold H. Fisher, chairman of the Hoover Institute.

Appropriately enough the book begins with the origins of "Communist" and "Communism," which is followed by a carefully structured outline of the basic Marxian concepts of class, surplus value, party, power, and revolution. The Marxist theory of history is carefully delineated from the Bolshevik theories of revolution and the Bolshevik exercise of power under Lenin and Stalin. It is, in short, something of a guide to those ideas and those practices which have made the Soviet Union what it is today, and which, moreover, have helped to create that cleavage between the Communist and non-Communist world which so fearfully plagues "men at the summit" in the mid-twentieth century.

Chapter XVI entitled "Questions and Speculations," should prove to be a useful guide to teachers—not excluding college professors—who are frequently at a loss to answer searching questions by their students. The questions with which Dr. Fisher deals are: "How to tell a Communist from a non-Communist" (in which the author warns against assuming guilt by the association of ideas); "What successes have the Communists had" (in Western Europe they are weaker than at the end of World War II, and, though they have gained major victories in China and Indo-China, they have lost ground elsewhere in Asia. In the United States their strength is fantastically inconsequential); "What causes the Communists to threaten the peace of the world?" (in which Fisher refers to the respective interpretations of Gorer, Berdiaev, Crankshaw, Toynbee, Kennan, Hugh Seton-Watson, and others); "Is war with the Communists inevitable?" (the author is not one who indulges in such simple clichés as, "The world can not remain half-slave and half-free"; "coexistence may not be comfortable, but it is possible"—and "preferable to total war"); "What is to be done?" (to which the author affirms his confidence that in the long run ahead, provided we keep our powder dry, our way of life will triumph because it represents, as Marx long ago acknowledged, "the explosive power of democratic ideas and the inborn urge of the human race in the direction of human freedom.")

The book contains a very useful bibliography, and a chronology of the Communist movement.

University of Nebraska ALBIN T. ANDERSON

RADSPIELER, TONY, *The Ethnic German Refugee in Austria: 1945 to 1954. Studies in Social Life II.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955. Pp. xvi, 198. 15 Guilders.

Dr. Radspieler, an American scholar who received his doctorate from the University of Zürich, gives us a meticulously thorough analysis of the problems created by the presence within Austria's borders of a large (it constitutes upward of 5% of the total population) ethnic German refugee group. It is difficult to generalize about these problems because of the extreme fragmentation of this group into sub-groups of diverse national origins: Danube Swabians, Sudeten Germans, Transylvanian Saxons, Carpathian Germans, Slovenian Germans and Bukovina Germans, to mention only the larger ones, and, while Dr. Radspieler sometimes goes astray by insisting on considering all the sub-groups in the same statistical light, it is to his merit that he does recognize that their problems must be studied individually. He asserts that the only long-run solution to the refugee problem is the eventual integration of all of the refugee groups into the Austrian state and economy. Few will quarrel with him here. He believes that the relative failure to achieve such an integration up to the present has been largely due to two factors: most of the refugees are farmers or agricultural laborers, of whom Austria already has a surplus; and the issue of naturalization, a necessary first step to inte-

gration, has become a political football, to be kicked about by the two major Austrian parties, the *Österreichische Volks Partei* and the *Sozialistische Partei Österreichs*. Both these factors have certainly been operative, but it should also be kept in mind that certain of the refugee groups, notably the Sudeten Germans, have not renounced their claims to the areas they formerly inhabited, and are, therefore, far from willing subjects for integration. It is regrettable that the otherwise excellent bibliography does not include one title in a Slavic language. Consultation of non-German sources might have prevented Dr. Radspieler from repeating, without comment or qualification (p. 20), the ludicrous German assertion that during the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia (1945-1946) this group suffered 450,000 to 600,000 "casualties." It also might have helped him to make clear (as his book in its present form does not) why the return of the refugees to their places of origin is entirely out of the question.

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